(dissenting) — I dissent. The majority not only legislates, it renders an advisory opinion on a variety of subjects and is clearly erroneous.
The deputy sheriff made a lawful arrest. The defendant possessed an expired driver's license and indicated an intent to continue driving in violation of the law.
*51The arresting officer was entitled to enforce the law and prevent further violations of the statutes. In the course of exercising his discretion, that officer under all the applicable cases, was entitled to search the defendant. He did so and found contraband.
This court should not do two things (1) second-guess the officer's exercise of discretion and (2) legislate what the legislature has declined to do in "decriminalizing" minor traffic offenses.
The United States Supreme Court has approved the pro: cedures followed by the officer. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 94 S. Ct. 467 (1973), and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 38 L. Ed. 2d 456, 94 S. Ct. 488 (1973). The majority admits that.
Under the majority ruling the officer almost needs an appellate court riding his patrol vehicle to advise of the changing nature of the rules.
The unwarranted excursion of the majority is evidenced by its gratuitous holdings that no civil liability attaches to this particular arrest, that it is prospective only and no one else benefits from the holding. These are all issues not before us and indicate the bizarre departure from the heretofore established rules.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
Hamilton and Stafford, JJ., concur with Brachtenbach, J.