(concurring)—I concur in the result reached by the majority. I have serious misgivings, however, with respect to the evidence of probable cause and the particularity of the search warrant. The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution requires that "no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or *255affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched ..." There is a similar provision in the Washington Constitution, article 1, section 7. By the terms of the Fourth Amendment, therefore, the requirement of probable cause and particularity are inextricably intertwined. A warrant to search can never include more than that which is covered by the showing of probable cause to search. Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 441, 69 L. Ed. 1032, 45 S. Ct. 546 (1925); United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 325 (7th Cir. 1955); United States v. Jacob, 502 F. Supp. 1221, 1226 (D. Md. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 657 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1981), cert, denied, 455 U.S. 942, 71 L. Ed. 2d 653, 102 S. Ct. 1435 (1982); see also J. Hall, Search and Seizure § 6:8 (1982 & Supp. 1985). Although the issuing magistrate may draw commonsense inferences from the facts and circumstances contained in the affidavit, there must be a substantial factual basis for the ultimate conclusion that the items sought are located at the place to be searched. State v. Larson, 29 Wn. App. 669, 671, 630 P.2d 485 (1981); State v. Peterson, 3 Wn. App. 946, 947, 478 P.2d 745 (1970).
Although the majority properly states the general rules applicable to this case, search warrants must be "evaluated on a case by case basis" and those rules "must be applied to specific factual settings." State v. Helmka, 86 Wn.2d 91, 93, 542 P.2d 115 (1975).3 In People v. Joubert, 140 Cal. App. *2563d 946, 190 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1983), the court faced facts nearly identical to these. There, during an aerial flight a deputy sheriff observed a circular-shaped, cultivated area he identified as growing marijuana. The circular patch was the only place on the 28-acre parcel where he saw anything resembling marijuana. The parcel also consisted primarily of open, uncultivated areas in the Sierra foothills, forested with oak, brush and grass. There were several structures scattered on the acreage, all of which were within 500 yards of one another. The deputy sheriff could see at least four structures from the air, but was unable to say that any of them were residences. A search warrant was issued authorizing the search of the entire 28 acres and all structures thereon. Concluding the search was unreasonable, the court noted:
"The basic requirement is that the officers who are commanded to search be able from the 'particular' description of the search warrant to identify the specific place for which there is probable cause to believe that a crime is being committed."
Joubert, at 951 (quoting United States v. Hinton, supra at 325-26). The court concluded:
[I]t appears clear that probable cause to search all of the living units on the 28-acre parcel or the entire 28-acre parcel could not be predicated upon probable cause to search for one small, circular patch of marijuana existing on the premises.
(Italics mine.) Joubert, at 952.
Absent words in an affidavit establishing probable cause to search the entire acreage, I conclude it cannot be reasonably inferred from the existence of such a patch that there was marijuana growing on other areas within the 60-acre parcel. Moreover, there was no contention by the officers that they encountered problems in locating the patch, *257which was located near the tepee, an identifiable landmark. Thus, the constitutionally protected right of privacy was violated because the warrant lacked reasonable particularity and subjected Mrs. Christiansen to a roving search subject only to the discretion of the law enforcement officers. See, e.g., United States v. Marti, 421 F.2d 1263, 1268-69 (2d Cir. 1970); State v. Frye, 26 Wn. App. 276, 281, 613 P.2d 152 (1980); Joubert, at 952; People v. Fitzwater, 260 Cal. App. 2d 478, 485-86, 67 Cal. Rptr. 190, cert, denied, 393 U.S. 953, 21 L. Ed. 2d 364, 89 S. Ct. 378 (1968). I would, therefore, suppress the evidence seized from areas other than the garden located near the tepee.
Even excluding this evidence, however, I am constrained to concur since some marijuana, although in minimal amount, was found in the location of the garden sighted during the aerial surveillance. As the officers found "a branch of marijuana" and evidence indicated the garden had been harvested recently, sufficient evidence substantiates Mrs. Christiansen's conviction for unlawfully manufacturing a controlled substance, marijuana.
The majority concludes the search was reasonable also because the acreage covered by warrants approved in State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d 561, 689 P.2d 32 (1984) and State v. Myrick, 102 Wn.2d 506, 688 P.2d 151 (1984) each exceeded 60 acres. But in Cockrell, the flyover identified 15 marijuana gardens in the searched area. Here, only 1 was observed. Myrick lends little support to the reasonableness of this search because the court failed to indicate the number of gardens viewed during the flyover.
Furthermore, the additional authority, relied upon by the majority, actually allowed searches narrower in scope than the search here. See, e.g., State v. Helmka, supra (drugs found in apartment); State v. Larson, 29 Wn. App. 669, 630 P.2d 485 (1981) (evidence found in residence); State v. Frye, 26 Wn. App. 276, 613 P.2d 152 (1980) (warrant "specifically referred" to persons and vehicles at the residence); State v. Harris, 12 Wn. App. 481, 530 P.2d 646, review denied, 85 Wn.2d 1010 (1975) (search in hotel room). Indeed, in State v. Peterson, supra, the *256court suppressed evidence seized under a warrant allowing a search of the residence and appurtenant property because, inter alia, there must be "a substantial factual basis for the ultimate conclusion that the items sought are probably located at the place to be searched." Peterson, at 947.