Opinion
CLARK, J.Appeal from judgment denying petition for writ of mandate or prohibition to compel respondent municipal court to appoint an interpreter in a civil action. We affirm the judgment.
A property damage action arising from an automobile accident was filed against appellant in the municipal court. Represented by a staff attorney of the Southeast Legal Aid Center founded under the Office of Economic Opportunity, he filed an answer and cross-complaint. Alleging indigency and inability to speak or understand English, appellant moved the court to appoint an interpreter skilled in English and Spanish, without expense to himself. The court denied the motion.
Appellant then commenced the instant writ proceeding in the superior court. That court concluded appellant does not have a common law right to an interpreter, and that refusal to appoint an interpreter for an indigent litigant in a civil case does not constitute abuse of discretion or denial of either due process or equal protection of the law.
Statutory Basis For Appointment
No statutory basis exists for appointment of an interpreter at public expense to assist non-English speaking litigants. Evidence Code section 752 provides for court appointment of an interpreter for a witness. An interpreter for a witness performs a different and much less burdensome function than an interpreter for a party. The witness’ interpreter is essential to permit the witness to understand questions asked and to inform counsel, judge and jury of the witness’ responses. By contrast, an interpreter for the litigant would interpret communications between the litigant and his counsel and all oral proceedings at trial including testimony by English-speaking witnesses, and communications of attorneys, judge, and jurors.
*184Inherent Power Of The Court
A trial court has inherent power to waive its filing fees to accommodate indigents in civil litigation. (Martin v. Superior Court (1917) 176 Cal. 289, 290 et seq. [168 P. 135]; Earls v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 109, 113 [98 Cal.Rptr. 302, 490 P.2d 814].) Appellate courts also have inherent power to waive filing fees for indigent civil litigants. (Ferguson v. Keays (1971) 4 Cal.3d 649, 653 et seq. [94 Cal.Rptr. 398, 484 P.2d 70].) However, appellant does not seek waiver of ordinary court costs or fees. Rather, he seeks retention of an interpreter to be paid for by the county or some other public agency.
In Ferguson, we did not reach the question whether indigents must be given funds to pay third party charges in civil cases. (4 Cal.3d at p. 654.) Subsequent cases have refused to require counties to provide indigent civil litigants with counsel or with appellate transcripts. (Leslie v. Roe (1974) 41 Cal.App.3d 104, 107 [116 Cal.Rptr. 386]; Hunt v. Hackett (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 134, 137-138 [111 Cal.Rptr. 456].)
Providing for appointed counsel for indigent prisoner defendants in Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908 [132 Cal.Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565], this court expressly pointed out that we do not possess the power to require expenditure of public funds for the purpose. Rather, attorneys are expected to serve gratuitously as part of their public responsibilities. (17 Cal.3d at p. 920, fn. 6.)
Determining whether indigent civil litigants should be provided interpreters at public expense, we first weigh the problem by considering the alternatives open to the litigants. In contemporary urban society, the non-English speaking individual has access to a variety of sources for language assistance. Members of his family, friends or neighbors—born or schooled here—may provide aid. Private organizations also exist to aid immigrants. (Cf. Guerrero v. Carleson (1973) 9 Cal.3d 808, 813 [109 Cal.Rptr. 201, 512 P.2d 833].) When counsel does not speak the litigant’s language, he too may secure aid from such persons and organizations to communicate with his client. Courtroom proceedings, of course, are controlled by counsel, and the absence of an interpreter for his client to explain court proceedings as they occur has not been shown to constitute a substantial burden.
Appellant questions the competence of family members and friends to interpret complex legal proceedings. However, court certified interpreters *185are certainly not lawyers and even if appointed, the complexities will remain. In any event it is counsel—not his client—who controls the litigation and must understand the proceedings at trial.
Appellant relies upon Gardiana v. Small Claims Court (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 412 [130 Cal.Rptr. 675] holding that in small claims court volunteer interpreters should be appointed when one of the parties does not speak English, and if volunteers are unavailable, an interpreter should be appointed and compensated at public expense. In support of the latter conclusion the court reasoned that Evidence Code section 752 requires appointment of an interpreter when a witness does not speak or understand English, that courts have an inherent power to appoint interpreters when necessary to the administration of justice, and that refusal to appoint an interpreter—as a practical matter—would restrict an indigent’s access to the courts.
The court’s reasoning must be viewed in light of the nature of a small claims court, and when this is done the case is clearly distinguishable. That court functions informally and expeditiously. There exist no attorneys, no pleadings, and no specific rules of evidence. The awards, while made in accordance with substantive law, result from common sense. The spirit of compromise and conciliation attends the proceedings, requiring participant comprehension. (Id., at pp. 417-418; Sanderson v. Niemann (1941) 17 Cal.2d 563, 573-574 [110 P.2d 1025].) The parties are usually their own witnesses and frequently the only ones. It is apparent that unless the non-English speaking party has an interpreter he is effectively barred from access to the small claims proceeding. By way of contrast, appellant possesses an attorney capable of fully representing him in the municipal court proceeding.
Because language assistance to indigent but represented litigants appears available, we are satisfied there is no need for courts to require appointment of interpreters at public expense to assist litigants.
Constitutional Basis For Appointment
Appellant contends that refusal to appoint an interpreter denies him an opportunity to be heard, depriving him of access to the courts in violation of the constitutional guarantees of both due process and equal protection of the law. There has been no showing as to whether non-English speaking litigants, able to afford paid interpreters, are likely to secure them for consulting with counsel and translating legal proceedings.
*186Absent “countervailing state interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard.” (Boddie v. Connecticut (1971) 401 U.S. 371, 377 [28 L.Ed.2d 113, 118, 91 S.Ct. 780]; Payne v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 908, 914.) In Boddie, it was held that indigents could not be forced to pay a filing fee in order to dissolve their marriage. Subsequent cases limit Boddie, holding indigents may be required to pay the filing fee for such relief as discharge in bankruptcy or review of an agency determination resulting in lower welfare payments. (United States v. Kras (1973) 409 U.S. 434 [34 L.Ed.2d 626, 93 S.Ct. 631]; Ortwein v. Schwab (1973) 410 U.S. 656 [35 L.Ed.2d 572, 93 S.Ct. 1172].)
One of the bases for distinguishing Boddie, recognized in Payne v. Superior Court, supra, 17 Cal.3d 908, 916-917, is that the indigent had alternative means to secure the relief sought—means other than resort to the trial court itself for aid. (United States v. Kras, supra, 409 U.S. at p. 445 [34 L.Ed.2d at pp. 635-636]; Ortwein v. Schwab, supra, 410 U.S. at pp. 659-660 [35 L.Ed.2d at pp. 575-576].)
As pointed out above, the non-English speaking litigant ordinarily has alternative sources for language assistance to communicate with counsel and other community professionals and officials. The court proceedings being controlled by counsel, we further suggest that appellant is in no worse position than the numerous represented litigants who elect not to be present in court at all.
The Constitution mandates expense-paid court access in limited cases. Petitioner has not shown his access to be constitutionally impaired.
The judgment is affirmed.
Mosk, J., Richardson, J., and Manuel, J., concurred.