. . I concur in the plurality’s disposition of this appeal insofar as it affirms the judgment as to guilt, sets aside the special circumstances findings, and reverses the judgment as to penalty.
I dissent from Part II.2.a of the plurality opinion (ante, pp. 313-315) insofar as it purports to answer the question we expressly left open in People v. Zimmerman (1984) 36 Cal.3d 154, 161, footnote 6 [202 Cal.Rptr. 826, 680 P.2d 776], i.e., whether “the use of peremptory challenges to systematically exclude persons who had reservations about the death penalty” denies a capital defendant “his due process right to a ‘neutral’ or impartial penalty phase jury within the meaning of Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510 . . . .” I disagree with the plurality’s answer to that question for the reasons stated in Parts I, II, and V (except pp. 342-344, ante) of the concurring and dissenting opinion by the Chief Justice in this case.
Respondent’s petition for a rehearing was denied January 17, 1985. Bird, C. J., and Lucas, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.