dissenting:
I regret that I am unable to agree with the majority. I would affirm the decision of the trial court.
First, I would hold the appellant’s intervention does not relate back to the filing of the original complaint. The majority relies upon Marshall v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 379, 641 P.2d 867 (1982), which construes the broad language of Rule 15(c) Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, to leapfrog over the statute of limitations to the date of the original filing. Marshall involved an original plaintiff amending her complaint to assert two additional counts against the defendant. The supreme court held that the amended complaint related back to the original filing. Our factual situation, however, differs substantially. Here, Quiles is an added party who intervened as a plaintiff in an existing lawsuit long after the statute of limitations has tolled. In addition, he seeks damages well in excess of those requested by his carrier.
I find the situation here more closely analogous to the decision in Pima County v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. 221, 550 P.2d 92 (1976). There a group of plaintiffs commenced an action for damages against Pima County and other defendants. Later, certain additional plaintiffs were permitted to intervene as parties plaintiff. Their original complaint in intervention did not name Pima County as a defendant. Almost three years later, the intervening plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint to include Pima County as a defendant after expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court allowed the amendment. Pima County moved for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations, but the trial court denied the motion. On special action the supreme court held that summary judgment should have been granted in favor of Pima County. It reasoned that, though Pima County was aware of the additional plaintiffs’ claim by virtue of their intervention, relation back of amendments under Rule 15(c), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure, applied only to substituted parties, not to added parties. The court stated:
The respondents in the special action point out that Pima County has been a defendant in the action since its inception. That is true, but only as to the original plaintiffs. We hold that as to the claims of the added plaintiffs, the relation back aspect to Rule 15(c) does not apply.
Pima County v. Superior Court, 113 Ariz. at 223, 550 P.2d at 94.
I am not unmindful of various decisions allowing relation back of claims brought by new plaintiffs. Watts v. State, 115 Ariz. 545, 566 P.2d 693 (App.1977), a case in which we allowed a claim by the personal representative to relate back, is a good example. I find, however, a clear distinction between Watts, where the proper party plaintiff was inadvertently omitted from a pleading, and the instant case, where an entirely new plaintiff seeks to intervene seeking additional damages.
Second, even if appellant’s claim could somehow relate back, I would hold that in any event, Arizona Workers’ Compensation *79law applies and therefore, that appellant’s claim has passed by operation of law to his carrier.
In Ross v. Ross, 96 Ariz. 249, 393 P.2d 933 (1964), our supreme court found that “[mjatters respecting the remedy, such as the bringing of suits” is determined by the law of the forum. Id. at 251-52, 393 P.2d at 935-36. Applying the rule of Ross, I would find the right to bring a third party suit in this case to be a procedural claim, and hold, therefore, that under A.R.S. § 23-1023(B) appellant did not own the claim at the time he brought suit. I note that California, the state whose substantive law is ultimately applied by the majority, has held these very statutory provisions to be procedural in nature. See County of San Diego v. Sanfax Corp., 19 Cal.3d 862, 140 Cal.Rptr. 638, 568 P.2d 363 (1977).
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.