Dullenty v. Rocky Mountain Fire & Casualty Co.

BISTLINE, Justice,

dissenting.

Our task in this case was not, as the majority suggests, simply to determine whether “the specific exclusion relied upon by Rocky Mountain which denies coverage in these circumstances, is void as against public policy,” but to determine whether it was void as against the legislature’s policy as stated in Idaho’s Uninsured Motorist Coverage Statute, I.C. § 41-2502. In pursuit of a supposed requirement of a judicial policy to protect insurance companies from having to make good on their statutory and contractual obligations, the majority of a necessity ignores both the dictates of I.C. § 41-2502 and the reasoning of the overwhelming majority of courts which have addressed the exact issue. As Justice Fogleman of the Arkansas Court so aptly expressed it, “I regret to see this court align itself with a pitifully small minority [of jurisdictions] in deciding such a case [as this one].” Holcomb v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 495 S.W.2d 155, 160 (Fogleman, J., dissenting).

That majority became even more pitiful shortly thereafter by the overruling of two of the cases upon which the Arkansas majority had relied. Mioreover, the majority regrettably ignores the plain language of Idaho’s Uninsured Motorist Coverage statute, I.C. § 41-2502, in a manner fundamentally inconsistent with its treatment of the same statute in Hammon v. Farmers Insurance Co., 109 Idaho 286, 707 P.2d 397 (1985). As in Hammon, the beneficiaries of today’s misguided opinion are those insurance companies dedicated to the use of adhesion contracts as a means for avoiding statutorily required coverage. The losers, of course, are the “insured” people of Idaho. To reach this result, the majority now takes precisely the opposite tack which was taken in Hammon. It seems that the “insured” people of Idaho are bound to lose, whatever the means required to guarantee that their “just” fate is to be unjustly denied coverage which has been purchased.

Hammon concerned a provision of an automobile insurance policy which excluded coverage of injuries suffered at the hands of a hit-and-run driver where there was no “physical contact” with the victim. The majority held this provision was not in derogation of I.C. § 41-2502. The sole basis for this holding was the following analysis:

I.C. §• 41-2502 requires that coverage be offered in every automobile liability insurance policy in the amount set forth by statute “for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles ____” The Hammons urge that the term “uninsured motor vehicle” should be construed to include an “unidentified motor vehicle.” However, it is fundamental rule of statutory construction that the language of a statute must be given its common and ordinary meaning. See, e.g., Florek v. Sparks Flying Service, Inc., 83 Idaho 160, 359 P.2d 511 (1961). [WJhere the language of a statute is unambiguous, the clear express intent of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion of con*108struction.” State v. Lawler, 81 Idaho 171, 175, 338 P.2d 264, 266 (1959).
An “uninsured” vehicle is clearly not the same as an “unidentified” vehicle. The statute directs that coverage be made available for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles. This language obviously contemplates that there is proof of the identity of the owner or operator of the vehicle; otherwise it could not be ascertained that the vehicle was uninsured. Normally, when the vehicle is a hit-and-run automobile, such identity cannot be ascertained. Hammon, supra, 109 Idaho at 288, 707 P.2d at 399 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

Applying those same rules of statutory construction to the instant case yields a result 180 degrees apart from today’s majority decision. The common and ordinary meaning of “persons insured thereunder” is human beings insured under the policy, not vehicles insured under the policy. The language of the statute unambiguously requires insurance companies to offer this coverage for the protection of human beings being insured. The unambiguous negative inference from this is that insurance companies may not exclude coverage to these human beings while occupying or driving a vehicle not listed in the policy. The clear express intent behind I.C. § 41-2502 is to require coverage of persons and to forbid coverage short of its requirement such as perpetrated by the instant insurance company. Accord, e.g., Welch v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 122 Wis.2d 172, 361 N.W.2d 680 (1985); Lindahl v. Howe, 345 N.W.2d 548 (Iowa 1984); Harvey v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 188 Conn. 245, 449 A.2d 157 (1982); Bradley v. Mid-Century Insurance Co., 78 Mich.App. 67, 294 N.W.2d 141 (1980); Otto v. Farmers Insurance Co., 558 S.W.2d 713 (Mo.App.1977); Nygaard v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 301 Minn. 10, 221 N.W.2d 151 (1975); Elledge v. Warren, 23 So.2d 912 (La.App.1972). As the unanimous Arizona Supreme Court noted concerning the same statutory language: “The statute does not contemplate a piecemeal whittling away at the liability protection for injuries caused by uninsured motorists.” Calvert v. Farmers Insurance Co., 144 Ariz. 291, 697 P.2d 684, 688 (Ariz.1985) (citations to numerous cases in accord omitted).

The majority purports to find “no language” in the statute requiring coverage where the insured is in an unlisted vehicle. This is not surprising where the majority conveniently avoids attempting any analysis of the language of the statute. By so confining itself the majority has been unable to discover therein the phrase “for the protection of persons insured thereunder.” Clearly, contrary to the converse situation in Hammon, it better suits the majority’s result-oriented opinion to ignore the statute’s plain language and express intent. One thing is certain: In each case the insurance company has received the favor of the majority which speaks for the Court.

Amazingly, the majority need have looked no further for the correct answer to today’s question than the Hammon decision which the same three justice majority rendered. Therein they wrote: “The statute directs that coverage be made available for the protection of persons thereunder who are legally entitled to recover from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles.” Hammon, supra, 109 Idaho at 288, 707 P.2d at 399 (emphasis added). This language clearly recognized that the statute protected persons, not vehicles. Today’s majority necessarily rejects its own understanding of I.C. § 41-2502 as recorded in Hammon.

Had the legislature intended to permit the tying of uninsured motorist coverage to vehicles, it easily could have done so. Instead, the legislature required that persons be offered the opportunity to protect themselves against the financial hardships of irresponsible drivers through the purchase of uninsured motorist coverage. The legislature did not restrict uninsured motorist coverage to circumstances where the per*109son injured was in the same vehicle which was insured against liability losses. See Calvert v. Farmers Insurance Co., 144 Ariz. 291, 697 P.2d 684, 687 (1985) (“If the Legislature had intended to include additional exclusions, such as an ‘other vehicle’ exclusion [which would deny coverage to insured persons injured in vehicles other than those covered by the liability policy], it would have expressly done so.”); id. 697 P.2d at 689 {“[OJur Uninsured Motorist Act was created ‘for the protection of persons,’ and not for the protection of the insured vehicle.” (Emphasis added.)); Harvey, supra; Bradley, supra; Otto, supra.

That the legislature knew how to tie insurance coverage to vehicles rather than to persons is clearly evinced in Idaho’s liability insurance statute, I.C. § 49-233. That statute requires liability coverage for injury, damages, or death resulting from the maintenance or use of motor vehicles :

49-233. Required motor vehicle insurance. — (a) Every owner of a motor vehicle which is registered and operated in Idaho by the owner or with his permission shall continuously provide insurance against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death or damage to property suffered by any person caused by maintenance or use of a motor vehicle or motor vehicles described therein in an amount not less than that required by section 49-1521, Idaho Code, and shall demonstrate the existence of any other coverage required by title 49, Idaho Code, or a certificate of self-insurance issued by the department pursuant to section 49-1534, Idaho Code, for each motor vehicle to be registered. (Emphasis added.)

As the majority concedes, this language clearly permits the exclusion of coverage for vehicles not “described therein [within the insurance policy.]” As the majority also concedes, I.C. § 41-2502 lacks such language permitting an “other vehicle” exclusion. But as the majority refuses to acknowledge, the fact that the legislature expressly permitted such an exclusion to liability coverage but omitted such express permission in its Uninsured Motorist Coverage statute strongly demonstrates its intent to not allow the very “other vehicle” exclusion which concerns us today. Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 n. 7 (1986) (reflecting the maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius). This expression of intent (which the majority ignores), coupled with the statute’s reference to persons (a reference the majority ignores), is convincing that the legislature intended for coverage to be offered to persons without prescription as to the place where those persons are when injured. As the Calvert court observed:

There is nothing in our uninsured motorist statute which limits coverage depending on the location or status of the insured. Thus, our uninsured motorist protection is portable. The insured and family members insured are covered not only when occupying an insured vehicle, but also when in another automobile, when on foot, when on a bicycle or when sitting on a porch. Calvert, supra, 697 P.2d at 689; accord, e.g., Bradley, supra; Elledge, supra; Welch, supra.

The legislature had good reason to tie uninsured motorist coverage to persons rather than to' vehicles. The insured individual who is injured by an uninsured motorist is equally disadvantaged when injured whether walking down the street, hopping on the majority’s “pogo stick,” or driving or passenger in a vehicle not listed on the policy Id. Obviously, the risk of the insured from uninsured motorists differs from the risk of liability which liability insurance concerns. The former risk is one of injury to one’s “person”; the latter is the risk of causing injury to others arising out of the use of one’s own vehicle. For this obvious reason, the legislature wrote separate and basically different statutes to govern the respective risks. Yet the majority treats I.C. § 41-2502 as though the wording were identical to I.C. § 49-233.

*110The majority’s smiling upon the “other vehicles” exclusion leaves open the possibility of various absurd results. As the majority points out, under his Rocky Mountain policy, had Dullenty been a passenger in someone else’s vehicle, or a pedestrian, or had been sitting on his front porch when he was injured by an uninsured vehicle, he would have been insured. Thus, Dullenty while standing next to his Blazer was insured, but was unprotected once he stepped inside. The legislature precluded such absurdity by requiring coverage of “persons” without limitation as to circumstances. Regrettably, the legislature’s work is now undone by a highly suspect court opinion.

The majority empathizes with insurance carriers’ its weighing of the risks related to the various circumstances under which an uninsured motorist might injure the insured person. This discussion makes tolerably interesting reading, but is wholly irrelevant, since the legislature directed that the insured persons be insured in all circumstances. The legislature evidently weighed the risk sufficiently great to require unexcepted coverage.

Continuing in its empathy for the insurance industry, the majority decries, along with other certain “opinions,” “the inequity of allowing a person who insures one vehicle with an insurance carrier to obtain a ‘free ride’ by thereby obtaining coverage by that same carrier on one, two, or a fleet of vehicles upon which he has paid no premium to the carrier.” “Some courts upholding the validity of such exclusionary clauses,” observes the majority, “opine that rewarding a plaintiff who himself is operating an uninsured vehicle is contrary to legislative policy.” First of all, the “free ride” philosophy to which the majority refers is hardly credible, as the cost of adding coverage to other vehicles is slight. As Professor Alan Widiss noted some time ago: “Acquisition of insurance for a second vehicle is relatively inexpensive; therefore, permitting the insurer to withhold coverage for the small return seems of dubious merit.” A. Widiss, A Guide to Uninsured Motorist Coverage § 2.9 (1969) (revised version cited infra). Second, Idaho, along with virtually all other jurisdictions, has in place uninsured motorist coverage statutes which contain no legislative policy against extending coverage to persons insured under the policy who by happenstance are injured in a vehicle other than the listed vehicle. To the contrary, the statutes mandate that policies insure “persons” wherever they are from the risk of injury at the hands of an uninsured motorist, since the risk is a potential threat to all “persons” whoever and wherever they ar Third and most important, both these “policy” arguments espoused by the majority spring from its own perceptions rather than from the statute, wherein the legislature’s policy is expressed. The majority would do well to take some venerable advice: “[Public policy] is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but when other points fail.” Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bingham. 229, 252 (1824) (J. Burrough). Here, without any plausible argument based on the language of the statute or persuasive authority, the majority mounts its own policy1 and takes Idahoans on a reckless ride over a cliff. Sorry Idahoans, that horse was not listed.

Curiously, as in the lengthy prologue pri- or to the policy-making of Dunbar, the majority cites twelve cases purportedly representing “the various viewpoints” on these “policy” considerations. Despite the majority’s plural reference to “various *111viewpoints” and to “opinions” and “some courts” which hold as it finally holds, eleven of the twelve cases cited uniformly held “other vehicle” exclusions invalid. See, e.g., Chavez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 87 N.M. 327, 533 P.2d 100, 103 (1975) (“other vehicle” exclusionary policy void; coverage required of plaintiff’s injuries sustained on uninsured motorcycle); Federated American Insurance Co. v. Raynes, 88 Wash.2d 439, 563 P.2d 815 (1977) (same holding); Cothren v. Emcasco Insurance Co., 555 P.2d 1037 (Okla.1976) (same holding). For example, the Ohio Court rejected the very argument the majority now makes:

Appellant argues that invalidating the exclusion would result in a “free ride” for Terry Ady. That is, he could obtain uninsured motorist coverage, at no additional cost, under his father’s policy. Initially, it is important to note that Terry Ady paid premiums for uninsured motorist coverage under his own policy. Here, he was asking for coverage under his father’s policy only for expenses above those covered by his own policy. But for the exclusion, he would qualify for coverage under his father’s policy.
More importantly, the purpose of the statute is to protect persons injured by uninsured motorists, it does not limit coverage to a few situations. Ady v. West American Insurance Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 593, 433 N.E.2d 547, 550 (1981).

In any event, what the majority simply will not come to grips with is the fact that insured individuals like Dullenty bought and paid for coverage of their “person. Accord, e.g., id. A person who buys several such policies insuring his or her person is entitled to the benefits of the purchase. An insured obtains no “free ride” from policies bought and paid for. However, under the majority’s holding Rocky Mountain and all other insurance companies are now the ones receiving a free lunch —having sold the insured uninsured motorist policy but now immunized from affording coverage under the policy. The Nevada Supreme Court aptly observed:

If our Legislature had intended to prevent an owner of two motor vehicles from paying for insurance on only one and recovering benefits for his injuries sustained while operating the other, it could have followed the lead of the legislatures in some of the other jurisdictions and limited the coverage by providing that N.R.S. 693.115(1) did not apply to bodily injury suffered by the insured while occupying a motor vehicle owned by him, unless the occupied vehicle was an insured motor vehicle. Such an amendment would be the prerogative and responsibility of the legislature and not the function of this court. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Hinkel, 87 Nev. 478, 488 P.2d 1151, 1154 (1971); accord, Calvert, supra, 697 P.2d at 689 and numerous citations therein.

Professor Widiss, author of the definitive treatise on uninsured motorist insurance, effectively rebuts all of the possible justifications for this exclusion:

One explanation for the exclusion is that it is designed to reduce the scope of the insured’s liability under the uninsured motorist coverage____ Since [the scope of] uninsured motorist insurance is statutorily mandated, there is little, if any, justification for allowing insureds to include this coverage exclusion in order to reduce their potential liability. Once a state has decided it is in the public interest to assure a source of indemnification to persons who are injured by negligent uninsured motorists, then the insurance ought to be available to an insured person at all times, including when the insured is occupying a vehicle owned by another clause (A) insured, or walking down a street or sitting in a rocking chair. ...
The family member exclusion may have been included in the uninsured motorist coverage terms to induce all family members to acquire liability insurance for each automobile owned by members of the household____ [I]t is doubtful whether the exclusion in fact has much impact in fulfilling [the objectives of promoting the sale of insurance and the *112public interest in having owners acquire liability insurance for all vehicles] because most purchasers are probably unaware of the exclusion and its impact on the uninsured motorist coverage____
From the standpoint of the insurance company, the exclusion is desirable in that it encourages the acquisition of insurance for all vehicles owned by family members who reside together from a single insurance company. However, most insurance companies make little, if any, effort to make this fact known to purchasers, and thus it is unlikely that this is a significant factor in either insurance marketing or actuarial computations of the premiums to be charged for the coverage ____
The household family member exclusion may also be intended as a limited form of intrafamily tort immunity that would preclude coverage when a claim is based on the negligence of a family member____ Although the insurance company’s liability under the uninsured motorist insurance depends on the negligence of a person — who in some instances may be a family member — the claim is against the insurance company under a first party insurance contract. Accordingly, the possibility of disrupting the family by litigation among family members, which is one of the most important justifications for intra-family immunity, does not exist in this context____
Enforcement of the exclusion has occasionally been urged on the basis that so long as the coverage provisions are not in conflict with the state’s uninsured motorist legislation, insurance policy terms should be treated as an agreement between the parties____ [However,] [m]ost purchasers are barely aware of the uninsured motorist coverage. They are neither aware of nor do they understand the intricacies of a coverage provision such as the household family member exclusion____ There is a lack of informed assent by insurance purchasers to the provisions of the uninsured motorist coverage. To predicate the enforceability of the exclusion on presumed assent ignores the true character of this type of insurance transaction____
The most plausible rationale for the family member exclusion may be that it ... was designed to reduce the number of instances in which the multiple coverage question can arise by eliminating coverage for an insured who occupies a vehicle owned by a member of the insured’s family when the vehicles is not insured by the same policy. In other words, the exclusion is an additional means of avoiding claims under more than one insured motorist coverage____ Suffice it to observe here that many of the multiple coverage provisions in uninsured motorist insurance have been voided in a substantial number of states [the reason for which Professor Widiss discusses elsewhere]. A. Widiss, 1 Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance § 4.19 (2d ed. 1985) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted; citations omitted).

The authority which has decided this issue contrary to today’s decision is the clear and growing majority. See generally, A. Widiss, supra. The Arizona Court compiled a list of 26 jurisdictions, Calvert, supra, 697 P.2d at 687-88, to which we can now add Arizona and Ohio. Ady, supra, 433 N.E.2d at 551. See also, Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985) (invalidated “household” exclusion). Contrary to the majority’s cavalier and undocumented assertion, these opinions typically are carefully and thoroughly reasoned. See, e.g., Calvert, supra; Welch, supra; Lindahl, supra; Elledge, supra; Harvey, supra; Bradley, supra; Otto, supra. These courts yield to the legislature’s plain language and clear intent. In contrast, the four cases cited by the majority ignore both. Holcomb v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 254 Ark. 514, 495 S.W.2d 155 (1973) (fails to analyze statutory language); MFA Insurance Companies v. Whitlock, 572 S.W.2d 856 (Ky.1978) (a brief opinion, along with its equally cursory predecessor, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company *113v. Christian, 555 S.W.2d 571 (Ky.1977), which fails to examine or even quote the statutory language); Herrick v. Liberty Mutual, 202 Neb. 116, 274 N.W.2d 147 (Neb.1979) (a brief opinion based on judicially perceived policy rather than on statutory language); Beliveau v. Norfolk & Dedham Mutual Fire Insurance, 120 N.H. 73, 411 A.2d 1101 (1980) (fails to distinguish between liability and uninsured motorist coverage). The fourth case relied upon by the majority, Beliveau, involved an exclusion from coverage of a relative living in the insured’s household rather than the insured himself; consequently, this case is not on point. Beliveau, supra, 411 A.2d at 1103.

While sheer numbers of decisions may not be controlling, when the weight is as extreme on one end of the scale, as it is here, “sheer numbers” evinces the sheer folly of adopting a rule of law so pervasively shunned by the majority of courts. Even as the majority takes the position of upholding the exclusion, other jurisdictions which formerly held that position are recognizing it to be fallacious, and hence are abandoning it. See Calvert, supra (Arizona); Ady, supra (Ohio); Richards v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 122 Wis.2d 172, 361 N.W.2d 680 (Wisc.1985); Shepard v. American States Insurance Co., 671 S.W.2d 777 (Mo.1984). The majority today for unfathomable reasons takes an ill-charted course without any regard to the statutory language, and wholly at odds with overwhelming and persuasive authority.

HUNTLEY, J., concurs.

. The bench and bar may find this not the first time Justice Shepard has confused statutory language and case law in order to place this Court in the position of "determining and enunciating policy.” Dunbar v. United Steelworkers of America, 100 Idaho 523, 546, 602 P.2d 21, 44 (1979), overruled Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 723 P.2d 755 (1986). In the case of the uninsured motorist coverage statute, which concerns us now, as with the Tort Claims Act which concerned us in Dunbar, the statutory language and case law afford far more than the "scintilla of [legislative] intent” Justice Shepard is willing to concede. Id.