dissenting.
I.
Not only do I disagree with the majority, but its decision may very well run afoul of constitutional law. By refusing to hold that a cause of action accrues under I.C. § 5-219(4) only after the injured party discovers (or reasonably should have discovered) the facts giving rise to his or her cause of action, the majority is seemingly oblivious to art. 1, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution, wherein it mandates that: “Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.” (Emphasis added.)
In declining to properly determine when a cause of action accrues under I.C. § 5-219(4), the majority reaches the anomalous result that in some instances a plaintiff will find himself barred from the courts even before discovering, or having had a reasonable opportunity to discover, the harm inflicted upon him or her by a negligent party. It is difficult to fathom a more grossly unjust result. This Court’s acquiescence in the legislature’s amending of I.C. § 5-219(4), so as to only alíow application of the discovery rule in cases involving foreign objects or fraudulent concealment, is a judicial abrogation of this Court’s duty to uphold and protect the constitutional rights of the citizens of this state.
It is conceded that the legislature can legislate, but in so doing, it cannot contravene the Constitution. This Court should not be party to the closing of the courtroom door before a plaintiff has learned that he has good cause for judicial redress. As the United States Supreme Court long ago declared:
It may be properly conceded that all statutes of limitation must proceed on the idea that the party has full opportunity afforded him to try his right in the courts. A statute could not bar the existing rights of claimants without affording this opportunity; if it should do so, it would not be a statute of limitations, but an unlawful attempt to extinguish rights arbitrarily, whatever might be the purport of its provisions. Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62, 22 S.Ct. 573, 575, 46 L.Ed. 804 (1902) (emphasis added).
In simple direct language the Idaho Constitution directs that the courts of this state be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury suffered. This Court should be the first to heed this mandate. Nothing justifies ignoring it.
This is not to say that art I, § 18 invalidates statutes of limitations per se. Clearly, such is not the intent of § 18. What this section does provide, however, is that all people have a reasonable opportunity to seek redress through this state’s court system. Fundamental fairness requires no less.
II.
In Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836, 475 P.2d 530 (1970), this Court expanded the discovery rule so as to include not only cases involving foreign objects or fraudulent concealment, but misdiagnosis cases, too. The result in Renner to my mind harmonized the application of this state’s statute of limitations with art. I, § 18. The reasoning of Justice Shepard for requiring the discovery rule in all cases is persuasive:
It would, in our opinion, be manifestly unjust to bar the enforcement of injury claims brought by a plaintiff who was not, nor could not have known that he was, the victim of tortious conduct because the consequent harm was unknowable within two years of the negli*310gent act. In this age of enlightened medicine and highly sophisticated curative treatment it is very likely that the maturation of injury resulting from negligent treatment would not evidence itself for well after the two years provided for in the statute of limitations____ This thought becomes particularly disturbing when one realizes that the latent injuries arising from medical malpractice would very likely go undetected by the victim, as only trained and- skillful practitioners of medicine could ascertain whether a patient has been mistreated. Even the physical symptoms which might herald future inquiry may well be beyond the comprehension or perception of the average layman.
...To construe the statute narrowly so as to preclude a person from obtaining a remedy simply because the wrong of which he was a victim did not manifest itself for at least two years from the time of the negligent conduct, is clearly inconsistent with the concept of fundamental justice. To require a man to seek a remedy before he knows of his rights, is palpably unjust. Under such circumstances in order for a patient to secure and protect his legal rights against doctors for malpractice, the patient would be required to submit himself . to complete examinations by a series of independent physicians after every operation or treatment he received from the physician of his first choice. The unreasonableness of such a result is- self-evident. No statute should be construed to bring about a patently inane result; moreover, we have often said the legislature could never be presumed to have intended to enact laws which are absurd, unjust or unreasonable. Id. at 839, 475 P.2d at 533 (emphasis added).
On rehearing in Renner, Justice Donaldson also argued persuasively for application of the discovery rule to the forerunner of today’s I.C. § 5-219(4):
I concur with the majority’s opinion that in cases of negligent misdiagnosis the Statute of Limitations begins to run from the time the wrongful act was discovered or the date that the plaintiff, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered it. The Court has previously adopted this rule as to foreign objects left within the body in Billings v. Sisters of Mercy of Idaho, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964) and I can see no rational basis for a distinction between one kind of malpractice and the other. It is manifestly inconsistent and unfair to bar a negligently injured party’s cause of action before he even had an opportunity to discover that it existed. This is as true where it consists of negligent misdiagnosis or treatment as when a foreign object is left within the body. The application of the “discovery rule” to all medical malpractice cases seems to be the modern trend. Renner, supra, at 842-43, 475 P.2d at 536-37 (emphasis added).
If refusal to recognize a general discovery rule is, as Justice Shepard puts it, “palpably unjust” and “inconsistent with the concept of fundamental justice,” or as Justice Donaldson puts it, “manifestly unfair,” then under what rationale can the legislature’s attempted repeal of Renner be viewed as permissible? Constitutionally, there is no rationale; this is exactly what art. I, § 18 was meant to prevent— the “unjust” and “unfair” closing of this state’s courtrooms to injured and oppressed citizens before they have been granted a viable opportunity to enter. Those persons entertaining serious concerns about the protection of individual constitutional rights can only wonder in amazement today at the unseemly retreat of Justice Donaldson and Justice Shepard from their eloquent, sound, and persuasive views of fifteen years ago.
Subsequent opinions handed down since Renner, rather than forthrightly declaring unconstitutional the legislature’s attempted overruling of this Court’s holding in Renner, have chosen instead the path of acquiescence and obeisance. See, e.g., Holmes v. Iwasa, 104 Idaho 179, 181, 657 P.2d 476, 478 (1983); Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 26, 644 P.2d 341, *311348 (1982). In no case, however, has this Court yet dealt specifically with the constitutional requirements of art I, § 18. Renner came close, as witnessed by the language of Justice Donaldson and Justice Shepard. Most constitutional lawyers would equate the language in Renner of “manifestly unjust,” “palpably unjust,” “clearly inconsistent with the concept of fundamental justice,” and “no rational basis for a distinction,” with notions of constitutional law. This is evidenced by the fact that various authors of this Court’s opinions have often used these terms when constitutional requirements were at stake.
Somewhat contrary to the promise of Renner, in Jones v. State Board of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 864, 555 P.2d 399, 404 (1976), this Court held that art. I, § 18 does not vest in the citizens of this state rights to recovery for injuries to person and property which existed at the time our Constitution was adopted. Accordingly, the Court held that the legislature can alter common law remedies and attach conditions precedent to the exercise of these common law rights without providing alternative or substitute remedies which existed at the time our Constitution was adopted. Accord, Twin Falls Clinic, supra. With that much I am able to agree. But Jones says nothing about the legislature’s attempting to preclude a citizen from seeking a remedy before knowing or having a reasonable opportunity to discover his or her injury, and whether such an attempt is invalid pursuant to art I, § 18 of our Constitution.
In Holmes, supra; Twin Falls Clinic, supra; and Jones, supra, this Court has also upheld, respectively, I.C. §§ 5-219, 5-241, and 39-4201, et seq., against equal protection, and due process challenges. Like Jones, supra, however, none of these cases purport to determine whether the Renner discovery rule is constitutionally mandated. In Twin Falls Clinic, supra, the Court did acknowledge the legislature’s attempted repeal of the Renner discovery rule holding, but did not even purport to determine — or even discuss — whether the legislature had acted within the constitutional bounds of art I, § 18. Twin Falls Clinic, supra, 103 Idaho at 26, 644 P.2d at 348.1
Therefore, the time is now for this Court to meet the issue. On any adequate analysis, the only conclusion to be reached is that the Renner discovery rule is constitutionally required. Courts from other states addressing this issue have also so concluded.
III.
In Barrio v. San Manuel Division Hosp. of Magma Copper, 143 Ariz. 101, 692 P.2d 280 (1984), the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the Arizona legislature could require a minor injured under the age of seven years to bring his or her action for damages before reaching the age of ten. See A.R.S. § 12-564(d). Noting that the legislature could properly *312regulate the time within which a plaintiff must bring his or her cause of action, it held that under art. 18, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution (which prohibits the abrogation of the right of action to recover damages for injury), this attempt by the legislature constituted an abrogation of the right to seek damages for injury. Barrio, supra, 692 P.2d at 286. Therefore, the limit was held unconstitutional. The court further set down the test for differentiating between valid regulatory statutes of repose and those which are invalid attempts at abrogating a person’s right to seek damages for injuries suffered. The test is as follows:
“If [the statute] ... were to be construed as taking away the right to pursue the constitutional action of negligence without granting a reasonable election to all persons entitled thereto, it would indeed be unconstitutional____
Ruth v. Industrial Commission, 107 Ariz. [572,] at 575, 490 P.2d [828], at 831 quoting from Moseley v. Lily Ice Cream Co., 38 Ariz. 417, 421, 300 P. 958, 959 (1931) (emphasis added in Ruth).
... The legislature may regulate the cause of action for negligence so long as it leaves a claimant reasonable alternatives or choice which will enable him or her to bring the action. It may not, under the guise of “regulation, ” so affect the fundamental right to sue for damages as to effectively deprive the claimant of the ability to bring the action. Barrio, supra, 692 P.2d at 285 (emphasis added).
The conclusion of the Arizona Supreme Court in Barrio is in harmony with what Id. Const, art. I, § 18 requires: a plaintiff should not be precluded from seeking redress for a wrong before he or she has had a reasonable opportunity to do so.
In Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918 (Tex.1984), the Texas Supreme Court held that a Texas statute2 which barred any claim for compensation resulting from negligent medical treatment or hospitalization not filed within two years from when the tort occurred or the medical treatment completed, was unconstitutional, being in violation of art. I, § 13 of Texas’ Constitution. That provision states in pertinent part: “All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”
The Texas court held that art. I, § 13 of its Constitution precludes the Texas legislature from making a remedy by due course of law contingent on an impossible condition. Nelson, supra, at 921. Applying this reasoning, the Court held that a statute of limitations which cuts off a cause of action before the party knows, or reasonably should know, that he is injured, and the cause thereof, imposes an impossible condition upon the plaintiff. Because that was the effect of the statute in question, the Court held it unconstitutional. Id., at 922.
. The Texas court’s defining of its “open courts” provision so as to require a plaintiff to know, or have the reasonable opportunity to know, that he or she is injured, and the cause thereof, before a statute of limitations can begin to run, is exactly that which Idaho’s “open courts” provision mandates.
A far from exhaustive search has revealed that other state supreme courts have reached the same result when faced with the issue similar to that which is before this Court. See, e.g., Daugaard v. Baltic Co-op Bldg. Supply Ass’n, 349 N.W.2d 419 (S.D.1984); Jackson v. Mannesman DeMag Corp., 435 So.2d 725 (Ala.1983); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288 (1983); Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 54 N.C.App. 589, 284 S.E.2d 188 (1981), modified and affd, 306 N.C. 364, 293 S.E.2d 415 (1982); Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So.2d 874 (Fla.1980); Phillips v. ABC Builders, Inc., 611 P.2d 821 (Wyo.1980).
*313A likewise less than exhaustive search of Idaho’s various statutes of limitations reveals that many such statutes do apply the Renner discovery rule. For example, I.C. §§ 6-905 and 6-906 require aggrieved parties to file their claims against the state or one of its subdivisions within 120 days from the date the claim arose “or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever, is later.”3 In addition, the 1985 legislature amended I.C. § 6-911 to permit suits to be filed up to two years after the claim arose or “reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later.” 1985 Idaho Sess.Laws, Chap. 136 (HB 61).
I.C. § 5-237 states that actions brought against the directors or stockholders of a corporation must be brought within “three years after the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts upon which ... liability was created.” I.C. § 5-243 bars actions to recover for radiation injuries which are not brought within three years “after the person suffering such injury had knowledge or ought reasonably to have had knowledge of having suffered the injury and the cause thereof.” The statute does impose a time limit within which such claims must be filed — but the maximum time extends for 30 years!
The policy reasons for tolling these statutes begin running until an individual has had reasonable opportunity to ascertain the facts and cause of his or her injuries apply equally to I.C. § 5-219(4). Why, then, the discrepancy — a discrepancy favoring the medical profession? The answer probably lies in the fact that tort victims have no association representing them, and have no financially well-endowed group lobbying the legislature for them.
Reasoning and precedent are overwhelmingly in favor of a citizen having the right of reasonable access to his or her state’s courtrooms. This Court does a monumental disservice by failing to address this issue and opting instead to blithely continue acquiescing‘in an unconstitutional abrogation of citizens’ rights of access to their courts to seek redress for injuries suffered.
Properly applying the discovery rule mandated by our Constitution, it is readily apparent that I.C. § 5-219(4) is inapplicable and cannot .bar Annette Theriault’s suit, where she did not learn or could have reasonably learned the cause of her injuries until she watched in 1981 a “60-Minutes” program linking the ailments she was suffering with use of a Daikon Shield. Therefore, it is only from that point in which I.C. § 5-219(4)’s two-year time period can begin to run. Because her suit was filed in 1982, her suit is not barred, it having been filed within the two-year limit imposed by I.C. § 5-219(4).
IV.
This Court’s prior decisions upholding the constitutionality of I.C. §§ 5-219, 5-241, and 39-4201 et seq. against equal protection and due process challenges do not purport to be the last word on all such challenges.
In Jones, supra, this Court upheld against an equal protection attack the classification which I.C. § 39-4201 et seq. makes between people damaged for over $150,000 and those damaged for less than that amount, by setting a ceiling of recovery one can obtain from a hospital at $150,-000.
In Twin Falls Clinic, supra, this Court upheld the classification I.C. § 5-241 makes in affording architects and builders special protection while denying owners, occupants, and suppliers of the same buildings worked on similar protection. . Holmes, supra, simply follows Twin Falls Clinic, supra, in upholding I.C. § 5-219.
Significant, however, is the absolute fact that no case in Idaho has yet decided whether the classification I.C. § 5-219 makes between patients whose claims are premised on the existence of a foreign object or fraudulent concealment and those whose claims are based on a differ*314ent cause, such as negligent misdiagnosis, violates equal protection. It is interesting to note, therefore, that the supreme courts of Colorado and New Hampshire on this very issue have held that statutory limitations provisions identical to that found in Idaho violate equal protection insofar as they made the “discovery rule” unavailable to all medical malpractice plaintiffs except those whose actions were based on discovery of a foreign object or a knowing concealment of the negligent act on the defendant’s part. See Austin v. Litvak, 682 P.2d 41 (Colo.1984); Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
In the Colorado case, the court applied the “rational basis” test, requiring first, that the classification be not arbitrary, but reasonable, and second, that the classification bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest. Austin, supra, at 50. In the New Hampshire case, the court applied the test of whether the challenged classifications were reasonable and had a “fair and substantial relation” to the object of the legislation, noting that its only inquiry would be whether the legislature could have reasonably conceived to be true the facts on which the challenged legislative classifications are based. Carson, supra, 424 A.2d at 831.
In both cases, the two courts struck down the various statutes being challenged —C.R.S. 13-80-105 and R.S.A. 507-C:4 (Supp.1979) — because of the irrational, arbitrary, and unfair classification they attempted to make. The Colorado Supreme Court stated, in quoting the Oregon Supreme Court:
“On a theoretical basis it is impossible to justify the applicability of the discovery rule to one kind of malpractice and not to another. The reason for the application of the discovery rule is the same in each instance. It is manifestly unrealistic and unfair to bar a negligently injured party’s cause of action before he had had an opportunity to discover that it exists. This is true whether the malpractice consists of leaving a foreign object in the body or whether it consists of faulty diagnosis or treatment.” Austin, supra, at 50, quoting Frohs v. Greene, 253 Or. 1, 452 P.2d 564, 565 (1969) (emphasis added).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court declared:
The [discovery] rule is premised on “the manifest unfairness of foreclosing an injured person’s cause of action before he has had even a reasonable opportunity to discover its existence.” Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp., 117 N.H. 739, 741-42, 378 A.2d 1138, 1139-40 (1977). Although the discovery rule was initially employed in this State in a “foreign-object” case, Shillady v. Elliot Community Hosp., 114 N.H. 321, 320 A.2d 637 (1974), we made it clear in Brown v. Mary Hitchcock Memorial Hosp. that the rule and the fundamental equitable considerations underlying it applied to medical malpractice cases generally. 117 N.H. at 741, 378 A.2d at 1139. As such, the legislature may not abolish the discovery rule with respect to any one class of medical malpractice plaintiffs. Carson, supra, 424 A.2d at 833 (emphasis added).
I find the rationales put forth, and the conclusions reached by these two courts, to be persuasive. Inasmuch as this Court has yet to decide whether the classification I.C. § 5-219(4) makes between types of medical malpractice plaintiffs violates equal protection, those who wish to continue to assert it should be on notice of the weak constitutional footing upon which it stands.
V.
The issues I have raised demand deliberation. This Court should not be too quick in preventing Annette Theriault from having her day in court. Rather, it should consider the constitutional ramifications that will proceed from its decision today if left undisturbed. At the least, the majority should request additional briefing on this issue from both parties so as to be assured of a better informed opinion.
. Justice Shepard, for a majority consisting of himself, Justice Donaldson, and, in part, Justice McFadden stated:
Appellant Twin Falls finally asserts that a discovery exception to the statute of limitations for professional malpractice, I.C. § 5-219(4), should be engrafted by this Court. In prior cases, Billings v. Sisters of Mercy, 86 Idaho 485, 389 P.2d 224 (1964), and Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 386, 475 P.2d 530 (1969), this court has so acted to engraft a discovery exception to the otherwise existing statutes of limitation; however, the court was careful to point out therein that it was doing so only in the absence of legislative direction and hence on the basis of what it perceived to be valid policy considerations. Since that time, however, the legislature has acted in the area of defining the point in time at which a cause of action accrues, sometimes in accordance with the decisions of this Court and sometimes with a differing view which we deemed to have effectively overruled the decisions of this Court. This court has thereafter acted in deference to those legislative policy decisions. Owyhee County v. Rife, 100 Idaho 91, 593 P.2d 995 (1979); Martin v. Clements, 98 Idaho 906, 575 P.2d 885 (1978). We are not at the present time persuaded that such judicial deference to legislative policy making should be abandoned and we adhere to those decisions and decline to create a further discovery exception to the statutes of limitations governing architects negligence. Twin Falls Clinic, supra, at 103 Idaho 26, 644 P.2d at 348 (emphasis added).
. The applicable statute is Article 9.82, section 4 of the Texas Insurance code, subsequently repealed and replaced by Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art 4590; § 10.01 (Vernon Supp.1984).
. 1985 Idaho Sess.Laws, Chap. 136 (HB 61), effective July 1, 1985, extends the time period within which a claim must be filed from 120 days to 180 days.