dissenting.
The majority holds, contrary to the reasoned conclusions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, that defendant Hamilton Corporation is subject to Arizona’s long-arm jurisdiction. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion on both the Arizona long-arm provision issue and the due process issue and conclude that the trial court’s ruling granting defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to establish in personam jurisdiction should be affirmed.
/^RULE 4(e)(2) J
The Arizoharlong-arm rule provides that a nonresident corporation can be subject to jurisdiction in the Arizona eourts if it is either “doing business in this state” or “has caused an event to occur in this state out of which the claim which is the subject of the complaint arose____” Rule 4(e)(2), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, 16 A.R.S. Plaintiffs do not contend that defendant is doing business in this state. They argue instead that defendant has caused an event to occur in this state out of which the claim arose, and that event is the agreement to provide a cruise. The majority agrees with the plaintiff that the formation of the contract in Arizona was the “event” out of which the claim aros^It is conceded that if the claim is one sounding in tort and no tortious event occurred in Arizona there is no jurisdiction in this stateNArcie 906-907:
Plaintiffs maintain thatfthey were promised a “pleasure cruise” which, due to the fact that they were deprived of their luggage during the cruise, was not “pleasurable.” Their luggage had erroneously been placed on another of defendant’s ships. Although the events surrounding the missing luggage and the cruise occurred outside of this state, the majority conclude that the essence of the contract claim is a total failure of consideration and the facts fit within the scope of the Arizona long-arm rule in the following way: “The claimed breach is co-extensive with the reach of the underlying contract. Thus, the alleged breach touched Arizona.” Ante 907. I agree that the alleged breach “touched” Arizona insofar as plaintiffs' are Arizona residents and part of the contracting process took place in Arizona. \This does not, however, satisfy the requirement that defendant caused an event to occunN The event which caused plaintiffs’ displeasure was the misdelivery of the luggage. The events surrounding the formation of the contract which might justify jurisdiction, are not the subject of complaint. The claim of the plaintiffs is a collateral matter arising out of an event which occurred wholly outside of this state.
*254DUE PROCESS
A more important consideration is the issue of due process. I agree with the majority that to establish in personam jurisdiction in Arizona the provisions of both the long-arm rule and constitutional ‘due process must be met. Ante 906, 907. Due process is satisfied if the defendant has sufficient contacts with the forum state so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
The majority states that “isolated or sporadic contacts with this state will not suffice.” Ante 907. Nevertheless it finds sufficient “minimum contacts” based solely on the single transaction and advertisement in this case:
In the instant case, one of the most persuasive contacts was that money changed hands in Phoenix, Arizona. This transaction, we believe, coupled with the advertising and the delivery of the tickets in Arizona, established sufficient minimum contacts such that Arizona’s exercise of personal jurisdiction in this case complies with the requirements of fair play and substantial justice.
Ante 908. The so-called change of money consisted of the plaintiffs paying a travel agent who sent the money to the defendant, and the defendant sent tickets to the travel agent for delivery to the plaintiffs. There is nothing in that transaction which is the subject of complaint between the parties. The matter at issue involves activities which happened totally outside of Arizona. At most one can describe the loss of luggage as collateral to the contract, but it is not sufficient to support jurisdiction in a constitutionally cognizable sense. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Under the rationale of the majority if one of the defendant's waiters spilled soup on the plaintiffs while at sea, Arizona would have jurisdiction of plaintiffs’ complaint in contract against the defendant for failure to deliver a pleasure cruise.
I believe the majority’s reliance on Hollingsworth v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 152 Ga. App. 509, 263 S.E.2d 190 (1979) is misplaced. The portion of the Georgia court’s opinion quoted by the majority illustrates the obvious distinction between that case and the case at bench: “Cunard voluntarily availed itself of the right to conduct commercial activities within the state of Georgia on a continuing and systematic basis through its national and local advertising and distribution of ticket stock to different travel agencies, and telephone correspondence with such travel agencies.” Ante 907. The Georgia court’s assertion of jurisdiction was based on the Georgia long-arm statute which extends jurisdiction over any non-resident for a cause of action arising from the transaction of any business within the state. Id. 263 S.E.2d 190. The continuing and systematic commercial activity in the Georgia case is in sharp contrast to the isolated event in this case.
I would affirm the opinion of the Court of Appeals and the trial court’s granting of defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of in personam jurisdiction.