dissenting.
I would affirm defendant’s conviction.
I read the majority’s opinion to say that the only *284prejudice that defendant suffered was anxiety.1 I would hold that, without more, anxiety, no matter how prolonged, cannot be the basis for a dismissal for want of a speedy trial. In this case, no prejudice to defendant was shown.
In State v. Dykast, 300 Or 368, 378, 712 P2d 79 (1985) the Supreme Court explained:
“Most criminal prosecutions cause stress, discomfort and interference with a normal life. Delay adds to the problem.”
In Dykast, there was evidence that the delay caused the defendant to postpone his marriage plans and impeded his working capacity. He was restricted from carrying on his family’s farming operation, which was already impaired due to his father’s failing health. He suffered business losses, and the money that he deposited for his release was tied up in court so that he was unable to use it for his business. His defense costs mounted with each delay. He suffered mental anguish as to the uncertainty of his future and, in his words, the delay had “made it hard for [him] to make decisions” and his life was placed in a “holding pattern.” 300 Or at 380-381 (Jones, J., concurring). Notwithstanding, the Supreme Court was not persuaded that Dykast’s anxiety and stress were so great as to require dismissal.
In this case, by contrast, defendant’s anxiety and stress, i.e., he was greatly concerned and worried about the outcome of this matter because he drives professionally for a living, were relatively minor. They do not require reversal of his jury conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 US 514, 92 S Ct 2182, 33 L Ed 2d 101 (1972); Haynes v. Burks, 290 Or 75, 619 P2d 632 (1980); State v. Ivory, 278 Or 499, 564 P2d 1039 (1977); State v. Hacker, 62 Or App 691, 662 P2d 21 (1983); State v. Neal, 58 Or App 180, 647 P2d 974 (1982); State v. Langlois, 54 Or App 452, 635 P2d 653 (1981); State v. Vance, 53 Or App 290, 631 P2d *285843 (1981); State v. Meikle, 44 Or App 91, 605 P2d 301 (1980); State v. Evans, 19 Or App 345, 351, 527 P2d 731 (1974), cert den 423 US 843 (1975).2 My research indicates that no appellate court in the United States has ever before held that delay alone justifies dismissal of a criminal charge.
Defendant’s second assignment of error, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the results of a blood test, because the emergency medical technician who drew a sample of defendant’s blood was not acting under the direction and control of a licensed physician, lacks merit. See former ORS 487.825;3 State v. Stover, 14 Or App 559, 565, 513 P2d 537 (1973), rev’d on other grounds 271 Or 132, 531 P2d 258 (1975).
After a pretrial hearing on defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of speedy trial, the trial court stated:
“I think the real issue here is the actual prejudice to the defendant. The court does not find any actual prejudice except a slight dimming of memory of the defendant, and I’m going to deny the motion.”
On appeal, the state argued that defendant’s testimony at trial was specific about every aspect of his case. My review of the transcript confirms the state’s assertion in that regard.
Defendant does not rely on ORS 135.747 or ORS 135.750.
My vote to affirm does not imply approval of the state’s conduct in this case. Rather, I conclude that this case represents “an unfortunate lapse in orderly judicial administration.” State v. Neal, supra, 58 Or App at 186.
Former ORS 487.825 was repealed by Or Laws 1983, ch 338, § 978, and replaced by ORS 813.160(2), Or Laws 1983, ch 338, § 173 (amended by Or Laws 1985, ch 16, § 57 and Or Laws 1985, ch 337, § 2).