(dissenting)—The majority opinion indicates that Navarre was appellant’s agent for the purchase of the insulated pipe from Ric-Wil. Freeman awarded the contract to Navarre to furnish materials and install the heating system. In fact, in this action, he sued Navarre for *777breach of contract. I fail to find anything in the record which would make Navarre, Freeman’s agent.
The only question presented in this appeal is whether appellant, the ultimate user, can recover from respondent, the manufacturer, in the absence of a specific contract between the two.
This state has kept in step with those jurisdictions recognizing exceptions to the privity of contract rule. In the case of Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633, the plaintiff operated a restaurant. He purchased from the Seattle Grocery Company a carton of cooked tongue which was prepared and ready to be used for food without further cooking. The package had been manufactured and prepared by Armour & Co. In making the purchase, he relied upon the manufacturer’s representations that the food was pure and wholesome. He served to one of his patrons a portion of the tongue. The patron became sick and nauseated and publicly exposed the service to him of the poisonous food. The restaurant owner sued Armour & Co. for damages, which ensued as a result of the above. In holding the manufacturer liable, we said:
“It has been accepted as a general rule that a manufacturer is not liable to any person other than his immediate vendee; that the action is necessarily one upon an implied or express warranty, and that without privity of contract no suit can be maintained; that each purchaser must resort to his immediate vendor. To this rule, certain exceptions have been recognized: (1) Where the thing causing the injury is of a noxious or dangerous kind; (2) where the defendant has been guilty of fraud or deceit in passing off the article; (3) where the defendant has been negligent in some respect with reference to the sale or construction of a thing not imminently dangerous. . . .
“To the old rule that a manufacturer is not liable to third persons who have no contractual relations, with him, for negligence in the manufacture of an article, should be added another exception—not one arbitrarily worked by the courts—but arising, as did the three to which we have heretofore alluded, from the changing conditions of society. An exception to a rule will be declared by courts when the case is not an isolated instance, but general in its character and the existing rule does not square with justice. Under such *778circumstances, a court will, if free from the restraint of some statute, declare a rule that will meet the full intendment of the law. No case has been cited that is squarely in point 'with the instant case, but there is enough in the adjudged cases to warrant us in our conclusion. . . .
“Our holding is that, in the absence of an express warranty of quality, a manufacturer of food products under modern conditions impliedly warrants his goods when dispensed in original packages, and that such warranty is available to all who may be damaged by reason of their use in the legitimate channels of trade.”
In Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409, 15 P. (2d) 1118, 88 A. L. R. 521, Sam Baxter purchased a Model A Ford automobile from St. John Motors, a Ford dealer, which had acquired the automobile from the Ford Motor Company. He claimed that representations were made to him by both the dealer and the manufacturer that the windshield was of nonshatterable glass which would not break, fly or shatter. He was injured, losing an eye, when a pebble struck the windshield, causing glass to fly into his eye. The catalogs furnished by the manufacturer to the dealer for sales assistance, and relied upon by the purchaser, stated:
“All of the new Ford cars have a Triplex shatter-proof glass windshield—so made that it will not fly or shatter under the hardest impact. This is an important safety factor because it eliminates the dangers of. flying glass—the cause of most of the injuries in automobile accidents. In these days of crowded, heavy traffic, the use of this Triplex glass is an absolute necessity.”
We held the manufacturer liable to the ultimate purchaser and, referring to the food and drug cases, said:
“The rule in such cases does not rest upon contractual obligations, but rather on the principle that the original act of delivering an article is wrong, when, because of the lack of those qualities which the manufacturer represented it as having, the absence of which could not be readily detected by the consumer, the article is not safe for the purposes for which the consumer would ordinarily use it.”
We then said:
“Since the rule of caveat emptor was first formulated, *779vast changes have taken place in the economic structures of the English speaking peoples. Methods of doing business have undergone a great transition. Radio, bill boards and the products of the printing press have become the means of creating a large part of the demand that causes goods to depart from factories to the ultimate consumer. It would be unjust to recognize a rule that would permit manufacturers of goods to create a demand for their products by representing that they possess qualities which they, in fact, do not possess; and then, because there is no privity of contract existing between the consumer and the manufacturer, deny the consumer the right to recover if damages result from the absence of those qualities, when such absence is not readily noticeable.”
Bock v. Truck & Tractor, Inc., 18 Wn. (2d) 458, 139 P. (2d) 706, was a case in which a dealer sold a secondhand truck, which had been overhauled by him, to one La Vergne. The dealer represented that the truck had been completely overhauled and reconditioned. While La Vergne was operating the truck, owing to its faulty condition, the left front spring broke completely through, and the plaintiff, who was riding in the truck, was injured. In holding that the injured party could recover against the dealer, we said:
“In our opinion, it is but a logical extension of the rule announced in the case of Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., supra, to hold that a dealer in secondhand motor vehicles who undertakes to overhaul and recondition such vehicles for subsequent sale to the general public has the same duty as has the manufacturer to exercise reasonable care with reference to the equipment of the vehicle and with respect to the ascertainment of its condition, so that it may be kept under control and not become a menace to life and limb; and, further, that such duty rests not upon a contractual obligation, but rather on the principle that the delivery of a motor vehicle lacking in those qualities which the dealer represents it to have, or impregnated with defects which render the vehicle unsafe for its intended use and which defects the dealer could have ascertained by the exercise of reasonable care, constitutes an actionable wrong as to all those who suffer injury therefrom. This would include not only the immediate purchaser of the motor vehicle, but also those who the dealer should expect would use it or would be in the vicinity of its probable use, provided such injured person has not been contributorily negligent. It goes with*780out saying, of course, that the wrong is the more pronounced and reprehensible where the sale of the motor vehicle is accompanied by positive representations by the dealer that the vehicle has been completely overhauled and reconditioned, is fit for safe and proper operation upon the highways, and carries a guaranty of safety and fitness.”
It will be seen that the exceptions to the privity of contract rule have arisen in tort actions where there has been a violation of a duty owed by the manufacturer to third persons; a duty which does not rest upon a contractual obligation, but rather a duty to members of the general public to prevent them from suffering injury as a result of the wrongful manufacture or distribution of any particular article or -articles. That is not the situation here. True, appellant has been damaged, but he has not been wronged. There has been -no violation of a duty to him which would give rise to a tort action. See Cochran v. McDonald, 23 Wn. (2d) 348, 161 P. (2d) 305. The warranty which the Ric-Wil Company gave was simply part and parcel of a contractual obligation, and appellant cannot recover unless he was in privity with that obligation.
The term “privity”, used with respect to contract, implies a connection, mutuality of will, and interaction of parties. It is the relation that exists between two or more contracting parties, and its existence is essential to the maintenance of an action. Wrenshall State Bank v. Shutt, 202 Wis. 281. 232 N. W. 530.
Was there privity of contract between Ric-Wil and appellant’s predecessors? The latter employed Bliss Moore, Jr., as general architect. He, not understanding heating and ventilating problems, employed Bouillon & Associates as consulting engineers for that purpose. They specified the use of Ric-Wil units. Navarre was awarded the contract to furnish materials and install the heating system. The contract of sale was between Ric-Wil and Navarre.
Mr. Bouillon testified that he wrote up the specifications from technical literature supplied by respondent’s agent; that it was a new product, and that he had had no previous experience with it and that he got his information concern*781ing the qualities of insulation from the literature. He denied, however, that he relied upon such literature in specifying the use of Ric-Wil units.
The manufacturer knew that the system was sold to Navarre for use on appellant’s project. The order and material list was marked for “Bellevue Central Heating Plant.” Respondent prepared a shop drawing from the specifications and plans and marked it, “Ric-Wil Insulating Pipe Units for Underground Steam Distributing System, Bellevue Center, Bellevue, Washington.” ' This was apparently done, however, after the contract of sale had been made with Navarre.
In Cochran v. McDonald, supra, Winterine Manufacturing Company manufactured an antifreeze product to be used in motor vehicles for the purpose of preventing freezing in cold weather. The antifreeze was put up in sealed gallon jugs, and to each jug the manufacturer affixed a label which contained a guaranty. McDonald purchased a large quantity from the manufacturer, sold part to Huletz Auto Electric Co., and it resold to a Texaco service station. Cochran, an ultimate purchaser, relying upon the printed representations, bought a gallon jug of the antifreeze from the service station. He put the antifreeze in the radiator of his automobile, resulting in damage to the radiator and motor. In denying recovery for breach of warranty, after discussing the cases to which I have referred, we said:
“We feel that, as no question of public policy is involved, and the reasons for the exception to the general rule of implied warranty in the law of sales applied in the food cases are absent, we would not be warranted in extending the rule of the cases cited to this case and in holding that a wholesaler is liable to a purchaser of the goods from a retailer upon either the theory of an implied warranty of quality or fitness for the purpose intended, or upon the theory that the wholesaler had sold an article that ultimately proved dangerous to property when used for the purpose for which it was manufactured.”
In the instant case, in ruling on the motion to dismiss, the trial court said: “I feel clear that unless the law is changed by the Supreme Court, that the defendant Ric-Wil is not liable under the evidence.” I agree with the trial court. *782This case does not come within the purview of exceptions to the privity of contract rule enunciated in the Mazetti, Baxter, and Bock cases. However, I am very fearful that the decision herein will result in the privity of contract rule being thrown out of the window.
I have no quarrel with the holdings in the above mentioned cases. They all involved tort actions where there had been a violation of duty owed by a manufacturer to third persons. A tort is a private or civil wrong or injury—a wrong independent of contract. No tort was committed here. There was a breach of a common, everyday, run-of-the-mill contractual obligation. Freeman should not recover from Ric-Wil because there was no privity of contract between them.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Donworth and Ott, JJ., concur with Schwellenbach, J.