dissenting:
The majority determines that the definition of “pedestrian,” as found in the no-fault portion of the insurance policies issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance *391Company (State Farm) and in section 10-4-703(9), 4A C.R.S. (1994), of the No Fault Act, does not apply to the uninsured motorist (UM) coverage portion of the insurance policies at issue. The majority thus holds that “a bicyclist is not a ‘pedestrian’ within the meaning of the [UM] coverage portion of the automobile insurance policies” in this case. Maj. op. at 385. As such, the majority concludes that the anti-stacking provision in each State Farm insurance policy issued to Renee Stein (Stein) and her family does not apply to her claim for UM benefits. I disagree. I believe that the definition of “pedestrian” as found in the no-fault portion of the State Farm policies and in section 10-4-703(9) of the No Fault Act should apply to Stein’s claim for UM benefits in this case. Therefore, I believe that a bicyclist is a “pedestrian” and that the anti-stacking provision contained in each of the insurance policies applies to Stein’s claim for UM benefits. Accordingly, I dissent.
I.
Insurance contract terms are to be construed as they would be understood by a person of ordinary intelligence. See Simon v. Shelter Gen. Ins. Co., 842 P.2d 236, 240 (Colo.1992). When construing the language of an insurance contract, one should not read its provisions in isolation, but must consider them as a whole. See id. at 239. An integrated contract is to be interpreted in its entirety so as to harmonize and give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless. See Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310,1313 (Colo.1984). When the parties give contractual terms specific meanings, those provisions should control. See Thomas v. Great Western Sugar Co., 773 P.2d 582, 583-84 (Colo.App.1988).
In the current ease, the State Farm insurance policies at issue contain “anti-stacking” clauses as follows:
If there is other coverage:
1. If the insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrian and other uninsured motor vehicle coverage applies:
a. the total limits of liability under all such coverage shall not exceed that of the coverage with the highest limit of liability; and
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is that percent of the damages that the limit of liability of this coverage bears to the total of all uninsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to the accident.
According to the “anti-stacking” clauses, an insured is precluded from stacking UM benefits if the insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrian. However, a definition for the word “pedestrian” is absent from the UM provisions and the general definitions of the State Farm policies. Nevertheless, the no-fault portion of the policies defines a “pedestrian” as “a person not occupying a motor vehicle or machine operated by a motor or engine.” According to this definition, a bicyclist would be considered a “pedestrian.”
The majority holds that because no definition for the word “pedestrian” exists in the UM portion of the insurance policies, the definition of that word in the no-fault portion of the policies should not apply in this case. Thus, the majority concludes that, according to the common meaning of the word, a “pedestrian” does not include a bicyclist.1
I disagree with the majority’s holding because its construction of the insurance policies in this case fails to interpret the policies in their entirety. Construing the policies in their entirety, a person of ordinary intelligence would understand that the word “pedestrian” is assigned the same meaning in each instance in which it appears in the policies. This is particularly true because, unlike the word “insured,” which is explicitly designated with four different definitions in the State Farm policies, the word “pedestrian” is not explicitly designated with different meanings in the. two places in which it appears. Assigning two different definitions to the same word in the same policies serves only to confuse rather than clarify the provisions of the policies. By discounting the *392definition of the word “pedestrian” found in the no-fault portion of the policies when determining the meaning of the word in the UM portion, the majority reads the insurance policies’ provisions in isolation rather than considering them as a whole. The majority thus fails to harmonize and give effect to all of the policies’ provisions so that none will be rendered meaningless.
Moreover, this court has held that the same phrase contained in different portions of an insurance policy should be interpreted to have the same meaning. Specifically, in Cung La v. State Farm Automobile Insurance Co., 830 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Colo.1992), this court held that the phrase “arise out of’ contained in the liability portion of an automobile insurance policy had the same meaning when applied to the UM provisions of that policy. In the current case, the parties gave the word “pedestrian” a specific meaning within the no-fault portion of the insurance policies. The fact that the word “pedestrian” wás not redefined in the UM portion of the insurance policies does not preclude application of that word’s definition as found in the no-fault portion of the policies. Consequently, the meaning of “pedestrian” found in the no-fault portion of the policies should control and it is unnecessary to look to the word’s common meaning as the majority does.
II.
Additionally, I believe that the definition of “pedestrian” found in the No Fault Act should apply to the UM coverage portion of the State Farm policies in this case. Provisions of the No Fault Act have been applied to UM coverage. For example, in Lopez v. Dairyland Insurance Co., 890 P.2d 192, 194-95 (Colo.App.1994), a panel of the court of appeals applied section 10-4-721, 4A C.R.S. (1987), of the No Fault Act to a claim involving UM coverage. In Lopez, the court of appeals held that section 10-4-721, which allows insurers to exclude certain named drivers from insurance coverage, precluded UM coverage for a passenger injured while riding in the described vehicle because the policy specifically excluded the named driver involved. Lopez, 890 P.2d at 194.
In the current ease, section 10-4-703 of the No Fault Act provides a definition for the word “pedestrian” as follows:
As used in this part 7, unless the context otherwise requires:
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(9) “Pedestrian” means any person not occupying or riding in or upon a motor vehicle or machine operated by a motor or engine.
§ 10-4-703, 4A C.R.S. (1994). While section 10-4-703(9) provides a specific definition for the word “pedestrian” as it is used in the No Fault Act, the language of this section does not limit the definition of “pedestrian” to the No Fault Act. Moreover, section 10-4-703(9) provides the only definition for the word “pedestrian” in Colorado’s statutory provisions for automobile insurance. As such, I believe that it is appropriate to utilize the No Fault Act’s definition of “pedestrian” in evaluating the current claim for UM benefits. Consequently, I disagree with the majority’s holding that the No Fault Act’s definition of the word “pedestrian” is inapplicable to the UM coverage portion of the insurance policies at issue.2
III.
I disagree with the majority’s refusal to apply the definition of the word “pedestrian,” as found in the no-fault portion of the insurance policies and in section 10-4-703(9) of the No Fault Act, to the UM coverage portion of the insurance policies in this case. In my view, the definition of “pedestrian” contained in these contractual and statutory provisions should apply to Stein’s claim for UM benefits. As such, I believe that a bicyclist is a “pedestrian” and that the anti-stacking provision of the insurance policies applies to *393Stein’s claim for UM benefits. Accordingly, I dissent.
. As the majority notes, the common meaning of the word "pedestrian” is " 'a person going on foot.’ ” Maj. op. at 388 n. 5.
. Defining the term "pedestrian" in accordance with the No Fault Act and as stated in the insurance policies at issue is in harmony with the recognition that persons involved in automobile accidents will generally fall into two simple categories: those who are occupying a vehicle and those who are not occupying a vehicle, the latter being classified as "pedestrians.” See Rose v. Allstate Ins. Co., 782 P.2d 19 (Colo.1989).