(dissenting)—This case poses problems similar to those previously ruled upon in Eagan v. Spellman, 90 Wn.2d 248, 581 P.2d 1038 (1978). Essentially, the outcome of the case depends upon whether the court characterizes the challenged legislation as pension legislation or as an act relating to an employee's form of compensation. While it is arguable that the result reached by the majority is correct, to reach that result this court must declare it does not believe what the Legislature clearly stated it intended by the enactment of the statute. Where the intent of the Legislature is debatable, and I believe from the legislative history of this act its intent is debatable, it is improper for this court, as a separate branch of government, to impose its *690views upon another branch of government, contrary to their stated purpose in enacting the legislation.
In presuming the impermissible, rather than the permissible, intent, the majority acts in stark contrast to usual principles of statutory construction. Cf. Salstrom's Vehicles, Inc. v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 87 Wn.2d 686, 690-91, 555 P.2d 1361 (1976) (statute to be presumed constitutional and existence of necessary state of facts to be assumed); 2A C. Sands, Statutory Construction § 48.17 (4th ed. 1973) (absent expression in statute itself, legislature's motive is to be disregarded).
Such action by this court does violence to a responsible respect for the separation of powers between independent branches of government. Rather than involving this court in the morass of problems involving pension legislation and funding, I believe it is better judicial policy to accept the legislation on its face. It is an act relating to employees' form of compensation and not pension rights. We should let the Legislature, and not this court, judge the wisdom of the act. I would reverse the decision of the trial court.