Baker v. Morris

Stafford, J.

(dissenting) — The majority opinion has recited the necessary facts correctly. Nothing will be gained by repeating them. I disagree, however, with the conclusion that the Board acted beyond its authority in adopting rule 7.040 which requires at least six board members to waive an inmate’s mandatory minimum term.2

The statute giving rise to the disagreement is RCW 9.95.040, which provides in part:

Except when an inmate of the reformatory, penitentiary or such other penal institution . . . has been convicted of murder in the first or second degree, the board may parole an inmate prior to the expiration of a mandatory minimum term, provided such inmate has demonstrated a meritorious effort in rehabilitation and at least four board members concur in such action . . .

(Italics mine.)

*812The majority is correct in saying RCW 9.95.040 was enacted at a time when the Board consisted of five members and that subsequently the legislature increased the Board’s membership to seven without changing RCW 9.95.040. I also agree that, in response to the legislatively increased membership, the Board adopted rule 7.040 increasing the number of votes required to waive an inmate’s mandatory minimum term pursuant to RCW 9.95.040. I do not agree, however,' that the rule which now requires a concurrence of six members (rather than four) to waive an inmate’s mandatory minimum term, exceeds the Board’s rulemaking authority.

The majority’s view stems primarily from RCW 9.95.150 which provides in part:

The board of prison terms and paroles shall make all necessary rules and regulations to carry out the provisions of this chapter not inconsistent therewith . . .

(Italics mine.) The majority hold that the increase in required membership concurrence from four to six, for waiver of a mandatory minimum, is clearly inconsistent with RCW 9.95.040 and thus invalid under RCW 9.95.150.

Such holding ignores the plain language of RCW 9.95.040 and substitutes language that is not there. RCW 9.95.040 does not provide that a waiver must be granted if four board members vote favorably thereon; that there must be a four-fifths majority to waive a mandatory minimum; or, that the required number voting favorably upon a waiver of a mandatory minimum cannot be increased. RCW 9.95.040 provides merely that the Board “may parole an inmate prior to the expiration of a mandatory minimum term, provided ... at least four board members concur in such action” (Italics mine.). Unfortunately the majority has ignored the phrase “at least.”

“At least” is not a restrictive phrase of maximum requirement, as the majority appear to assume. Rather, it has regularly been held to be expressive of a minimum, to be *813equated with “no less than” or “the smallest number.” “At least” implies that while the number shall not be less than that specified, it may be more.3 That being the case, RCW 9.95.040 neither mandates the waiver of a mandatory minimum term upon the concurrence of four board members nor does it prevent the Board, after an increase in membership, from requiring a favorable vote of a larger number of board members. The provision for “at least four board members” provides a minimum below which the board shall not go. However, the maximum is not so restricted. Clearly the Board acted within its statutory authority. Its rule is not inconsistent with RCW 9.95.040.

The petition for habeas corpus should be denied.

Hale, C.J., Hamilton, J., and Cole, J. Pro Tern., concur with Stafford, J.

Rule 7.040 states as follows:

“Except when a resident of an adult correctional institution has been convicted of Murder in the First Degree or Murder in the Second Degree, the Board may parole a resident prior to the expiration of a mandatory minimum term, provided, such resident has demonstrated a meritorious effort in rehabilitation and at least six members concur in such action . . .” (Italics mine.)

See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 442 S.W.2d 413, 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969); Schmeckpeper v. Panhandle Co-op. Ass’n, 180 Neb. 352, 357, 143 N.W.2d 113, 117 (1966); Santow v. Ullman, 39 Del. Ch. 427, 433, 166 A.2d 135, 139 (1960); Miller v. State, 130 Miss. 564, 583, 94 So. 706, 709 (1923).