While I concur in the majority’s affirmance of the findings of the Review Department of the State Bar Court, I respectfully dissent from the court’s imposition of a three-year actual suspension as the appropriate discipline. I believe disbarment is warranted.
I agree with the majority that the review department improperly relied upon standard 1.7(b) of the State Bar Rules of Procedure, division V, Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, for its recommendation that petitioner Natali be disbarred. However, I find disbarment to be independently warranted in light of the serious and persistent nature of Natali’s misconduct.
Over a period starting in 1975 and extending more than 10 years, Natali has demonstrated a chronic incapacity to represent his clients’ interests properly. He has neglected cases which cried out for attention. He has failed to appear on critical hearing dates. He has failed to take reasonable steps to protect his clients from the deleterious results of his inaction. Instead of formally withdrawing and seeking to provide for a substitution of attorneys, *470Natali simply has permitted one client to suffer a default judgment and another to have her case dismissed.
Even more disturbing perhaps is Natali’s dishonesty in dealings with the courts and his dishonest attempt to mislead the court in connection with one of these incidents. He falsified the date on an at-issue memorandum and on the attached cover letter. In addition he blatantly violated a court order by demanding fees from his client to pay sanctions levied against him alone. Finally, Natali has shown no sign of remorse, has accepted no responsibility for his misconduct and has presented no substantial evidence in mitigation.
Under the circumstances I believe a suspension is insufficient to protect the public and the legal profession. (Arden v. State Bar (1987) 43 Cal.3d 713, 728 [239 Cal.Rptr. 68, 739 P.2d 1236] and cases there cited.) I would disbar petitioner Natali as recommended by the review department.
Lucas, C. J., concurred.
Petitioner’s application for a reharing was denied June 30, 1988. Mosk, J., did not participate therein.