dissenting.
I write separately to express my concern that the majority opinion may be interpreted as a judicial retreat from the constitutionally mandated principle of reasonableness which traditionally has applied to these kinds of cases.
In our previous opinion, we held that it was reasonable for the police officers to look in defendant’s pack for identification. We also determined that defendant had not properly raised the closed container issue and, therefore, declined to address the propriety of opening the cigarette box. The Supreme Court remanded so that we could determine whether the principles enunciated for inventories in State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1, 688 P2d 832 (1984), and State v. Perry, 298 Or 21, 688 P2d 827 (1984), have any impact on this case. Somewhere in between, this case has suddenly been transformed into a closed container case. Given the decision to move the goal posts, the majority’s result is mandated by the current state of the law. The officer’s conduct in looking in the cigarette box for identification would not have been reasonable. I concur to that extent.
However, I prefer to deal with this case as it was originally presented and address the issues for which it was specifically remanded to us, i.e., are Atkinson and Perry applicable to the police officer’s “search” of defendant’s backpack for identification? In that regard, I disagree with the *156majority’s conclusion that the principles of Atkinson and Perry are necessarily applicable to this case.
Both of those Supreme Court cases clearly were limited to inventories. The majority’s leap of faith ignores an obvious and crucial distinction between inventory searches and the case in question. In both Atkinson and Perry, the police were apprised of who owned the property before initiating their searches. In Atkinson, the officers tried to contact the owner of the vehicle before towing it away. His identity was presumably ascertained by running a check on the car’s license. In Perry, the owner of the suitcase had been booked and was in custody. Thus, the inventory searches were conducted for the sole purpose of determining the exact makeup of the seized property.
That purpose should be contrasted with the one which prompted the officer in this case to open defendant’s pack. He was called to the scene to investigate the activities of a stranger who left his backpack where he had no apparent right to do so and with no indication of when he would return. The officer testified that his only reason for looking into the pack was to find identification. He had no desire to to examine the pack’s contents merely to see what it contained. There was no contrary evidence. Accordingly, his motivations were completely different than those of the officers in Atkinson and Perry and the rationale of those cases should not be applied. State v. Ridderbush, 71 Or App 418, 692 P2d 667 (1985), does not compel a different conclusion. Rather, a reasonableness standard, which is firmly rooted in both Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, should continue to be used in cases of this type.
Under that standard, the officer was justified in looking into defendant’s backpack for identification. The house where defendant left his pack in an open carport was unattended. The owner had asked a neighbor to keep an eye on it and to call the police if he saw anyone there. Those instructions were communicated by the neighbor to the responding officer. On the day in question, the small town of Garibaldi was in the middle of its annual “Garibaldi Days” festival. During the course of the celebration, the population *157of Garibaldi swells, and the police are confronted with more trespasses than at any other time of year.
That the house belonged to defendant’s grandfather is irrelevant, because that fact was known only to defendant. From an objective standpoint, the backpack was left or abandoned by an apparent stranger in an open carport where, because of express instructions, no one but the homeowner was allowed. In effect, the pack was trespassing. Rather than walk away and sanction the intrusion onto private property, the officer elected to take the pack back to the station, but first he endeavored to determine the identity of its owner so that it could eventually be returned. His actions were justified under the circumstances, and the opinion should so sítate.
However, if the majority is correct that Atkinson and Perry apply to all noncriminal, nonemergency situations, then a new day is indeed dawning for law enforcement officials, one in which it would no longer be enough for them to act reasonably. Their reasonable actions would have to taken pursuant to established procedures. See State v. Atkinson, supra, 298 Or at 10.
I assume that by established procedures, the Supreme Court meant a set of written rules covering inventories, lost or abandoned property or any other noncriminal, nonemergency situations when police officers would be justified in examining private property without a search warrant. That will place a very heavy burden on local governments throughout this state.
By requiring local governments to adopt written rules authorizing what have heretofore been constitutionally reasonable actions, they will be dealing with the very different and difficult task of legislating reasonableness. That burden would fall most heavily on smaller local agencies, which have such limited manpower and other resources to attempt such an undertaking on their own. We should point out to them that it would be to their benefit cooperatively to pursue the adoption of uniform rules. By such an endeavor, our communities will avoid the need of reinventing the wheel over and over again. It also would lend predictability and efficiency to the judicial system in that we would not be required to review dozens of sets of different rules when they are inevitably *158challenged in the next generation of noncriminal, non-emergency search cases.
Richardson and Van Hoomissen, JJ., join in this dissent.