I respectfully dissent. The majority bases its decision almost exclusively upon its construction of Code of Civil Procedure section 1500 et seq., the Unclaimed Property Law (UPL). It draws a careful history of the legislation and analyzes it closely but in a virtual vacuum. Consequently, the majority arrives at a reasonable but unpersuasive result. The Public Utilities Commission (Commission), in my view, acted within its power in designing a plan which protected Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company’s (Pacific) customers.
The Commission stands nearly alone among state agencies as a constitutionally empowered, independent, multifunctioned body whose mandate is to represent and protect the public good. (See Comment (1965) 38 So.Cal.L.Rev. 144.) The Legislature codified the range of Commission power when it authorized it to “do all things necessary and convenient” in regulating “every public utility in the State.” (Pub. Util. Code, § 701.) The extent of the Commission’s authority evinces the Legislature’s concern that utilities exert virtually monopolistic control over necessary services and therefore require close monitoring. (Arnebergh, Public Utilities Regulation and the Community Interest (1957) 30 So.Cal.L.Rev. 191.) Consistently, this court has construed the Legislature’s intent likewise, finding the Commission’s duties, functions and powers to be far reaching. (Consumers Lobby Against Monopolies v. Public Utilities Com. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 891, 905 [160 Cal.Rptr. 124, 603 P.2d 41]; People v. Superior Court (1965) 62 Cal.2d 515, 518 [42 Cal.Rptr. 849, 399 P.2d 385].) The Commission’s broad discretion, then, is rooted in the Constitution and legislative scheme which has been affirmed by this court.
The Commission has been vested with particular authority: its factual findings will be presumed final; its legal findings may be appealed, but only to this court. (Pub. Util. Code, § 1756.) Our review is limited in that we can overrule a Commission’s finding of law only if it violates a petitioner’s constitutional right (Pub. Util. Code, § 1757) or “fails to bear a reasonable relation to statutory purposes and language.” (Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Public Utilities Com. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 406,410 [67 Cal.Rptr. 97,438 P.2d 801].) This limited power of review, coupled with the clear mandate in Public Utilities Code section 701 giving the Commission wide discretionary powers to regulate public utilities, goes to the heart of the controversy in the instant case. Here the Controller has the substantial burden of showing the Commission’s error before this court can properly set aside the Commission’s procedure. The Controller fails.
All parties agree that the Commission’s initial order requiring Pacific to refund nearly $381 million to its customers who received services between 1974 and 1980 complied with Public Utilities Code section 453.5. Current customers who were customers during those years simply received their refund in the form of a credit. Pacific tried to locate former customers and gave refunds in *530the form of drafts. Those who remain unreimbursed are former customers Pacific was unable to locate. Apparently, some of those persons have since died, moved elsewhere without leaving a forwarding address, or moved into other households. There is nothing in the record to indicate a lack of diligence or good faith on Pacific’s part.
Having acknowledged the Commission’s broad authority, we now analyze its reading of section 453.3. The provision was added in 1977 in order to identify the proper recipients of refunds based on utility overcharges: customers are to be reimbursed as fairly as possible. Section 453.5 protects all current utility customers and former customers when practicable. In the instant case, the Commission found that the requirement had been sastified by Pacific’s efforts and proposed a second distribution to current customers only when Pacific reported that more than $5 million remained undistributed. The Commission’s reading of section 453.5 is not the only possible reading in this case, but it is reasonable.
The Controller argues that the UPL protects the interests of the absent property owners. I agree. The Controller Further insists that reading the UPL and section 453.5 must result in the unclaimed monies being escheated to the state, because utility refunds are no longer exempt from the UPL. In arguing for application of section 453.5, on the other hand, the Commission notes that specific statutes control general statutes, which is ordinarily the rule. (Cohn v. Isensee (1920) 45 Cal.App. 531, 536 [188 P. 279].) Both statutes deal with the disposition of funds not in the hands of the rightful owner. The purpose of each is consumer protection. Given this common ground, this court ought to harmonize the statutes (Long Beach City School Dist. v. Payne (1933) 219 Cal. 598, 605 [28 P.2d 663]), which the majority fails to do. Harmonizing statutory provisions which appear to be antagonistic requires a look at the purpose of each statutory scheme. Here we must begin by recognizing the Commission’s broad powers to regulate telephone use and protect customers. Then we must ask whether the Commission has abused its power or violated the UPL.
First, a careful reading of the UPL shows that a primary purpose is to prevent windfalls to holders of unclaimed property who are not rightful owners. Here Pacific is the holder of the unclaimed property. It stands to gain no windfall, however, because it is asserting no interest in keeping the money. Therefore, the Commission’s plan does not evade this important UPL purpose.
Second, the UPL authorizes the unclaimed property to inure to the state for safe keeping until the rightful owner claims it. In effect, the state uses the money, knowing that historically no more than 50 percent of the absent owners ever claim their property. (Majority opn., ante at p. 528.) The question becomes whether the state is the appropriate recipient of a portion of monies *531which Pacific’s customers were overcharged; that is, whether the Commission abused its power in ordering a second credit which includes all overcharges and will benefit present customers. Current customers have a direct relationship to Pacific, whereas general taxpayers as a class, and the state itself, have none. Consequently, the group that section 453.5 intends to protect is the group that would benefit from the Commission’s plan.
Finally, we add a purely practical observation. The Controller contends that current customers stand to gain a windfall (of approximately 65 cents each) by receiving the absent customers’ refunds. However, with utilities there is never an exact correlation between payments and services. Customers regularly pay for utility improvements which will not be available for years.
I am unwilling to argue that the Commission’s discretion is boundless. A different plan, or a different factual situation, could mandate a different result. If, for example, $10,000 were owed each customer there is little question that a Commission plan contrary to the UPL would be an abuse of discretion. The record before us, however, presents a picture of the Commission’s reasonable, systematic approach fashioned to protect current and past Pacific customers. Our duty ends when we determine that the Commission operated within its broad discretionary power.
The Commission chose a procedure which was designed to benefit Pacific’s customers. I believe it has operated under the requirements of Public Utilities Code section 453.5 and within the goals of the UPL. Therefore, I believe the Commission’s plan should be affirmed.