CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION OF CIRCUIT JUDGE
TSUKIYAMAI concur as to all Defendants except Hawaii Tribune Herald, Ltd. (HTH). In my view, the same issue of fact exists as to the “good faith” of both UPI and HTH in publishing patently defamatory statements.
I subscribe to the majority opinion’s thoughtful analysis of the legal precepts which govern the disposition of the issues herein. However, it is my opinion that in a summary judgment setting there are other considerations which must be specifically addressed and emphasized in balancing First Amendment guarantees against the right of an individual to privacy and protection against defamatory lies. These considerations require a reversal as to HTH.
*158The mandate of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), is that the public interest which is subserved by the First Amendment requires the courts to shield any person or the established media from liability for defamatory lies about a public official unless the official defamed can establish with convincing clarity that the defamatory lies were made with “ ‘actual malice’ - that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.” Id. at 280. The essence of “reckless disregard” is “good faith.” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
The qualification of “good faith” reflects a modicum of protection for the individual public official which the Times rule allows in recognition of the rights of the public official as an individual. The distinction between the public official as a public servant and as an individual was aptly expressed in the dissenting opinion in St. Amant v. Thompson, supra, and repeated in Tagawa v. Maui Publishing Co., 50 Haw. 648 at 655 (1968).
The occupation of public officeholder does not forfeit one’s membership in the human race.
In applying the Times rule in a summary judgment setting, we must recognize that this rule does not confer upon any person or the established media a license to publish defamatory lies about a public official. Neither Times nor its progeny would hold that the First Amendment immunizes any person or the established media from civil liability for defamation. Nowhere is it suggested, and certainly we should not conclude, that Times requires the courts to place a premium upon reckless lies to ensure the ascertainment of truth or to presume that the public is interested in or benefits from such defamatory lies about the personal qualities and activities of public officials.
In the process of balancing First Amendment guarantees against the rights of a public official as an individual, we must be mindful of the existence of public interests which compete with the particular interest which is protected by the Times rule. It is axiomatic that the public interest is subserved by uninhibited, robust and wide-open debate on public issues and officials and that the dissemination of erroneous information must be protected as a concommitant of such debate. On the other hand, the public interest is also subserved by the recruit*159ment and retention of competent public officials and by the ascertainment of truth.
A public official is not stripped of his private identity and integrity by virtue of his office. To expose an individual to reckless and vicious defamatory lies of a personal nature without providing any remedy therefor or an opportunity for vindication, merely because the individual provides a few hours of uncompensated service to the public, would effectively discourage any sensible, highly qualified individual from consenting to public service. The absence of such individuals from public service clearly would be contrary to the public’s best interest.
We must be sensitive also to the public’s interest which is subserved by the ascertainment of the truth. A summary judgment against a public official in a defamation action terminates the legal proceeding which is intended to provide the parties with an opportunity of demonstrating, and the public of determining, the truth or falsity of the defamatory matter published. It thereby precludes the ascertainment of truth and deprives the public of any basis for the vindication or condemnation of the public official. Unless there is clearly no genuine issue of material fact for consideration by a jury, a summary judgment in a defamation action merely creates doubt and suspicion and subserves neither the interest of the public nor the public official.
In imposing limitations upon First Amendment guarantees, the established media cannot be held to the standard of an insurer of the truth of everything that it publishes. Such an obligation would effectively stifle the First Amendment. However, the imposition of a “good faith” requirement in the publication of defamatory statements about the personal qualities or activities of a public official does not have the effect of suppressing the kind of debate on public issues and officials which would subserve the public’s interest. St. Amant v. Thompson, supra. But, a summary judgment against a public official in a defamation action definitely would have the effect of suppressing, and encouraging speculation and distortions about, the truth. Depending on the facts of each case, the limitation which the “good faith” requirement places upon First Amendment guarantees may indeed be de minimus as *160compared to the irreparable loss to the public resulting from the suppression of the truth and the irreparable injury to the public official.
In light of the foregoing considerations, it is my opinion that the majority opinion’s analysis, which leads to the conclusion that there is a genuine issue of fact as to UPI, applies to HTH.
In determining whether there is a genuine issue of fact as to the “good faith” of HTH, the Court must address the question of whether the statements published “are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation” St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. at 732. See also Goldwater v. Ginzburg 414 F.2d 324 (2nd Cir. 1969) cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
On June 16, 1977, HTH published a virtually word-for-word account of the UPI story which was released on June 15, 1977. HTH added the story headline “Godfather Named.” HTH made several unsuccessful attempts to contact Mehau prior to its publication of the initial UPI story.
The story headline composed by HTH could be construed as implying that there existed a “godfather” and that the story merely identified him. The story contained no basis for this implication and there was no indication that the persons making the charge had any facts or personal knowledge relative thereto. There can be no question of the seriousness of the statements made in the publication and of their public importance. Neither is there any question of the patently defamatory nature of the allegations and the irreparable injury it would cause a public official if untrue. Moreover, if untrue, such allegations would serve no better purpose than to recklessly undermine the public’s confidence in its public officials and government generally. The public’s interest is not subserved by the erosion of the public’s confidence in its government officials as a result of defamatory lies.
Given what appears to be the circumstances surrounding the initial dissemination of the UPI story, there appeared to be no basis for the urgent publication of the story. It does not appear that a responsible investigation of the allegations prior to its publication would have jeopardized the public’s interest. *161Indeed, given the nature of the allegations, the public’s interest in the truth thereof, and the individual’s right against defamatory lies, the public’s interest would have been subserved only by a responsible and balanced presentation of the allegations and the facts pertinent thereto.
The UPI story identified Mehau as a member of the State Land Board and thereby must have alerted HTH that he held a position of public trust. In light of the serious and patently defamatory nature of the UPI story, and the position of public trust held by the subject, a jury could find that the allegations were “inherently improbable” and that there was an obvious basis for doubting the veracity thereof.
HTH asserted that it relied entirely upon UPI for the accuracy of the story and that it had no reason to doubt its accuracy. Even if these assertions were true, such reliance and belief would not preclude a finding by a jury of “actual malice,” i.e. that the defamatory allegation was made with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Similar assertions were responded to in Goldwater v. Ginzburg, supra.
Reliance upon newspaper articles . . . and upon accurate reprinting of another’s letter are only factors which, with other factors, are probative of whether the publisher of the cumulated material was motivated by actual malice when he caused the full material to be published. Repetition of another’s words does not release one of responsibility if the repeater knows that the words are inherently improbable, or there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the person quoted or the accuracy of his report. Id. at 337.
In the circumstances surrounding HTH’s publication of the initial UPI story, I believe that there exists a factual dispute as to whether the HTH publication was made with “actual malice,” and further that a reasonable jury acting reasonably could find “actual malice” with convincing clarity.
I would reverse and remand as to HTH.