Kennedy v. Sundown Speed Marine, Inc.

Dimmick, J.

(concurring in the result) — I concur in the result only, and not with the reasoning of the majority. I also agree with the dissent that the issue is whether the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

I would affirm the trial court's determination that proper *549service was effectuated upon Mr. Machupa. At the time the trial court entered the default judgment against Volvo Penta it had apparent jurisdiction pursuant to the sheriff's return of service. However, Volvo subsequently challenged Mr. Machupa's authority to accept service on its behalf. At the time of hearing, the trial court had before it two affidavits asserting that Mr. Machupa was not authorized by the corporation. On the other hand, the plaintiff presented a letter from James Dunlo, the deputy sheriff who served the process, on the official letterhead of the sheriff in Chesapeake, Virginia. The letter unequivocally stated that Mr. Machupa had express authority from the corporation to accept the summons and complaint. Plaintiff's counsel told the court that he could get an affidavit stating the same thing if required to do so. The trial court accepted the letter rather than delaying the matter by waiting for a formal affidavit containing the same information. I will not substitute my judgment for that of the trial judge as to the wisdom of accepting that letter rather than a formal affidavit. He obviously concluded that the letter was reliable evidence and chose to accord it great weight.

Upon review of the entire record before the trial court and the applicable law, I agree with the trial court that Mr. Machupa was a specially authorized agent of Volvo Penta expressly for the acceptance of this summons and complaint. Thus, I would reverse the Court of Appeals, which totally ignored the letter, and affirm the trial court.

Williams and Dore, JJ., concur with Dimmick, J.