concurring and dissenting:
Together with our brothers Thompson and Mowbray, we believe the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider an award of punitive damages. However, we think the trial court later erred in substituting its own views concerning the amount of punitive damages, in place of the views of the eight citizens who composed the jury.
Of course, whether the record contains sufficient evidence to justify an award of punitive damages is a question of law, and for the court to decide. U.S. Fidelity v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975). However, where the requisite factual basis for punitive damages exists, the amount of the award rests in the sound discretion of the trier of facts, which in this case was not the trial judge but the jury. Cf. Caple v. Raynel Campers, Inc., 90 Nev. 341, 526 P.2d 334 (1974). It is possible, of course, that some persons may view some kinds of consciously wanton conduct as less culpable than others. Still, where the record justifies the jury’s finding of requisite intention or willingness to injure, we believe a reduction of punitive damages may not be justified, by. the trial judge’s personal thoughts about the relative social acceptability of different kinds of willfully wrongful conduct. Our brethren *395cite no authority supporting the idea that a trial judge has superadded discretion to reduce punitive damages whenever there is no evidence the particular injury inflicted was “deliberate,” but “merely” evidence that in order to operate their business at a higher profit “the defendants consciously and deliberately disregarded known safety procedures regarding the handling of chlorine cylinders in reckless disregard of possible results....”
Of course, where a punitive damage award is so large, as compared to a wrongdoer’s total assets, that it will not merely punish but will destroy, then it is proper for the court to intervene. Miller v. Schnitzer, 78 Nev. 301, 371 P.2d 824 (1962). Likewise, the court may intervene when there is some sound basis for saying the award “shocks the judicial conscience.” Caple v. Raynel Campers, Inc., cited above; General Electric v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972). Here, however, our brothers Thompson and Mowbray seemingly do not suggest that either these, or any other recognized basis for judicial interference, appears of record. Rather, they seem to be saying thaba trial judge has unbridled discretion to reassess punitive damages, not because some defined legal standard impels or allows it, but simply because he has a pervasive power in the premises. In sum, they apparently would view a jury’s verdict concerning punitive damages as advisory only.
With that aspect of Justice Thompson and Justice Mow-bray’s views, we cannot concur, and as we understand him, Justice Batjer does not concur with them either. Instead, as we understand him, Justice Batjer merely concurs in reduction of the punitive damages out of belief that the record does not support any award of punitive damages.
We think evidence to support punitive damages is ample, and the jury’s award offends no standard heretofore recognized for punitive damages. It should, therefore, be affirmed.