Appellant, Mitchell Construction, was awarded the general contract to construct an office building to house the State of Idaho Department of Agriculture. All phases of the building have been completed except the roof, which is allegedly defective and has never been approved or accepted by the state. The state sued Mitchell for the “cost of repair or replacement” of the roof. In order to indemnify its potential liability, Mitchell filed third party complaints against the architect, the roof subcontractor Linton, Inc., and Linton’s two major suppliers, one of which is respondent Neogard Corporation of Dallas, Texas.
Neogard developed an “elastomeric” roofing process, which is a layer of urethane foam sandwiched between flexible membranes, all of which is applied through a spraying process. Neogard manufactured the membrane materials and supplied them to the subcontractor along with application specifications. Neogard was instrumental, through its sales representative, in persuading the state’s architect to include Neogard's elastomeric roof in the general contract specifications as an alternate type roof. Neogard was also instrumental in locating a licensed applicator to apply the roof as the subcontractor when the state architect ultimately approved an elastomeric roof for the building. However, Neogard had no direct dealings with Mitchell in negotiations, nor did Neogard sell any products directly to Mitchell.
Mitchell alleged that Neogard is liable for the defective roof on the theories of negligence, strict liability and breach of implied and express warranties. The district court granted summary judgment to Neogard, holding that: (1) the damages sought are merely economic damages; (2) economic damages cannot be recovered in negligence and strict liability actions; and (3) economic damages cannot be recovered in breach of implied and express warranty actions in the absence of privity of contract. Mitchell appealed the grant of sum..mary judgment to Neogard, and assigned as error the district court’s holding on only two issues: (1) whether “privity of contract should be a prerequisite to a products liability action based on express warranty,” and (2) whether “the loss suffered by the State of Idaho amounted to economic loss
Regarding the economic loss characterization issue, Mitchell asserts that the loss suffered by the state is property damage rather than economic loss which our prior cases have held will not support a tort action in either negligence or strict liability. Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784 (1978). However, Mitchell has produced no evidence by affidavit, and the record contains no evidence of any damage to any property other than the defective or damaged roof. Our opinion in Salmon Rivers Sportsmen Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306, 309 (1975), held that “[ejconomic loss includes cost of repair and replacement of defective property which is the subject of the transaction....” While viewing the record most favorably to Mitchell, the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, we nevertheless find that there is no issue of material fact in regard to the characterization of the damage as economic loss, and therefore the district court did not err in granting summary judgment against Mitchell on its negligence and strict liability claims.
*337Mitchell’s other assignment of error asserts that the district court erred in requiring privity of contract as a prerequisite to recovery on the theory of express warranty. The trial court granted summary judgment based upon the failure of Mitchell to show any privity of contract with Neogard, analogizing to our decision in Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 544 P.2d 306 (1975). That case held that there must be privity of contract in order to sustain an action to recover only economic losses on the theory of implied warranty. On Mitchell’s express warranty claim, the trial court specifically noted that the Court in the Salmon Rivers case had left open the question of whether or not a claim of breach of express warranty required privity of contract. The trial court concluded that privity was also necessary for a claim upon express warranty. The trial court arrived at its conclusion based upon language in both Salmon Rivers and Clark v. International Harvester Co., which indicated that express and implied warranties arise out of agreement between the parties.
In our view, there is insufficient evidence in the record to support an issue of fact as to Mitchell’s claim of the existence of an express warranty, and accordingly we affirm. The defendant Neogard, in the summary judgment proceeding, submitted an affidavit asserting that no express warranties were given regarding their product. Mitchell filed no affidavits in opposition to Neogard’s motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, the record contains no evidence that Mitchell purchased any product directly from Neogard which might give rise to a sales contract containing an express warranty. The record contains no evidence that representations, written or oral, were made to Mitchell by Neogard outside a sales agreement which could be the basis of an express warranty contract. Neither does the record contain any express warranty contract between Neogard and the State of Idaho which might arguably have been made expressly for Mitchell’s benefit.1 “A mere scintilla of evidence will not create an issue [of material fact]” and defeat a claim for summary judgment. Jephson v. Ambuel, 93 Idaho 790, 793, 473 P.2d 932, 935 (1970). Even viewing the evidence most favorably to Mitchell, we nevertheless conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to Mitchell’s claim that it is the recipient or beneficiary of an express warranty from Neogard. We therefore do not address the issue of privity of contract in express warranty.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment to Neogard is affirmed. Costs to respondent. No attorney fees allowed.
SHEPARD, J., concurs.. Although not argued by Mitchell in its brief on appeal, the record does reflect an advertising brochure apparently given to the state's architect by Neogard’s agent which, while primarily describing the elastomeric roofing system and its specifications, states that "the Neogard Corporation jointly guarantees every project with its applicators.” However, the record does not reflect that Mitchell was ever aware of this brochure when Mitchell entered into the roofing subcontract with Linton, Inc., nor does the record reflect that this statement was part of the “basis of the bargain” as that phrase is used in the analogous circumstance covered by the U.C.C., I.C. § 28-2-313(1).