specially concurring and dissenting in part:
The primary issue raised is whether or not the Idaho Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction to resolve the contractual dispute between Afton Energy and Idaho Power, particularly the jurisdiction and power to order Idaho Power to enter into a 35-year fixed term, fixed rate contract to purchase power from Afton. The majority finds such jurisdiction and power under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA), § 210, and purportedly also finds jurisdiction based on state statutes. However, in the course of its discussion, the majority states, “Thus, it is clear that PUR-PA was intended to confer upon state regulatory commissions authority and duties not conferred under state law.” I vehemently disagree with this statement.
It has apparently been established that the United States Congress can create rights and obligations between Afton and other cogenerators, and Idaho Power and similar regulated public utilities. The Supreme Court has said as much in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 102 S.Ct. 2126, 72 L.Ed.2d 532 (1982), reh. den. 458 U.S. 1131, 103 S.Ct. 14, 73 L.Ed.2d 1401. However, in my view the United States Congress cannot create jurisdiction in a state agency to resolve or litigate the rights and obligations between such individuals if the state entity has not been given that jurisdiction by state law. Any such attempt to create such jurisdiction by Congress would violate the tenth amendment.
The Idaho Public Utilities Commission’s jurisdiction must stem from state law. The commission has no inherent power, and its powers and jurisdiction derive in their entirety from the enabling statutes, and “nothing is presumed in favor of its jurisdiction.” Arrow Transportation Co. v. Idaho Public Util. Comm’n. 85 Idaho 307, 379 P.2d 422 (1963); see also Lemhi Telephone Co. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 98 Idaho 692, 571 P.2d 753 (1974).
There are no statutes in Idaho’s public utilities law which give the commission jurisdiction to order Idaho Power to enter into the type of contract involved in this case. Afton Energy is attempting to enforce contractual rights granted by federal law. As we noted in Lemhi Telephone Co., supra,
*791“Generally, construction and enforcement of contract rights is a matter which lies in the jurisdiction of the courts and not the public utilities commission. This is true notwithstanding that the parties are public utilities or that the subject matter of the contract coincides generally with the expertise of the commission. If the matter is a contractual dispute, it should be heard by the courts.” Id. at 696, 571 P.2d 753.
The majority misinterprets FERC v. Mississippi, supra. The majority states that “the United States Supreme Court has interpreted PURPA as imposing requirements on state regulatory authorities in excess of their duties under state law.” However, a correct reading of that case indicates that the Supreme Court, in deciding whether or not PURPA violated the tenth amendment, assumed that the Mississippi Public Service Commission already had pre-existing state jurisdiction to resolve disputes of the type arising under the statute. In light of that assumption, the Supreme Court ruled that PURPA did not violate the tenth amendment because it simply required Mississippi authorities to adjudicate disputes of the type they already dealt with under their state jurisdiction. That court stated:
“In essence, then, the statute and the implementing regulations simply require the Mississippi authorities to adjudicate disputes arising under the statute. Dispute resolution of this kind is the very type of activity customarily engaged in by the Mississippi Public Service Commission.
“The Mississippi commission has jurisdiction to entertain claims analogous to those granted by PURPA, and it can satisfy section 210’s requirement simply by opening its doors to claimants.” Id. 102 S.Ct. at 2137-38.
The Supreme Court’s assumption that the Mississippi commission previously had jurisdiction of analogous claims may or may not be correct. However, it is clear that such an assumption cannot be made under Idaho law without a close examination of Idaho statutory law because of our previous decision in Lemhi Telephone Co. v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra. In Lemhi we ruled that the commission did not have jurisdiction to rule on the obligations between those parties. Thus, jurisdiction cannot be assumed, and the only jurisdiction that can exist is that granted by Idaho law.
That is not to say that the purpose of the United States Congress when it enacted PURPA has been frustrated because Idaho has not provided a forum in which the rights and obligations between cogenerators and utilities can be litigated and settled. The dispute between Afton Energy and Idaho Power Company could have been litigated either in the state courts under I.C. § 1-705, or I.C. § 10-1201 et seq., the Idaho Declaratory Judgment Act, or in the federal courts under 16 U.S.C. 924a-3(g), -(h).1 However, it is not true that merely because the federal government has created rights and obligations between cogenerators and utilities and has provided that they may be enforced in the courts that the federal statute or regulations can grant jurisdiction to a state administrative agency which has not been given that jurisdiction by the Idaho legislature.
The majority opinion does find Idaho statutory authority for the regulation of CSPP contracts. See supra, p. 430. It is true that Idaho state law gives the commission the authority to supervise and regulate electric utilities and the contracts they enter into, and the facilities they construct to produce power. Arguably, then, there existed, prior to the enactment of PURPA, jurisdiction under state law for the commission to regulate contracts formed by Idaho Power to buy power from entities such as Afton. See I.C. §§ 61-503, 61-502, 61-501. Thus, as the majority reasons, PURPA could give the state commission authority to entertain *792contract claims analogous to those over which it already had jurisdiction. FERC v. Mississippi, supra.
However, the commission never has had jurisdiction to order an electric utility such as Idaho Power to enter into a fixed rate, long term contract which is not subject to change. The Idaho Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction to set up a schedule of rates and require Idaho Power to enter into contracts on that basis, the schedule being subject to change for future conditions like all other schedules of power rates which the commission sets for Idaho Power. Likewise, it has authority to order modification of contracts entered into by utilities when the rates set in that contract are adverse to the public interest. Agricultural Products Corp. v. Utah Power & Light, 98 Idaho 23, 557 P.2d 617 (1976). But it presently has no statutory authority to compel a utility to enter into a contract for a fixed rate for 35 years which cannot be modified by subsequent commissions based upon subsequent conditions.
Idaho Power requested that the commission rule that the rates set forth in the Afton contract would be subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the PUC so that the rates could be maintained as just, fair, reasonable and sufficient. That request is consistent with the commission’s duty to maintain a continuing inquiry into a regulated utility’s rate structure. See I.C. § 61-502; Grindstone Butte Mutual Canal Co. v. Idaho Power Co., 98 Idaho 860, 574 P.2d 902 (1978). In any contract which the commission compels the utility to enter into, the rate charged must remain subject to the continuing power of the commission to adjust the rate under the contract to allow for elimination of any contract provision that produces unjust or unreasonable rates to consumers served by the electric utility. I.C. § 61-502 (“Whenever the commission shall find ... that the ... contracts ... affecting such rates ... are unjust, unreasonable, discriminatory or preferential, ... the commission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates ... or contracts to be thereafter observed or in force____”); I.C. § 61-503 (“The commission shall have power ... to investigate a ... contract ... of any public utility, and to establish new ... contracts ... in lieu thereof.”)
The majority rejects this continuing authority of the commission, arguing that such continuing authority would subject CSPP’s to utility-like regulation, a result not desirable under PURPA. The fallacy in this assumption is clear. CSPP’s like Afton Energy would not be subject to utility-like regulation merely because the commission retained jurisdiction to supervise the rates paid by Idaho Power Company. CSPP’s would still be free to conduct their own operations free from commission interference, charge any rate to third parties that the third parties would be willing to pay, and make any amount of profit they wish. Their rate of return could reach 100% if that is the rate the market will bear. The commission could not supervise any of the essential elements of a CSPP’s business. The only power the commission would have is to order Idaho Power to pay only those contract rates which produced utility rates to consumers that were just, reasonable and sufficient to maintain the proper rate of return to the utility.
As previously noted, the Idaho Public Utilities Commission has only limited jurisdiction, and nothing is presumed in favor of its jurisdiction. Nothing in Idaho statutory law gives the commission the broad authority to order a utility to enter into a fixed rate, 35-year contract. The majority attempts to interpret PURPA in such a way as to give the commission the authority to do just that. With this approach I must disagree because, as already stated, federal law cannot grant to our state commission authority to act in excess of the jurisdiction granted under state law. Federal law may well create a right in a CSPP to a long term fixed rate contract, but any such right must, under present Idaho law, be enforced in the courts and not by the Idaho Public Utilities Commission which lacks the jurisdiction and power under existing Idaho law to order such a contract.
*793Thus, I dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which uses federal law to grant the Idaho Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction to order Idaho Power Company to enter into the fixed term contract which it approves today.
. The public utilities commission has acknowledged in its brief, “These provisions [PURPA] could be enforced by FERC or by a CSPP in court. 16 U.S.C. 924a-3(g) and (h)."