dissenting.
The majority erroneously holds that the evidence of uncharged crimes was fully admissible under State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143 (1991). It was not admissible under the aegis of any prior case precedent.
PART I.
The complaint filed by the prosecutor contained three counts. Counts I and II charged Tolman with violating I.C. § 18-1508 (lewd conduct with a minor or child under sixteen). Count I alleged Tolman committed fellatio with T.H., a twelve year old boy. Count II alleged the same type of act, but with D.P., a thirteen year old boy. Count III alleged Tolman violated I.C. § 18-1506 (sexual abuse of a child) when he licked the penis of J.H., a ten year old boy.
At trial, all three boys testified in support of those charges. That testimonial evidence, if believed by the jury, would sufficiently support a guilty verdict on all three criminal charges. T.H. and D.P. testified that they skipped school one day and went to Tolman’s house where he molested them. J.H. testified he was molested by Tolman in the bathroom at Tolman’s house.
Additionally, the boys were allowed to testify to other uncharged acts of sexual molestation. T.H. testified that Tolman molested him when they were camping and again when they were deer hunting. D.P. testified that Tolman molested him when they were elk hunting. J.H. testified that Tolman molested him two other times: once in an abandoned house and a second time while they were camping.7
Defense counsel vigorously objected to the introduction of this evidence, arguing that the evidence was inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b). The court overruled the objection holding that the evidence was admissible under that rule because it was evidence which tended to establish that Tolman’s activities relative to the youths was a common plan or scheme.
The court, to its credit, did give an oral instruction which attempted to limit the purpose for which the evidence could be considered:
Evidence may be offered for the purpose of showing that the defendant has engaged in prior similar conduct or activity other than that for which he is on trial. Such evidence, if believed, is not to be considered by you to prove that the Defendant is a person of bad character or that he has a disposition to commit crimes.
Such evidence may be received and may be considered by you only for the limited purpose of determining, if it tends to show, a characteristic method, plan, or scheme used in the commission of the offense alleged in this case.
For the limited purpose for which you may consider such evidence, you must weigh it in the same manner you do all other evidence in the case. You are not permitted to consider such evidence for any other purpose.
R., Yol. I, 95 (emphasis added).
PART II.
Tolman on appeal renews his argument that the evidence was inadmissible under I.R.E. 404(b). That rule provides that:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of the person in order to show he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other pur*908poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
(Emphasis added.)
As noted above, the district court admitted the evidence as proof of a common scheme or plan. The common scheme or plan exception as it applies to child sex abuse cases was discussed in State v. Moore, 120 Idaho 743, 819 P.2d 1143, a recent decision of this Court with which I disagreed, and continue to disagree as to sufficiency of any carefully thought out analysis. There, the defendant was charged with lewd conduct with a minor and sexual abuse of a child with his granddaughter during the period of time the child was six or seven years old. Moore sought to exclude evidence that he had allegedly engaged in similar misconduct with his daughter when she was between the ages of nine and thirteen. The district court denied Moore’s motion in limine, holding that the evidence showed a common scheme or plan.
The Court in a three-to-two opinion affirmed the district court’s ruling for two reasons: first, the majority affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the proposed testimony “demonstrate[d] a common criminal plan or scheme on Moore’s part which was probative of his motives or lustful disposition, and was indicative of the specific intent required for a conviction.” Moore, 120 Idaho at 745, 819 P.2d at 1145. In that respect, the instant case is similar to Moore in that the evidence here demonstrates Tolman’s general plan to molest young boys of the neighborhood when they chanced to come under his supervision. Second, according to Moore, a court must determine whether the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
PART III.
Tolman, however, further argues that even if the evidence shows the existence of a plan, it is still inadmissible because it is irrelevant. See I.R.E. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.”) The question of relevancy of a common scheme or plan was also addressed in Moore. Beginning at 120 Idaho at 745, 819 P.2d at 1145, the majority opinion is seen as waxing philosophical, having been led in that direction by a law review article by a student author which was written fifteen years ago:
With regard to relevancy, the proffered testimony is relevant to the issue of credibility and corroboration of the victim’s testimony. Although corroboration is no longer mandatorily required in all sex crime cases, corroborating evidence may still be relevant, particularly in sex crime cases involving minors, [citations omitted] Corroborative evidence in sex crime cases involving youthful victims is often times necessary to establishing the credibility of a young child. Too often the determination of the case rests strictly upon establishing that the victim’s testimony is more credible than that of the alleged perpetrator. As was discussed in a UCLA law review article:
[A]dmission of corroborative evidence serves the dual purpose of reducing the probability that the prosecution witness is lying, while at the same time increasing the probability that the defendant committed the crime.
Other Sex Offenses, 25 UCLA L.Rev. 261, 286 (1977).
In the instant case, the proposed testimony regarding acts of abuse previously inflicted by Moore upon other female children in the victim’s household corroborates her testimony. Evidence of all the incidents of abuse, taken together, may provide an evidentiary plan or pattern that tends to make the alleged incidents more plausible and probable.
Moore, 120 Idaho at 745-46, 819 P.2d at 1145-46.
Thus, to the extent that any child’s testimony corroborated the testimony of another child’s testimony concerning the charged sexual misconduct, it was relevant under Moore. However, that does not end the inquiry because Moore does not allow a witness to corroborate his own testimony *909by claiming more than one incident of abuse. In Moore, the proffered testimony corroborated the alleged victim’s testimony because it came from a third person who claimed to have been abused by the defendant under similar circumstances. The fact that another person experienced similar abuse could have the effect of making an alleged victim’s testimony more credible.
Here, unlike Moore, the court allowed the jury to consider the evidence of uncharged offenses as corroboration of the same child’s testimony about the charged offense. However, the fact that a witness testifies that a defendant committed several acts of wrongdoing does not make that witness’s testimony any more credible. The experiences of life instruct us that a person may be apt to tell several untruths as easily as he can tell one; repeated testimony does not make a mistake or untruth the more likely to be true. Thus, a more enlightened Court should this day rule that the trial court erred in allowing the various witnesses to self-corroborate their allegations. An appropriate enlightened decision is clearly required and would be consonant with Moore. In fact, the law review article utilized by the majority in Moore, had it only further perused the article, supports my conclusion:
The determination of admissibility hinges on the source of the corroborative evidence: The complaining witness is precluded from self-corroboration; but evidence of the defendant’s sexual misconduct, as attested by other victims, may properly corroborate the complaining witness’s testimony.
Comment, Other Sex Offenses, 25 UCLA L.Rev. 261, 285-86 (1977). The California Court of Appeals has stated the rule thusly:
[T]he rationale for admissibility of evidence of sexual misconduct with others, in cases where there is no issue as to identity, absence of accident, and so forth, is simply corroboration of the complaining witness. Where such corroboration comes from the mouth of another witness, we admit it. When it consists of nothing but the complaining witness corroborating himself, we reject it.
People v. Kazee, 47 Cal.App.3d 593, 596, 121 Cal.Rptr. 221, 223 (2nd Dist.1975). Or put another way, “the trier of fact is not aided by evidence of other offenses where that evidence is limited to the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution witness.” People v. Stanley, 67 Cal.2d. 812, 817, 63 Cal.Rptr. 825, 828, 433 P.2d 913, 916 (1967). See also State v. Simerly, 463 S.W.2d 846 (Mo.1971) (evidence of prior incestuous acts with sister of complaining witness admissible to corroborate witness’s testimony), People v. Covert, 249 Cal. App.2d 81, 57 Cal.Rptr. 220 (1967) (same as Simerly).
Because the trial court improperly allowed the other bad acts evidence to self-corroborate the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, we should reverse the conviction and remand for a new trial. Tolman’s defense was that the children were not telling the truth and the credibility of the complaining witnesses was the central issue in the case. As the determination of a witness’s credibility is best left to the trier of fact, I cannot conclude that the outcome would have been the same even if the children’s testimony had not been improperly self-corroborated.
PART IV.
Touching again on State v. Moore, having revisited it now some months later in regard to this Tolman prosecution, it should be said that in comparison, Moore was considerably the better-reasoned opinion. Today’s majority opinion goes far, far afield from which this Court had to say in Moore. For instance, Moore made it very clear that:
Generally, evidence of other criminal acts or offenses is inadmissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he committed the crime for which he is on trial. I.R.E. 404(b); State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 796 P.2d 1007 (1990); State v. Needs, 99 Idaho 883, 591 P.2d 130 (1979); State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 584 P.2d 1231 (1978). However, such acts may be ‘admissible for other *910purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.’ I.R.E. 404(b); see also State v. Paradis, 106 Idaho 117, 676 P.2d 31 (1984); State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho 506, 584 P.2d 1231 (1978); State v. Hatton, 95 Idaho 856, 522 P.2d 64 (1974); State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 486 P.2d 82 (1971); State v. Kombol, 81 Idaho 530, 347 P.2d 117 (1959).
Moore, 120 Idaho at 745, 819 P.2d at 1145. Mentioned earlier in the Moore opinion is the statement that:
The State sought to introduce evidence that Moore had allegedly engage in uncharged sexual misconduct with his stepdaughter during the period from 1977 to 1981, when she was between five and nine years of age. The State also proffered evidence that Moore had allegedly engage in similar misconduct with his daughter during the period from 1969 to 1973, when she was between the ages of nine and thirteen. The district court denied Moore’s motion in limine on the basis that the evidence showed a common scheme or plan, was probative of Moore’s motives or lustful disposition toward children, and was indicative of specific intent.
Moore, 120 Idaho at 744, 819 P.2d at 1144. The trial court denied Moore’s motion in limine aimed at precluding such testimony. This Court’s opinion then set out the two-tiered analysis which must be made, relevant to the crime charged, and the probative value weighed against the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.
At that point my interest in Moore was on the wane, simply because of an inability to understand from what logical source flows this authorization allowing the State to put into evidence conduct, assertedly bad, which had never brought the perpetrator to court to stand trial, yet allowing the jury to deduce therefrom that the defendant being then and there on trial was guilty on the charge that had been laid against him. A majority of this court, not including Justice Johnson or myself, went so far as to say in the Martin8 prosecution that the prior uncharged offenses which had occurred ten and twelve years earlier did not make evidence of prior wrongful conduct “unfairly prejudicial because of remoteness.” Topping that, the majority went on to bolster that pure ipse dixit by adding that during that ten or twelve year expanse of time, the defendant had been incarcerated nearly the entire period, intimating that had he not been locked up, his sex crime career would not have been interrupted.
The Hammock9 criminal prosecution, utilized by the majority in Moore, without question held as portrayed, but it does not necessarily follow that it applies here, although the majority would leave that impression. Beyond refute, the State did not in that case introduce any evidence of uncharged sexual conduct by Hammock. It had prepared no case against him based on such an hypothesis. The charge, plain and simple, was that the prosecutrix was under the age of consent, “[t]he fact that this girl, under the age of consent, had had intercourse with other men, or even if she had become a common prostitute, would constitute no defense for the defendant.” Hammock, 18 Idaho at 426, 110 P. at 169. Justice Ailshie wrote the opinion, Justice Sullivan concurred, and now, eighty-two years later, Justice Bistline voices his concurrence.
All of which brings me to wonder if our system of justice may be on the verge of crumbling because of such decisions as those mentioned, other than Hammock, if the Court persists in authorizing the prosecution and the district courts to find successful a state’s case against a defendant by the use (or overuse) of uncharged crimes, uncharged misconduct, common criminal plan or scheme, common criminal *911design, evidence of similar acts, or an evidentiary plan or pattern.
JOHNSON, J., concurs in PARTS I, II, and III.. The court later struck the testimony about the camping incident.
. State v. Martin, 118 Idaho 334, 796 P.2d 1007 (1990).
. State v. Hammock, 18 Idaho 424, 110 P. 169 (1910). The charge on which Hammock was prosecuted was statutory rape. The defense was shot down in its effort to obtain an answer from the prosecutrix as to whether she had ever had sex with anyone prior to submitting to the defendant.