dissenting: The appellant, Quintin R. Bentley, committed the sordid acts of taking indecent liberties with his nine-year-old niece. After committing the offenses he angrily told her not to tell anyone or he would do it again. To fully appreciate the significance and force of such threats, it must be remembered that- the child was terror stricken by the acts committed on her by an adult she knew and trusted and who was an authoritarian figure to her. The threats were as if Bentley had threatened her life. Thus, she did not let anyone know of the offenses committed on her until March of 1984.
It was unclear when the offenses were committed but the trial court found the appellant’s threats were made to prevent discovery and therefore constituted concealment. Under K.S.A. 21-3106(3), if the facts of the crime are concealed, the two-year statute of limitations is tolled. Accordingly, the trial court found this action was not barred by the two-year statute of limitations.
The majority in affirming the Court of Appeals’ reversal of the trial court, reasons, “Crimes against persons, by their very nature, cannot be concealed.” Thus Mafia activities and child molestations concealed by threat are barred by the statute of limitations while the statute is tolled by concealment of crimes against property. Further, the majority notes, “Other people may not know a crime has occurred, but the victim necessarily knows that a crime has been committed.” This reasoning is faulty. It fails to take into account the special circumstances of child molestation cases. A nine-year-old victim does not “necessarily know” that the acts of a trusted uncle constitute a crime. As in most indecent liberties cases, the victim was quite young, naive and trusting. Though horrified by her uncle’s actions and threats she did not realize until much later the offenses committed against her constituted a crime punishable at law.
K.S.A. 21-3106 provides the two-year statute of limitations is tolled during any period in which “the fact of the crime is concealed.” In State v. Watson, 145 Kan. 792, 794, 67 P.2d 515 (1937), we considered similar language in our former statute (G.S. 1935, 62-504) and defined concealment as follows:
“Concealment is any statement or conduct which prevents another from acquiring knowledge of a fact. ... To constitute concealment it must appear that the statements or conduct of the accused was calculated and designed to prevent discovery of the crime with which he is charged; mere silence, inaction or nondisclosure is not enough.”
*341See also State v. Gainer, 227 Kan. 670, 674, 608 P.2d 968 (1980). Thus, we can see the word “concealed” is self-defining. It is any statement or conduct, i.e., any action, on the part of an accused which is calculated or designed to prevent discovery of the crime.
The actions of the appellant in this case clearly fit the definition of concealment. This statute needs no further construction. The appellant’s statements to his victim were calculated to prevent her from revealing his criminal actions. The victim’s lips were sealed by Rentley’s threats as surely as if he had physically restrained her. I would follow Watson and hold that concealment obtained by the statements and conduct of threatening a child with bodily harm is the type of concealment contemplated by the statute.
The majority is “sympathetic” to the State’s argument, but would rather leave it to the legislature to fashion exceptions to the statute of limitations. This shirks our responsibility. We need not call upon the legislature for help; statutory construction is the function of the judiciary. Rentley’s conduct in this case comes within the concealment exception to the two-year statute of limitations and is consistent with previous interpretations of that statute by this court. Obviously the legislature did not intend to make crimes against property more serious than crimes against persons, particularly crimes against children.
I strongly disagree with the majority’s holding and would reverse the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.