dissenting.
I dissent. In my opinion plaintiff Bank not only pleaded but proved a tort claim against Hufford. While it is true Bank’s petition could have pleaded additional facts making it clearer, the petition does allege facts putting Hufford on notice of a tort claim. Lowe v. Francis Construction Co., 373 P.2d 51, 54 (Okla.1962). Bank’s proof then clearly supports the allegations in its petition. Moseley v. Boyd, 167 Okl. 485, 486, 30 P.2d 897, 899 (1934).
The proof shows the following. On February 11, 1982, defendant Hufford, using another’s name, bought a burned-out 1979 Ford F-100 pickup truck in Houston, Texas. Less than two weeks later on February 23, 1983, a 1979 Ford F-100 pickup truck was stolen in Tulsa, Oklahoma. On February 25, 1983, Hufford, still using another’s name, applied for a title in Oklahoma for the bumed-out Texas truck. Less than a week later, Hufford filed for a second title transferring the title from the borrowed name to Hufford. Hufford then placed the title to the burned-out Texas truck on the stolen Tulsa truck and sold it to Kelley’s Auto Sales on March 5.
On April 12, 1983, Kelley’s Auto Sales then sold the “Tulsa truck” to defendant Story. Story then mortgaged it to Bank. Bank later had to repossess the truck from Story, but lost the truck to the original owner from whom it had been stolen. Huf-ford entered a nolo contendere plea to receiving stolen property on another stolen *568vehicle. Bank sued Story and Hufford for actual and punitive damages.
The jury found in favor of Bank against Hufford and Story. Story paid the judgment obtained by the Bank against him. Hufford appeals the judgment obtained gainst him by the Bank. Story’s payment to Bank for the actual damages would not void Bank’s judgment already obtained against Hufford.
Based on the foregoing, I would affirm the trial court.