(dissenting) — There is no question that the validity of a search warrant requires its issuance by a neutral and detached magistrate, and neutrality and detachment require severance and disengagement from law enforcement. Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350, 32 L. Ed. 2d 783, 92 S. Ct. 2119 (1972). A judge who is sitting as a special inquiry judge is not a neutral and detached magistrate because that role is aligned with the prosecutor's. A special inquiry judge is both statutorily disqualified and precluded by due process from issuing search warrants. I therefore dissent to the majority's resolution of this issue.
Statutory Disqualification
A judge who has been or is acting as a special inquiry judge is statutorily disqualified from acting in any other capacity than in the case under inquiry. RCW 10.27.180 provides:
The judge serving as a special inquiry judge shall be disqualified from acting as a magistrate or a judge in any subsequent court proceeding arising from such inquiry[,]
except for specified contempt situations. The majority's efforts to provide dictionary definitions to certain words in the statute fail to answer the only relevant question about the meaning of the disqualification provision: Upon what event is the special inquiry judge disqualified to act in subsequent proceedings? To the extent that the statute does not explicitly provide the answer, it is ambiguous. Our enunciated rules of statutory construction compel our resolution of the Legislature's intent that the appointment of the special inquiry judge, not the termination of the special inquiry proceedings, disqualifies that judge in regard to subsequent proceedings.
"Subsequent" is defined as "following in time: coming or being later than something else". Webster's Third New *90International Dictionary 2278 (1971). The question for us is not the meaning of "subsequent", but rather what is the something else after which the special inquiry judge is disqualified. There is no support for the majority's assumption that the something else is the conclusion of the special inquiry proceedings.
When the words in a statute, given their plain, ordinary meaning, are unambiguous, the court may not construe the words otherwise. People's Org. for Wash. Energy Resources v. Utilities & Transp. Comm'n, 101 Wn.2d 425, 679 P.2d 922 (1984). But, when a statute is ambiguous, it must be interpreted in a reasonable manner and in accordance with the apparent intent of the Legislature. Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, 97 Wn.2d 118, 641 P.2d 163 (1982). The court should look primarily to the language of the statute itself to determine legislative intent. Department of Transp. v. State Employees' Ins. Bd., 97 Wn.2d 454, 645 P.2d 1076 (1982). The court must construe the act as a whole giving effect to all the language used. Burlington N., Inc. v. Johnston, 89 Wn.2d 321, 572 P.2d 1085 (1977).
RCW 10.27.180 disqualifies the "judge serving as a special inquiry judge". (Italics mine.) By qualifying the special inquiry judge thusly, rather than in a form indicating a judge whose services as a special inquiry judge have terminated, the Legislature has indicated it meant a presently serving judge. Had the Legislature intended to disqualify a judge who had previously served as a special inquiry judge, it would have said so. See Jepson v. Department of Labor & Indus., 89 Wn.2d 394, 573 P.2d 10 (1977). The language of the statute indicates the Legislature's intent.
Examining RCW 10.27 as a whole, it is apparent that the Legislature did not intend the special inquiry judge to issue warrants. The actions that the special inquiry judge may take are limited by the statute. On petition of the public attorney, the special inquiry judge shall command persons to appear and answer questions as the special inquiry judge may approve, and shall direct production of evidence. RCW 10.27.170. On a belief that persons may have knowledge *91concerning the subject under investigation, the special inquiry judge may cause those persons to be called. RCW 10.27.140(3). The statute provides no explicit authority for the special inquiry judge to issue search warrants.
There is significance in the Legislature's failure to provide the special inquiry judge with the authority to issue search warrants. The purpose of the Criminal Investigatory Act of 1971 is "to serve law enforcement in combating crime and corruption." RCW 10.27.010. The majority apparently believes that the issuance of search warrants by the special inquiry judge would further this purpose. Nevertheless, the court is not permitted to add words to a statute. See Vita Food Prods., Inc. v. State, 91 Wn.2d 132, 134, 587 P.2d 535 (1978). The Legislature withheld from the special inquiry judge the authority to issue search warrants, and this court cannot supply that authority.
In addition to examining the words of a statute, we must construe the statute in a reasonable manner. Human Rights Comm'n v. Cheney Sch. Dist. 30, supra. We must avoid meaningless, arbitrary distinctions. Bellevue Fire Fighters Local 1604 v. Bellevue, 100 Wn.2d 748, 675 P.2d 592 (1984). Whatever the Legislature's motive for disqualifying a special inquiry judge from acting in any other capacity on the case under inquiry, it is unreasonable to suggest the disqualifying factors arise at the termination of the inquiry and not at its inception. The facts of this case illustrate the absurdity of such a conclusion. Judge Pitt was appointed special inquiry judge in July 1981. In March 1983, the State filed the information which terminated the special inquiry proceedings. See State v. Manning, 86 Wn.2d 272, 543 P.2d 632 (1975). In the nearly 2 years in which the special inquiry was ongoing, the majority's construction would permit Judge Pitt to issue warrants up to March 6, 1983, but would disqualify him as of March 7. If the nature of the special inquiry proceeding disqualifies the special inquiry judge from acting in any subsequent proceeding, that disqualification arises upon the judge's appointment.
*92Due Process
In addition to the statutory disqualification of the special inquiry judge, due process considerations also prevent the special inquiry judge from issuing search warrants.
The Fourth Amendment requires that the issuing magistrate be neutral and detached. State v. Porter, 88 Wn.2d 512, 515, 563 P.2d 829 (1977). "Whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, it is clear that they require severance and disengagement from activities of law enforcement." Shadwick v. Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350, 32 L. Ed. 2d 783, 92 S. Ct. 2119 (1972). The nature of the appointment of the special inquiry judge and the statutory authority of the office negate neutrality and detachment because the special inquiry judge has become a participant in the activities of law enforcement.
That the special inquiry judge is affiliated with the law enforcement branch of the government is apparent in several regards. First, the very purpose of the Criminal Investigatory Act of 1971 which established the special inquiry judge is "to serve law enforcement in combating crime and corruption." RCW 10.27.010.
Second, this court has recognized that the Washington special inquiry statute is patterned after the 1-man grand jury law of Michigan. State v. Manning, supra at 274. There, we stated that the statute provides for a procedure to investigate crime or corruption with a view toward causing a criminal prosecution. See also State v. Madry, 8 Wn. App. 61, 504 P.2d 1156 (1972).
Thus, the very purpose of the proceeding inevitably associates the special inquiry judge with law enforcement. Because of the close association to law enforcement, and the similarity to the 1-man grand jury, the reasoning of United States v. Defalco, 509 F. Supp. 127 (S.D. Fla. 1981) is applicable here. In Defalco, a grand jury returned an indictment charging 45 defendants with one count of conspiracy to commit interstate transportation of obscene materials, and listing as obscene approximately 100 films and 30 magazines. United States magistrates then issued *93search warrants for evidence of obscene materials and the conspiracy to transport them, relying upon the grand jury's indictment to supply the requisite probable cause. The Defalco court held that, since the grand jury was not the neutral and detached magistrate required by the constitution, the evidence seized pursuant to the warrants must be suppressed:
With regard to the role of the grand jury, the Court finds that while, in an ideal sense, a grand jury is supposed to be a body independent of any of the three branches of the government, the reality is, and the courts have recognized, that grand juries are under the control of the prosecutor.
(Citations omitted.) Defalco, at 138.
Similarly, while members of the judiciary are supposed to be independent of law enforcement, the reality is that the special inquiry judge is a major participant in an investigatory process which is specifically designed as an aid to law enforcement. As pointed out in Hawkins v. State, 130 Ga. App. 426, 427, 203 S.E.2d 622 (1973), there is no way that a person can investigate a criminal case and then attempt to review his own investigation with neutrality and impartiality.
The majority attempts to justify its position by implying that the special inquiry judge plays a passive role in the investigatory process. The majority distinguishes the function of the inquiry judge from that of a grand jury by pointing out that the inquiry judge cannot issue indictments.
The inability to issue indictments is not a criterion which implies neutrality and detachment. The investigating police officers also are not entitled to issue indictments. However, no one would attempt to say that they maintain the neutrality and detachment necessary to issue search warrants.
The inquiry judge actively participates and assists the prosecutor in accumulating information relevant to a criminal investigation. The judge who serves as the investigatory tool of the prosecution has been exposed to rumor, innu*94endo and unfounded testimony from inquiry witnesses. He cannot be expected to disregard his impressions and opinions compiled in the course of the investigatory role and become the neutral and detached judicial officer required for performing subsequent judicial acts in the same case.
The majority notes that the deputy prosecutor, in his request for an additional warrant on March 3, 1982, asked the special inquiry judge to incorporate by reference prior proceedings before him. Majority opinion, at 81. The judge's knowledge, necessarily outside the affidavits in support of the search warrants, negated neutrality and detachment.
That the special inquiry is generally under the control of the prosecutor rather than the special inquiry judge detracts from the majority's position. The special inquiry judge sits at the behest of the prosecutor, and enforces the prosecutor's requests for production of witnesses and other evidence. As an investigatory tool of the prosecutor, the special inquiry judge is necessarily aligned with the prosecutor during the course of the investigation. The special inquiry proceeding is an activity of law enforcement.
In its holding that due process prohibits the 1-man grand jury from sitting as the judge in a proceeding for contempt occurring in an earlier grand jury proceeding, the United States Supreme Court discussed the relationship of impartiality to our system of justice. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 99 L. Ed. 942, 75 S. Ct. 623 (1955). The Court said, "Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness." Murchison, at 136. The Court further stated,
A single "judge-grand jury" is even more a part of the accusatory process than an ordinary lay grand juror. Having been a part of that process a judge cannot be, in the very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquitted of those accused. While he would not likely have all the zeal of a prosecutor, it can certainly not be said that he would have none of that zeal.
*95Murchison, at 137.
If one were to disregard the statutory disqualification, a per se disqualification of a special inquiry judge is warranted. As the majority points out, Judge Pitt's active participation in the investigation appears from the record to be minimal. Nevertheless, a case-by-case approach can serve only to delay proceedings by requiring defendants to challenge any evidence seized under a warrant issued by a special inquiry judge.
[TJhere is much to be said for the proposition that any effort to assess the neutrality of a law enforcement official . . . would "involve the lower courts in a complicated fact-finding process which is better avoided by a prophylactic rule."
2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.2(a), at 32 (1978).
It is probable that the Legislature in enacting RCW 10.27.180 which disqualifies the special inquiry judge from issuing warrants, believed either that a per se disqualification better serves judicial efficiency than a case-by-case determination of neutrality and detachment, or that the very appointment as a special inquiry judge precluded neutrality and detachment in all circumstances. Whatever the Legislature's motives, the special inquiry judge is disqualified by statute and because his role does not meet the due process requirement of neutrality and detachment. The warrants issued by the special inquiry judge should be quashed.
Cunningham, J. Pro Tern., concurs with Rosellini, J.
Reconsideration denied December 13, 1984.