specially concurring.
I concur in the disposition of this case as reflected in the majority opinion. I do not find, however, that the majority opinion specifically articulates the proposition, which I espoused in my concurring opinion in Richter v. State, Wyo., 642 P.2d 1269, 1277 (1982), that the rule of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 48 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976), adopted by this court in Irvin v. State, Wyo., 560 P.2d 372 (1977), and Clenin v. State, Wyo., 573 P.2d 844 (1978), is limited to post-arrest silence by the accused. I wish to make it clear that my concurrence in the disposition of this case does not indicate that I have receded from my position in Richter v. State, supra. The interrogation in this case encompassed both pre-arrest and post-arrest silence. Since, under our cases these questions result in prejudicial error with respect to post-arrest silence, the disposition as reflected in the majority opinion is ineluctably correct.