I dissent. This case concerns the important question whether municipal zoning ordinances and other measures substantially affecting or restricting land use properly may be enacted through the initiative process, without providing affected property owners with the traditional due process safeguards of notice and hearing. I would hold that the initiative process as presently designed affords constitutionally inadequate protection to property owners, and that the essential demands of due process of law under the state and federal Constitutions may be satisfied only by a zoning procedure which incorporates some provision for notice and hearing in addition to the minimum opportunities available under the initiative election process itself.
It has long been the rule in this state that, as to general law cities or counties, the initiative process does not provide an adequate substitute for compliance with the state zoning law (Gov. Code, § 65800 et seq.), and particularly those provisions prescribing the requisite notice and hearing to be afforded to affected property owners. (Hurst v. City of Burlingame, 207 Cal. 134 [277 P. 308]; Johnston v. City of Claremont, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837 [323 P.2d 71]; Laguna Beach Taxpayers’ Assn. v. City Council, 187 Cal.App.2d 412, 415 [9 Cal.Rptr. 775]; People’s Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal.App.3d 869, 872-873 [106 Cal.Rptr. 666]; Taschner v. City Council, 31 Cal.App.3d 48, 61-64 [107 Cal.Rptr. 214].)
The preceding cases are based in part on the premise that general law cities and counties are governed by the provisions of the state zoning laws, which laws take precedence over the more general scope of *219initiative legislation. As stated in Hurst v. City of Burlingame, supra, 207 Cal. 134, 141, “The initiative law and the zoning law are hopelessly inconsistent and in conflict as to the manner of the preparation and adoption of a zoning ordinance. The Zoning Act is a special statute dealing with a particular subject and must be deemed to be controlling over the initiative, which is general in its scope.”
The majority herein take the position that the rule of the foregoing cases does not apply to charter cities or counties which are not bound by the provisions of the state zoning laws.1 Indeed, this position finds some support in the cases. (See Fletcher v. Porter, 203 Cal.App.2d 313, 320-323 [21 Cal.Rptr. 452]; Bayless v. Limber, 26 Cal.App.3d 463, 469 [102 Cal.Rptr. 647]; Duran v. Cassidy, 28 Cal.App.3d 574, 583-585 [102 Cal.Rptr. 647].) As stated in Bayless (p. 469), distinguishing Hurst v. City of Burlingame, supra, 207 Cal. 134, and Laguna Beach Taxpayers’ Assn. v. City Council, supra, 187 Cal.App.2d 412, “. . . respondents overlook the decisive fact that these cases involved general law cities while this case is concerned with a chartered city. In those cases it was held that zoning may not be done by initiative because the procedure leading to the enactment of an initiative ordinance is incompatible with that prescribed by statute for the enactment of zoning ordinances by a city council. . . . But the manner of enacting municipal ordinances is a municipal affair and, as previously indicated, the charter of a chartered city, rather than state statutes, govern municipal affairs within such a city. [Citation.] Moreover, ordinarily, there can be no implied limitations upon chartered powers concerning municipal affairs. [Citation.]”
In my view, the Bayless decision, supra, was premised upon the incorrect assumption that statutory provision for notice and hearing in zoning matters is a matter of legislative policy, rather than constitutional mandate. The majority seem to concede that if notice and hearing are essential elements of due process of law, even charter cities are powerless to ignore them. I turn then to an analysis of the question whether constitutional principles require some provision for notice and hearing before zoning measures may be adopted. Subsequently, I discuss whether the initiative process itself furnishes sufficient protection to *220affected property owners so that applicable constitutional principles are satisfied.
1. Due Process and the Zoning Laws
This court has frequently recognized that “the most fundamental ingredient of the ‘due process’ guaranteed by our state Constitution is ‘a meaningful opportunity to be heard.’ ” (Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal.3d 536, 550 [96 Cal.Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13], and cases cited.) On the other hand, we have acknowledged that “ ‘Due process’ is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable, and its content varies according to specific factual contexts.... Whether the Constitution requires that a particular right obtain in a specific proceeding depends upon a complexity of factors. The nature of the alleged right involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding, are all considerations which must be taken into account.” (In re Tucker, 5 Cal.3d 171, 179 [95 Cal.Rptr. 761, 486 P.2d 657], quoting from Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 [4 L.Ed.2d 1307, 1321, 80 S.Ct. 1502]; see Sokol v. Public Utilities Commission, 65 Cal.2d 247, 254 [53 Cal.Rptr. 673, 418 P.2d 265].)
Ordinarily, as the majority explain, if a proceeding is “legislative” rather than “adjudicative” in character, a hearing of a judicial type is not required by the Constitution. (Franchise Tax Board v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.2d 538, 549 [225 P.2d 905]; see United States v. Florida East Coast R Co., 410 U.S. 224, 244-246 [35 L.Ed.2d 223, 238-240, 93 S.Ct. 810]; Bi-Metallic Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441, 445 [60 L.Ed. 372, 375, 36 S.Ct. 141].) Although enactment of a zoning ordinance, contrasted with a grant of an easement or variance, may be characterized as a “legislative” act, nevertheless “A zoning ordinance can and does have a more direct and lasting effect upon property values and property owners within a city than almost any other type of ordinance. What is done with respect to one piece of property of necessity has an effect, good or bad, upon adjacent or nearby property.” (Johnston v. City of Claremont, supra, 49 Cal.2d 826, 837.)
Accordingly, our cases have long recognized the constitutional right of affected property owners to notice and hearing before a municipality may enact zoning ordinances which substantially restrict the use or otherwise substantially impair the value, of their property. (City of Escondido v. Desert Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 8 Cal.3d 785, 790 [106 Cal.Rptr. 172, 505 P.2d 1012]; Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal.3d 541, 549 [99 Cal.Rptr. 745, 492 P.2d 1137]; Gilgert v. Stockton Port District, 7 *221Cal.2d 384, 391 [60 P.2d 847]; Berrata v. Sales, 82 Cal.App. 324, 327 [255 P. 538]; see Anderson, American Law of Zoning, § 4.03, p. 159, § 4.11, pp. 168-169; McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, § 25.261, pp. 212-213; Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 449, 453, fn. 5.)2
For example, we have recently stated that “Zoning does not deprive an adjacent landowner of his property, but it is clear that the individual’s interest in his property is often affected by local land use controls, and the ‘root requirement’ of the due process clause is ‘that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest, except for extraordinary situations where some valid government interest. . . justifies postponing the hearing until after the event. . . .’ [Citations.]” (Scott v. City of Indian Wells, supra, 6 Cal.3d 541, 549.) We held in Scott that principles of due process of law required a city to provide notice and a hearing to nonresident adjacent landowners whose property would be affected by municipal zoning measures.3 Thus, it would appear firmly established in our jurisprudence that the adoption of zoning measures which involve substantial deprivations of property may not take place in the absence of constitutionally adequate provision for prior notice and hearing. I consider, then, the question whether the initiative process affords adequate due process safeguards.
2. Due Process and Zoning by Initiative
Contrary to the majority’s position herein, a number of cases have suggested that since the initiative process fails to afford adequate notice and hearing for affected property owners, it may not be constitutionally employed to adopt zoning measures which substantially affect the use of their land. (People’s Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d 869, 873-874; Taschner v. City Council, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d 48, 65-69; see Hurst v. City of Burlingame, supra, 207 Cal. 134, 141; Johnston v. City of Claremont, supra, 49 Cal.2d 826, 836-837; Chase v. Kalber, 28 Cal.App. 561, 573-574 [153 P. 397]; McQuillin, supra, § 25.246, p. 168; City of Scottsdale v. Superior Court, 103 Ariz. 204 [439 P.2d 290, 293-294]; Elliott v. City of Clawson, 21 Mich.App. 363 [175 N.W.2d 821, *222828]; Smith v. Township of Livingston, 106 N.J. Super. 444 [256 A.2d 85], affd. 54 N.J. 525 [257 A.2d 698]; but see Bayless v. Limber, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d 463, 469-470; Duran v. Cassidy, supra, 28 Cal.App.3d 574, 585-586.)
As indicated above, the Court of Appeal in Bay less v. Limber, supra, 26 Cal.App.3d 463, 469-470, concluded that no denial of constitutional due process occurs when a charter city enacts a zoning ordinance by the initiative process. The court reasoned that “Due process in law-making is not the same as due process in the adjudication of controversies. [Citations.] Generally speaking, a hearing on a legislative matter is held for the purpose of informing the law makers regarding relevant facts and policy considerations; it is not held for the protection of individual rights, property or otherwise. [Citation.] . . . The electoral process itself normally provides both notice and an opportunity to be heard to all electors, by written arguments (see Elec. Code, § 4017) and otherwise. In our view neither the United States Constitution nor the California Constitution requires more. [Citations.]” The Duran case adopted Bayless’ reasoning in this regard.
Yet as we have seen, prior cases of this court and the Courts of Appeal have established beyond reasonable dispute that the area of zoning is in a class by itself and presents real and tangible risks of deprivation of private property far beyond those involved in ordinaiy “legislative” measures. To protect the constitutional rights of the property owner the courts heretofore have insisted upon traditional due process safeguards of notice and hearing, safeguards which perform a function far beyond the simple one of “informing the lawmakers regarding relevant facts.”4 Thus, we necessarily must reach the ultimate question whether in fact the initiative process does provide constitutionally adequate notice and hearing, as was assumed in Bayless and Duran.
In my view the Court of Appeal in Taschner v. City Council, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d 48, correctly set forth the flaws in the Bayless/Duran analysis. In Taschner, the court explained at length the deficiencies of the initiative process when compared with the procedural safeguards specified in the state zoning laws (Gov. Code, § 65800 et seq.). As stated in Taschner (p. 64), “It is urged that interested persons can suffer no substantial injury because the election process itself provides the *223equivalent safeguards afforded by state zoning law procedures. We are unpersuaded. The kind of public debate on the merits of a proposed zoning measure afforded by the election process, including the limited opportunity for the submission of written arguments to the voters, cannot be equated with a dispassionate study, evaluation and report upon the proposal by a staff of planning experts (§ 65804), notice and hearing before the planning commission (§ 65854), written recommendation by the planning commission with reasons for its recommendation (§ 65855), and notice and hearing before the legislative body (§ 65856). Furthermore, it is common knowledge that election campaigns cost money and that the extent to which one may be heard in an election too often depends on the size of one’s pocketbook whereas planning commissions and legislative bodies are required by law to afford all interested persons a full and fair hearing on the merits of their respective claims. Moreover, the election offers the voters but a single choice, to accept or reject the proposal in its entirety. The legislative body, however, is empowered to modify (as well as approve or reject) a recommendation of the planning commission thereby enabling it to consider and take into account in its actions the legitimate claims and suggestions of those who would be affected by the proposal even though they may represent but a small segment of the electorate.”
The court concluded, consistent with the views I have expressed above, that some provision for notice and hearing comparable with the provisions of the state zoning laws is required as a matter of constitutional due process, at least whenever the zoning measure substantially affects land use.5
Thus, contrary to the statement in Bayless that the initiative election process affords adequate opportunity for notice and hearing, it is evident that in its present operation the initiative process fails to afford that degree of protection necessary to satisfy due process requirements under the state and federal Constitutions.6 I do not, of course, suggest that it *224would be impossible to modify the initiative process in such a manner as to provide adequate due process safeguards. The Legislature or the governing boards of local public entities might well develop an approach which strikes a proper balance between the rights of the affected property owners and the interests of the public in reserving the power to initiate legislation.7
In the instant case, however, it is apparent that the coastal zone initiative was adopted without providing plaintiffs and others similarly affected an adequate opportunity to be heard. San Diego’s new building height restriction is undoubtedly a zoning measure8 which could substantially affect plaintiffs’ use of their land, and substantially decrease its value. (See Taschner v. City Council, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d 48, 60, involving a similar building height restriction.)
I would affirm the judgment.
McComb, J., and Clark, J., concurred.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied February 19, 1975. Files, J.,* sat in place of Mosk, J., who deemed himself disqualified. McComb, J., and Clark, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sitting under assignment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
Government Code section 65803 provides that the provisions of the zoning laws shall not apply to a charter city except to the extent those laws may be adopted by charter or ordinance. Note, however, section 65804 (as amended in 1971), which specifies that even as to charter cities zoning agencies must develop rules of procedure for conducting public hearings “so that all interested parties shall have advance knowledge of procedures to be followed.” The section also provides that a record of the hearing must be made, if requested. The section thus assumes, but does not expressly require, that charter cities will hold hearings on zoning measures.
For cases from other states setting forth this principle, see Bell v. Studdard, 220 Ga. 756 [141 S.E.2d 536, 539]; Cugini v. Chiaradio, 96 R.I. 120 [189 A.2d 798]; Hart v. Bayless Investment & Trading Co., 86 Ariz. 379, [346 P.2d 1101]; Vandervort v. Sisters of Mercy of Cincinnati, 197 Ohio App. 153 [117 N.E.2d 51],
To the same effect is Gilgert v. Stockton Port District, supra, 1 Cal.2d 384, 391, wherein we stated that “Zoning is the deprivation, for the public good, of certain uses by owners of property to which their property might otherwise be put, but before the owner may then be deprived of his property and the enjoyment thereof he is entitled to adequate notice and a hearing thereon.”
Contrary to Bayless’ assumption that zoning hearings are held to inform the lawmakers, it is widely acknowledged that such hearings serve the independent purpose of affording property owners an opportunity to be heard. (Anderson, supra, § 4.11, p. 168.)
See also People’s Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 30 Cal.App.3d 869, 873, pointing out that, as a practical matter, “Zoning proposals should have the benefit of public hearings and professional study by the local government’s planning staff so as to integrate the proposal with the other zoning ordinances and particularly the city or county land use master plan. Overall planning would be seriously crippled if the initiative process could be used in this field.” See generally, Comment, 10 Cal.Western L. Rev. 105, discussing the legal and practical problems in zoning by initiative.
By comparison, it has been held that the referendum process passes constitutional muster in this regard since the referendum election occurs after the adoption of the ordinance to be voted upon, and after the property owner has had his notice and hearing. (See Johnston v. City of Claremont, supra, 49 Cal.2d 826, 836-837; Hurst v. City of Burlingame, supra, 207 Cal. 134, 140; Dwyer v. City Council, 200 Cal. 505, 516 [253 P. 247]; Taschner v. City Council, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d 48, 62, fn. 10.)
See Comment, supra, 10 Cal.Western L.Rev. at pages 128-130, setting forth the author’s recommended amendment to the state zoning law to permit zoning by initiative with provision for a modification hearing by the governing body after the initiative measure is adopted. See also Hurst v. City of Burlingame, supra, 207 Cal. 134, 141.
I would leave open for further case development the precise definition of “zoning” under the rule I propose herein. For cases discussing the question whether a particular measure is a zoning measure requiring notice and hearing, see Taschner v. City Council, supra, 31 Cal.App.3d 48, 68-69; Fletcher v. Porter, supra, 203 Cal.App.2d 313, 324-325; Laguna Beach Taxpayers’ Assn, v. City Council, supra, 187 Cal.App.2d 412. See also South Gwinnett Venture v. Pruitt (5th Cir.) 482 F.2d 389, distinguishing between a general zoning measure affecting the entire community and a more specific measure affecting a particular tract of land or disposing of a single petition for relief.
Assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.