dissenting.
In my opinion there was a clear abuse of discretion by the trial court in entering an award for spousal maintenance. When the trial record and the statutory prerequisites are conjunctively and objectively considered the conclusion is inevitable — spousal maintenance in this case is impermissible and should not have been awarded to the wife.
The basic predicate for an award of spousal maintenance is the necessity for a spouse to meet the statutory requirements with the corresponding postulate being that spousal maintenance is impermissible unless a spouse meets the requirements of A.R.S. § 25-319(A). Deatherage v. Deatherage, 140 Ariz. 317, 681 P.2d 469 (Ariz.App.1984); In re Marriage of Hinkston, 133 Ariz. 592, 653 P.2d 49 (App.1982). See also Neal v. Neal, 116 Ariz. 590, 570 P.2d 758 (1977). A.R.S. § 25-319(A) provides:
A. In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or legal separation, or a proceeding for maintenance following dissolution of the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may grant a maintenance order for either spouse only if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance:
1. Lacks sufficient property, including property apportioned to such spouse, to provide for his or her reasonable needs; and
2. Is unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment or is the custodian of a child whose age or condition is such that the custodian should not be required to seek employment outside the home or lacks earning ability in the labor market adequate to support himself or herself, (emphasis added)
In accordance with the clear statutory language it was necessary for the trial court, based on the evidence presented, to find that the wife lacked sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and was unable to support herself through appropriate employment or lacked earning ability in the labor market to support herself prior to awarding maintenance. Deatherage v. Deatherage, supra. Wholly aside from the employability factor, in my opinion, it affirmatively appears from the record that the wife by reason of the property apportioned to her in this proceeding possesses “... sufficient property, including property apportioned to such spouse to provide for ... her reasonable needs.” A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(l).
In order to determine whether the majority’s conclusion is sound, the interdependent statutory factors of (1) reasonable needs and (2) sufficient property apportionment must withstand record review scruti*394ny. I don’t believe the majority’s conclusion withstands such scrutiny.
Turning first to reasonable needs. The wife’s written spousal affidavit lists her reasonable monthly expenses as $1725. She did testify that she omitted the cost of health insurance which she estimated at approximately $100 per month. This amended figure of $1825 per month became suspect at trial since certain items in the affidavit appeared to be nonrecurring, improperly allocable expenses. In addition the wife, at times during the trial, stated that $1600 or even $1500 per month would be reasonable to meet her anticipated expenses. However, aside from these admissions against interest and arguably improperly listed monthly expenses, the figure of $1825 per month, for purposes of this judicial review, will be accepted as the monthly amount needed to provide for her reasonable needs.
The next consideration is the sufficiency of property available to her to meet her reasonable needs. The wife received one-half of the monies deposited with the Arizona Bank of approximately $307,000, i.e., she received $153,500. She was also awarded approximately $11,760 from an account with E.P. Hutton and Company, Inc. which, although asserted by the husband to be separate property, was properly considered by the trial court as community property subject to apportionment. She also received works of art with a value of $20,000 to $25,000. Placing the value of the art works at the low end of the scale ($20,000) it is clear from the record that the wife has property valued at $185,260, the substantial majority of which is “liquid.” The wife is also to receive one-half of the husband’s pension in the approximate amount of $111.00 per month. In addition she received clothing, jewelry and an automobile which was free and clear.
As acknowledged by the majority, the wife’s expert witness testified that at the minimum rate of return the wife could receive a yearly income in excess of $21,-500 ($1800 per month) based on a principal of $148,858. In addition she will receive $111.00 per month from the husband’s pension. It seems obvious, from a most conservative view point, that the wife will be receiving over $1900 per month without touching the principal and without considering any income from her employment, a factor I have not considered although she testified she was employed and was receiving limited income. Depending upon one’s perspective such additional employment income would be frosting on the cake or salt in the wound. Furthermore, although the trial court retained jurisdiction to increase or decrease the amount of maintenance and to shorten or lengthen the term set for maintenance, it would appear, as a practical matter, that there will not be a decrease or shortening of the term set for spousal maintenance. I state this for the reason that if the wife, during the three years, was able to secure gainful employment of any consequence she would risk a loss or decrease in the maintenance award. This appears to be a counterproductive incentive which would have the resultant effect of encouraging her to not seek or obtain employment for the three year period.
The underlying policy of our statutory scheme for dissolution of marriage is to disentangle and separate the lives of the two spouses upon dissolution. Public policy favors rehabilitative, or fixed term, spousal maintenance awards so as to encourage the party receiving the award to use diligence in obtaining training and skills so that he or she will become financially self-supportive and thereby be able to meet his or her reasonable needs. Lindsay v. Lindsay, 115 Ariz. 322, 565 P.2d 199 (App.1977). However, as previously pointed out, this public policy is predicated upon the statutorily imposed requirements that spousal maintenance is impermissible unless a spouse meets the requirements of A.R.S. § 25-319(A). Deatherage v. Deatherage, supra; In re Marriage of Hinkston, supra. It would thus appear to be contrary to public policy to permit an able-bodied spouse to continue to live off the labors of the other when such spouse by reason of the property apportioned has sufficient property to provide for current reasonable *395needs. Under the attendant facts as established by the evidence, public policy is not served when an award of this nature is made.
In any event, my review of the record leads me to conclude that the trial court was presented with evidence that the wife will have, at a bare minimum, a monthly income of $1900 with monthly expenses of either $1725 (as shown by the carefully prepared spousal affidavit) or $1600 (as she testified to at trial) or even $1920 as the majority somehow discerns. Based on this record, I cannot perceive how spousal maintenance would be permissible since, clearly, the wife does not meet the requirements of A.R.S. § 25-319(A) for any amount, let alone $1000 per month for three years. I therefore end up where I started. In my opinion, it was a clear abuse of discretion for the trial court to "ward spousal maintenance.