concurring.
I agree with the opinion written by Judge Coats, but think it necessary to separately explain my reasons for concluding that Betzner’s case must be remanded for resentencing.
It is well settled that, upon revocation of probation, the sentencing court must determine an appropriate sentence by applying the Chaney sentencing criteria to the totality of the circumstances in the case, including the seriousness of the original offense, the seriousness of the violation that gave rise to the revocation, and the nature of the defendant’s intervening conduct. See, e.g., Kanipe v. State, 620 P.2d 678, 679 (Alaska 1980); Crouse v. State, 736 P.2d 783, 786-87 (Alaska App.1987); Witt v. State, 725 P.2d 723, 724 (Alaska App.1986); Gilbert v. State, 706 P.2d 345, 347 (Alaska App.1985).
In this case, however, the state argues a different theory. Here, Betzner entered into a plea negotiation with the state that called for him to testify against other defendants. The requirement that Betzner testify was incorporated as a condition of his probation. Betzner’s probation was revoked after he refused to testify. On ap*1158peal, the state asks us to find that, because Betzner entered into a plea agreement that required him to testify as a condition of probation, his violation of the condition automatically justified imposition of the full suspended term.
In rejecting the state’s argument, I find it unnecessary to decide whether such a plea agreement might ever properly provide for automatic imposition of a suspended sentence upon a defendant’s failure to testify. It is sufficient to note that no express provision to this effect was made in Betzner’s plea agreement. The agreement provided only that, in return for Betz-ner’s plea and his promise to testify, any upward adjustment of the applicable presumptive term in his case would be suspended. No express provision was made for the automatic reinstatement of suspended time upon failure to comply with the agreement to testify. More significantly, the agreement did not establish any specific period of suspended time to be imposed as a quid pro quo for Betzner’s promise to testify. The superior court's remarks at the original sentencing hearing do not indicate what part, if any, of Betz-ner’s three and one-half year suspended term was actually attributable to his promise to testify. Nothing in the original sentencing record establishes that Betzner would have received an unsuspended term of ten and one-half years had it not been for the plea agreement.
Under the circumstances, I must conclude that the task of formulating Betz-ner’s sentence upon revocation of his probation was a matter for the superior court’s sentencing discretion. The exercise of that discretion should have been governed not by principles of contract law, but by the normal rules applicable to sentencing in probation revocation cases. My conclusion that resentencing is necessary in this case stems from uncertainty as to whether the superior court exercised appropriate sentencing discretion in determining Betzner’s sentence.
It is true, as the state points out, that the court undertook a Chaney analysis. Yet the court’s discussion of the Chaney criteria is ambiguous. Judge Cranston accepted the state’s argument that Betzner’s entire suspended term should be reimposed as a contractual matter. When asked by the prosecution to address the Chaney criteria, the judge at first declined to do so, stating his view that such an explanation was unnecessary. When pressed, the judge eventually addressed the Chaney criteria. However, Judge Cranston did so in a manner that suggests that he may simply have been rationalizing the automatic imposition of suspended time in terms of the Chaney goals. Judge Cranston said little to indicate that he took into account the nature and seriousness of Betzner’s original offense or the relative seriousness of his probation violation. The judge apparently continued to believe that imposition of the full period of time should be automatic, without regard to any consideration other than the fact that Betzner had violated his plea agreement.
It is also true that the sentencing court rejected Betzner’s claim of duress. However, the court’s ruling appears to have been only that the claim of duress was, as a matter of law, insufficient to qualify as a justification for Betzner’s refusal to testify. Judge Cranston did not expressly find that Betzner’s claims of fear for himself and his family were hot credible or that they were made in bad faith. If the court did believe that Betzner's refusal to testify was actually motivated by a genuine fear of reprisal, this certainly could have mitigated the seriousness of his probation violation, even if it did not excuse the violation altogether. From the record, however, it appears that the sentencing court may never have reached this issue because it believed that, once the probation violation was established, the full period of suspended time should automatically be reimposed. Having decided that duress was not a legal defense in Betzner’s circumstances, the court may simply have determined it unnecessary to give any consideration to potentially mitigating circumstances.
Admittedly, it is possible that Judge Cranston did correctly consider the totality of the circumstances in deciding to impose the full three and one-half years of sus*1159pended time. The judge may have concentrated his Chaney analysis on the probation violation only because of his belief in the overriding importance of Betzner’s agreement to testify on behalf of the state. By the same token, it is certainly possible that Judge Cranston did not believe Betz-ner’s explanation for refusing to testify and concluded that he was simply attempting to manipulate the system to his own advantage. Although it is possible to interpret Judge Cranston’s sentencing remarks in this manner, I find there is sufficient ambiguity in the record to warrant a remand for resentencing.
I would emphasize that my decision does not imply that the sentence Betzner received below is excessive, or that Judge Cranston would be clearly mistaken in reimposing precisely the same sentence on remand if he believed it to be justified under the totality of the circumstances. Indeed, I recognize that Betzner may deserve to have the full balance of his suspended term imposed. Whatever the sentence Betzner deserves, however, the sentence that he actually receives should be the result of an appropriate application of established sentencing procedures. In this regard, the supreme court has noted:
Our decisions reveal two kinds of sentence review cases. When the issue is whether the sentence was excessive, we defer to the sentencing court’s discretion and will disapprove a sentence only if it is ‘clearly mistaken.’ McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974). When the issue is whether the sentencing court was acting under an incorrect legal assumption, we review for error.
Campbell v. State, 594 P.2d 65, 67 (Alaska 1979) (footnotes omitted).
If it appears, on remand, that Betzner’s sentence was not the product of “an incorrect legal assumption,” I would have little difficulty in concluding that it was not excessive.