(concurring specially) .
I agree with the views expressed in the majority opinion herein this day promulgated of effect that Oklahoma does not have a well-defined period for bringing challenges to general obligation bond elections as contemplated in the referenced opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States and that the special election herein involved is not now open to challenge on the basis of that opinion. Moreover, I desire to express my further views as hereinafter appearing.
A state may establish other qualifications than residence for the exercise of the elective franchise. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d 675 (1965). Equal protection of the law does not require identity of treatment. It does require that classification be based on real differences, not wholly arbitrary. Walters v. City of St. Louis, 347 U.S. 231, 74 S.Ct. 505, 98 L.Ed. 660 (1954). Settle v. City of Muskogee, Okl., 462 P.2d 642, 646 (1969).
Since 1940, at the latest, our Constitution has been of interpretation as rendering “ineligible to vote on the question of bonded debts by municipalities those qualified voters who do not pay taxes on real or personal property.” (Emphasis supplied). Henry v. Oklahoma City et al., 188 Okl. 308, 108 P.2d 148, 152, (1940).
In my opinion, the first paragraph of the opinion of the majority of the Court *57in the case of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 90 S.Ct. 1990, 26 L.Ed.2d 523 (1970), distinguishes that case on the facts from our present case. There, the question was stated to be: Does the Federal Constitution permit a State to restrict to real property taxpayers the vote in elections to approve the issuance of general obligation bonds? (Emphasis supplied).
From the facts stated in Phoenix and the notes appended thereto a second compelling variance from our facts is set forth. There it is stated that property taxes were to be levied to service the involved indebtedness but in addition, the City was authorized to allocate other revenues for the same purpose and, in fact, on a general obligation debt service requirement of $5,594,937.00 for fiscal year 1969-1970, made a payment, typical of those made in recent years, of more than 55% of such general obligation service requirements or to be exact from such other sources paid $3,244,773.00 thereof.
Here, the applicable State Constitutional provision requires annual tax levies on personal and real property in the city, sufficient to meet all interest and principal maturities. Of course, a city may pay for permanent capital improvements out of current earnings as distinguished from ad valorem levies. Alsip v. City of Chandler, Okl., 408 P.2d 512 (1965). However, this was not firmly established until 1965 in Alsip, wherein are cited other earlier cases of that effect.
And, while it may be done, it is well known that only in six or eight cities and towns in Oklahoma in the past half century or so have there been sufficient funds from sources other than ad valorem tax revenues to pay any considerable amount of the expenses of municipal government above those categories of expenditures to which they were primarily allocable, viz., the cities of Stillwater, Wynnewood, et al. And, in each of those instances I daresay they were paid with funds produced from waterworks originally built from bond money taxable back to the owners of real and personal property, if not paid by revenues from the involved utility.
As to the facts of the present case, everybody knows Oklahoma City has issued millions of dollars in revenue bonds repayable from sewer taxes, water rents and what not to build capital improvements not obtainable from tax revenues within the constitutional debt limits, and had to enact a sales tax to make salary adjustments for its employees. This is not a condemnation of Oklahoma City. To the contrary, it demonstrates that Oklahoma City and its citizens and officials must use all lawful and constitutional sources of revenue available to provide the varied services required of so large a modern, metropolitan, growing city and yet maintain its cash position “in the' black”.
In copy of the published election proclamation attached to petition filed in the trial court in the case from which the appeal, sister to this case, arose, pursuant to authority vested in Oklahoma City by Article X, Section 27, Oklahoma Constitution, the City specified in the several involved propositions being voted upon that in addition to, that is, on top of all other taxes of all sorts the personal and real property ad valorem taxpayers were already paying, that those such taxpayers who voted were voting tax liens for different, additional taxes against their such respective properties.
In the election with which we are here concerned, it is my belief that the election authorities have not arbitrarily discriminated against any one for the following re-emphasized reasons, to-wit:
1. In Phoenix, Mrs. Kolodzieski was a qualified voter except that she owned no taxable real estate. As an owner of taxable personalty, in Oklahoma City at the involved election she would have been welcomed at the polls.
2. Oklahoma City must and perforce will pay for the improvements obtained with the proceeds of this bond issue from revenues received only from ad *58valorem taxes on real and personal property.
I respectfully concur specially.