On February 1, 1982, David Lee Mason was charged, pursuant to I.C. § 18-2403(4), *707with grand theft by possession of a 1979 Yamaha snowmobile. On February 9, 1982, Mason was also charged with accessory to grand theft of a 1977 Yamaha snowmobile, pursuant to I.C. §§ 18-205 and 18-2403(4). Following trial, a jury found Mason guilty on both counts. Mason was then sentenced to a four year indeterminate sentence in the Idaho Penitentiary for the first count and a concurrent two year indeterminate sentence for the second. Mason’s motion for reduction of sentence was denied on November 30, 1982. Mason appeals only from his sentence. We affirm.
Mason first contends that a four year indeterminate sentence is unduly harsh in light of his age and past record. We disagree. The sentence imposed upon Mason is clearly within the statutory maximum set in I.C. § 18-2408 for grand theft by possession and in I.C. § 18-206 for accessory to grand theft. Although Mason was only eighteen at the time of his arrest, with a record consisting of minor traffic violations and a possession of marijuana charge, we decline to find the court’s imposed sentence to be unreasonable. Not only was Mason in possession of one stolen snowmobile, but Mason had sought to obtain $500 from the rightful owners of the second snowmobile for information leading to its return. The presentence report included information showing that Mason was involved with marijuana and cocaine; that Mason offered to sell a stolen snowmobile to a neighbor; that when this offer was reported to the police, Mason began to harass the neighbor; and that a letter written by Mason outlined Mason’s involvement in a number of criminal activities. In light of these factors, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that Mason was “well on [his] way to becoming a hardened criminal ...,” and to sentence him accordingly.
Mason also contends that the trial judge improperly relied on hearsay evidence during sentencing. The evidence to which Mason objects is the letter written by Mason outlining his involvement in criminal activities and an allegation by the neighbor that Mason had poured glue on their walks and rock salt on their lawn. The original presentence report was supplemented with these items. Although the presentence report originally recommended that the court retain jurisdiction over Mason for 120 days, the trial judge refused to retain jurisdiction after the presentence report was supplemented. Mason alleges that the trial judge’s reliance on these supplemental items resulted in prejudicial error.
The legislature has specifically authorized admission of hearsay evidence for sentencing purposes in the form of a presentence investigation report. I.C. § 20-220. Hearsay evidence in this form is admissible at a sentencing hearing so long as the defendant is afforded an opportunity to present favorable evidence and to explain or rebut adverse evidence. State v. Johnson, 101 Idaho 581, 583, 618 P.2d 759, 761 (1980); State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 17, 454 P.2d 51, 54 (1969). Here, Mason had an opportunity to respond to these allegations during the sentencing hearing. At that time Mason explained the letter as “a joke” and denied having harassed the neighbor. Since Mason had an opportunity to respond to the allegations against him, the admission of the supplemental information was proper. Accordingly, we find no error in Mason’s sentencing.
DONALDSON, C.J., and SHEPARD and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.