dissenting, with whom ROSE, Justice, partially joins.
During June 1977, appellant and a girl, within five months of being seventeen years of age, engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. On December 21, 1982, five and one-half years later as a result of an investigation into the activities of others, this incident was reported by the girl to the sheriffs office. In an information filed February 2, 1983, appellant was charged with taking “immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child” in violation of § 14-3-105, W.S.1977,1 hereafter called the indecent liberties statute. He was convicted and sentenced to one to two years in prison.
Two questions addressed in this dissent make it clear that appellant was incorrectly charged under the indecent liberties statute. They are:
*296(1) Is a “child” a person under the age of 16 years or one under the age of 18 years as the majority opinion concludes?
(2) Does the indecent liberties statute apply to sex crimes involving sexual intrusion or penetration in any event?
AGE OF A CHILD
The indecent liberties statute does not tell us who is a child. If a child is one under the age of sixteen years, appellant could not have been charged with violation of the indecent liberties statute because the girl here was over the age of sixteen. This court in the majority opinion, by referring to what it claims to be the statute immediately preceding, construes the words “any such child” found in the indecent liberties statute to mean a female under the age of eighteen years. The court is mistaken in the statute it refers to, for the statute which preceded the indecent liberties statute and which was in effect on the date this incident occurred was § 14-2-111, W.S.1977, which provided:
“Anyone who solicits for, procures for, or knowingly encourages anyone under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage in illicit sexual penetration or sexual intrusion as defined in W.S. 6-63.1 [§ 6-4-301] is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for a term not to exceed five (5) years.” (Emphasis added.)
It is true that prior to the revision of the preceding statute by enactment of § 14-2-111, W.S.1977, supra, the age specified was eighteen years. I would conclude that it was the intent of the legislature to reduce the age specified to sixteen years. That result would be in accord with
“ * * * a general rule, in the construction of compilations, revisions, or codes, that when a provision is plain and unambiguous the court cannot refer to the original statute for the purpose of ascertaining its meaning.” 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 325.
The majority opinion is incorrect on two counts. First, the statute defines “any such child” as a person under the age of sixteen years, not eighteen years of age as stated by the majority. Second, the statute does not restrict itself to females but pertains to anyone under the age of sixteen years. Applying the statute in effect at the time of this incident, § 14-2-111, supra, to the determination of who is a child under the indecent liberties statute, it is apparent that a child is one under the age of sixteen years. That being so, appellant should not have been charged with violation of the indecent liberties statute as it existed at the time of this incident since the girl involved was over the age of sixteen years.
SEXUAL ASSAULT STATUTE APPLIES
The majority opinion insists, nevertheless, that the indecent liberties statute pertains to sexual intercourse involving females under the age of eighteen years. To so construe the statute means that consensual sexual intercourse between a boy eighteen years of age and a girl one day shy of being eighteen years of age is immoral, immodest, and indecent and that the boy is guilty of a felony which may result in imprisonment for ten years.
This construction of the indecent liberties statute is clearly contrary to what the legislature intended in adopting child abuse and sexual assault statutes. At the time the indecent liberties statute was reenacted in 1977, the legislature enacted a comprehensive sexual assault statute which set forth with specificity the instances in which sexual intercourse was to be a crime in the state of Wyoming. The sexual assault statutes provided in part as follows:
“(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if:
“(i) The actor causes submission of the victim through * * * physical force or forcible confinement.” Section 6-63.2, W.S.1957.
“(a) Any actor who inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second de*297gree if, under circumstances not constituted sexual assault in the first degree:
“(vi) The actor is in a position of authority over the victim and uses this position of authority to cause the victim to submit.” Section 6-63.3, W.S.1957.
“An actor who is at least four (4) years older than the victim and who inflicts sexual penetration or sexual intrusion on a victim under the age of sixteen (16) years is guilty of sexual assault in the fourth degree.” Section 6-63.5, W.S. 1957.
The opinion of the majority states that the sexual assault statute, § 6-2-304, W.S. 1977 (§ 6-63.5), is not more specific than the indecent liberties statute because the victim under the sexual assault statute “has the ability to give a consent which will be valid if the actor is no more than four years older than the victim [but invalid if five years older].” The opinion goes on to state, “[t]his is an inconsistency and is not rational.”
The rationale behind consideration being given the age differential between the parties is best stated in the Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4 (1955), at pages 253-254:
“The rationale of statutory rape is victimization of immaturity. It seems necessary, therefore, to recognize that immature males may themselves be victims of adolescence rather than engaged in exploitation of others’ experience. * * * The most convenient way to give effect to the victimization rationale is to require a substantial age differential in favor of the male. * * *. Certainly, existing statutory provisions under which the rape label is applied to sexual experimentation by a girl just under and a boy just over 16 seem harsh and unreasonable.”
The subject is a difficult one with which to deal. There is wide disagreement over what the age of consent ought to be. The difference in ages does and should make a difference, otherwise we would be sentencing to prison sixteen-year-old boys who are no more knowledgeable, mature or capable of wise judgment than a girl about the same age. The legislature has established sixteen years as the age of consent and the effect of age upon the criminality of the act. That is the function of the legislature, and this court must give effect to the statutes pertaining to sexual assault — which I see as clear and unambiguous pronouncements.
The indecent liberties statute and the sexual assault statute both deal with sex crimes. It was contended that they were clearly in conflict, that one was specific and the other was general, and that the specific statute effected a repealer of the general statute. Justice Rose, in Ketcham v. State, Wyo., 618 P.2d 1356, 1364 (1980), analyzing this question in his dissenting opinion, stated:
“I feel that repeal-by-implication analysis is not an appropriate way to resolve the conflict between the fourth-degree-sexual-assault statute and the indecent-liberties statute.”
The majority in this case holds that it was not the intent of the legislature that either statute work a repealer of the other. I am in full agreement with that holding and am convinced that the statutes do not conflict; they deal with different areas of the broad spectrum of sex crimes and can stand together.
Sexual penetration is defined in § 6-63.1, W.S.1957, supra, as “sexual intercourse.” The age of consent under § 6-63.5, W.S.1957, supra, is sixteen years of age.
There can be no serious argument but that the sexual assault statute is a specific statute that deals with sexual penetration either as a result of force, consent, or involving a female under the age of twelve years or under the age of sixteen years. It deals specifically with what formerly was referred to as rape. In Capwell v. State, Wyo., 686 P.2d 1148, 1151 (1984), we said:
“A statute making rape a crime was first adopted in Wyoming in 1899 * * * [and] remained in effect until 1977 when the legislature undertook a comprehensive revision of the statutes * * * [and] sub*298stituted the term ‘sexual assault’ for the term ‘rape’ * *
Rape seems specific. Sexual penetration to me seems specific. It is defined in § 6-63.-1, W.S.1957, supra, as sexual intercourse, and that seems specific. I would find that the sexual assault statute deals with a narrow area of sex crime, sexual penetration or intrusion, sexual intercourse, and that is specific as opposed to being general.
Extended argument seems unnecessary to also hold that § 14-3-105, W.S.1977, supra, making it unlawful to take “immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child,” is a general statute rather than specific. Justice Rooney conceded as much when, in considering the constitutionality of this indecent liberties statute in Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031, 1033 (1979), he quoted from Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48, 96 S.Ct. 243, 244, 46 L.Ed.2d 185 (1975):
“ ‘Even trained lawyers may find it necessary to consult legal dictionaries, treatises, and judicial opinions before they may say with any certainty what some statutes may compel or forbid.’ ”
Justice Rooney then proceeded to consult the dictionary to determine the meaning of “immoral, immodest, and indecent” liberties. He then, quoting from the opinions of other courts, stated: “ ‘True, what shall be regarded as “immodest, immoral and indecent liberties” is not specified with particularity * * And he further quoted: “ ‘The root of the vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness.’ ”
In construing statutes and determining the intent of the legislature with respect to each,
“[w]e presume that the legislature enacts legislation with full knowledge of existing law and with reference to other statutes and decisions of the courts. Such legislation should, therefore, be construed in a way that creates a consistency and harmony within the existing law. Civic Ass’n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, 57 Wyo. 213, 116 P.2d 236 (1941). Statutes should be construed in pari materia and if the special act is inconsistent with the general law, the provisions of the special act will control, Carpenter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kingham, 56 Wyo. 314, 109 P.2d 463 (1941). “ ‘ * * * “It is the general rule that where the general statute standing alone would include the same matter as the special act, and thus conflict with it, the special act will be considered as an exception to the general statute whether it was passed before or after such general enactment. Where the special statute is later, it will be regarded as an exception to or qualification of the prior general one; and where the general act is later the special statute will be considered as remaining an exception to its terms unless it is repealed in general words or by necessary implication.”’ 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th Ed.1973), p. 315.” Capwell v. State, supra at 1152.
Our sexual assault statutes, §§ 6-63.1 through 6-63.13, W.S.1957, supra, deal specifically with the criminality or lack of criminality of sexual intercourse whether resulting from force or consensual. It is the specific statute, and it governs in this case. Section 14-3-105 was reenacted after the adoption of the sexual assault statute, and it evidenced a clear intent on the part of the legislature that this statute should govern the criminality of other sexual conduct not involving sexual penetration or sexual intercourse. As we stated in Capwell v. State, supra at 1153:
“This construction gives effect to both statutes and a policy that ambiguity concerning the application of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity. # * * ))
Applying the above principles to this case, we have a woman who was within five months of being seventeen years of age. She candidly admitted in her testimony that the sexual intercourse with appellant was consensual. A fair inference from her testimony and from the five-and-one-half-year delay in reporting the incident would indicate she had no wish to prosecute nor did she believe what occurred was a crime. In fact, under our sexual assault statute, *299§ 6-63.5, W.S.1957, supra, it is doubtful that there was a crime.
I recognize that here appellant was a law enforcement officer and that there may be a natural bias on the part of society against one who is entrusted with enforcing our laws having sexual relations with a girl not quite seventeen, apparently while on duty. If this law enforcement officer used his position of authority to cause submission, that was the crime of second degree sexual assault under § 6-63.3, W.S.1957, supra, and carries a penalty of one to twenty years in prison. Appellant was not charged with this crime; and the record would seem to indicate that the facts of the incident would not support that charge, but that may not be so.
I would hold that where the incident charged involves sexual penetration or sexual intercourse as in this case, whether as a result of force or consent, the sexual assault statute is the statute under which the charge should be filed. I would, therefore, reverse and remand this case to the trial court.
. Section 14-3-105, W.S.1977, was a reenactment of the statute in effect at the time of this incident; § 14-2-112, W.S.1977, then in effect, provided:
"(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, including but not limited to parent, guardian or custodian knowingly to take immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any such child or knowingly to cause or encourage any such child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him or her any immoral or indecent act.
"(b) Any person who shall violate the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof shall be fined in any sum not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not to exceed ten (10) years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
See majority opinion for a discussion that the charge was brought under a statute not then in effect but held not to be prejudicial to appellant.