dissenting: I dissent. While I fully agree with the principles of law enunciated in the majority opinion, I do not feel they apply to the facts of this case. Here we have a claim dispute between two insurance companies. Over the course of three years the companies corresponded between one another as to the status of the claim. The defendants admitted liability for one-half of plaintiffs’ claim but stated their liability for the other half depended on the outcome of a declaratory judgment between defendants and another insurance company. This was an explanation of why payment to plaintiffs was delayed. The statements of defendants were not fraudulent, misleading or deceptive. Defendants did not induce or attempt to induce plaintiffs to delay filing their cause of action. Insurance companies are specialists in the field of claims and litigation. In the absence of a strong showing of inducement, plaintiffs should not be permitted to rely on equitable estoppel to vary the statute of limitations.
Equitable estoppel is not available to one who because of his own acts or failure to act has suffered a loss. Equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. (See, Younger v. Estate of Younger, 198 Kan. 547, 426 P.2d 67 [1967]; Rex v. Warner, 183 Kan. 763, 332 P.2d 572 [1958].)
The decision of the trial court should have been affirmed.
McFarland, J., joins the foregoing dissenting opinion.