dissenting:
In this case the defendant filed a “Motion for Disclosure of Informants’ Identity,” seeking disclosure of the informant referred to in the affidavit of Detective Mario P. Luchetta, and a “Motion to Suppress and for Return of Property.” In support of the latter motion the defendant submitted an unverified affidavit in which she stated: “I hereby verify the facts and contentions contained in the attached MOTION TO SUPPRESS” and “[A]ny additional statements of fact will violate my constitutional privilege against self-incrimination.” In addition she stated that her attorney had informed her that the search and seizure was unlawful and, as such, violated her constitutional rights. The motion to suppress did not specify the statements in the officer’s affidavit which she challenged.
At a hearing on the issue of whether the informant’s name should be disclosed, defense counsel, relying on People v. Dailey, 639 P.2d 1068 (Colo.1982), took the position that he was entitled to test whether the police officer or the informant gave false information.
The district attorney argued that in order to have a hearing based on People v. Dailey, supra, there had to be an initial showing by the defendant of some type of dispute concerning the affidavit of the police officer.
The trial court, although it didn’t believe that a bald statement made by the defendant that she had reason to believe the allegations in the officer’s affidavit were untrue was sufficient, permitted the defendant to take the witness stand and testify concerning who was in her house between the dates of January 9 and 11, 1982. After the defendant testified, the People advised
the court that Luchetta was the only person who knew the name of the informant and, since he was not present, offered no evidence.
The trial court, then ordered that the informant be produced for an in camera hearing pursuant to People v. Dailey, supra.
The majority opinion affirms the ruling of the trial court on the basis that, even though the affidavit of the defendant and the motion to suppress were conclusory and did not comply with the prerequisites of Dailey, the prosecution did not object to the foundation laid by defense counsel or to the procedure followed by the trial judge.
I have three points of disagreement with the majority opinion. First, as noted by the majority, the defendant’s affidavit was con-clusory. Therefore, there was absolutely no showing by the defendant of “some good faith basis in fact to question the accuracy of an affidavit for search warrant” before the hearing. People v. Dailey, supra.
Second, the motion to suppress did not specify which statements in the police officer’s affidavit would be challenged. The only reference in the motion to his affidavit was that it “is replete with statements consciously made in reckless disregard for the truth or with knowledge of their falsehood.” As we stated in Dailey, “fairness to the prosecution requires that the motion to suppress specify which statements in the affidavit will be challenged.... ” Here we have no such specificity, and the general statement made was one of over a dozen grounds for suppression.
Third, the prosecution did object to the foundation laid by defense counsel.1
*264The defendant failed to meet the conditions for a veracity hearing set out in Dai-ley, and the trial court erred in permitting the defendant to take the witness stand. There was no affidavit filed by the defendant that reflected a good faith basis for the challenge, and her motion did not specify the precise statements challenged.
In my opinion, the court, by affirming the order of dismissal, has negated, the clear and precise requirements set out in Dailey. By this opinion the bench and bar will be on notice that any attack on the affidavit supporting a search warrant can be commenced by surmise and conjecture.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice HODGES joins me in this dissent.
. Defense counsel stated: “The question is whether it’s Mr. Luchetta or whether, in fact, the confidential informant gave false information and that’s what we’re allowed to test.” The district attorney then said:
“Your Honor, I only have one problem with this. I think that to trigger the action of the case law which has recently come down [People v. Dailey], there has to be some evidence shown that would cause some sort of dispute. In other words, something has to be shown that would trigger it. It isn’t automatic just because we have an affidavit with a confidential informant.”
Shortly thereafter, defense counsel offered the defendant as a witness. The court said, “Let’s proceed,” and the district attorney then said, “I think you better do that.” It is this last statement of the district attorney upon which the majority relies to support its conclusion that “the prosecution did not object to the foundation laid by defense counsel at the hearing [except to question credibility] or to the procedure followed by the trial judge.”