This case presents the question whether police officers are required to obtain a warrant before searching the trunk of a lawfully stopped automobile when the officers who arrested the driver have probable cause to believe that the trunk contained relevant evidence of the crime for which the arrest could have been made. We hold that under these circumstances no warrant was required and the search of the trunk and the seizure of the crime evidence did not violate Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, or the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
FACTS
In the early morning hours of January 27, 1983, Ms. Tillman reported to two police officers, Krohn and Hudson, that defendant, her boyfriend, had assaulted her and stolen her purse containing $15 or $20. She also told the officers that defendant always carried a handgun in a “black purse” either on his person or in the trunk of his car. The gun had not been used in the incident with Tillman. Because of an earlier domestic disturbance between Tillman and defendant, Officer Hudson was personally acquainted with defendant and had reported that during the earlier disturbance defendant had a gun in his pocket. Officer Hudson also knew the make, year, color and license number of defendant’s automobile.
The following morning at about 1:15 a.m., Officers Krohn and Hudson stopped defendant while he was driving his automobile. The trial court found that “the reason for the stop was to arrest defendant on the assault and theft” charges and that “[defendant was advised why he was stopped, and was told of the accusations about possession of a weapon.” When defendant declined to consent to a search of his automobile, the officers searched the passenger compartment and the glove box. Officer Krohn then opened the locked trunk and saw a black leather bag or purse similar to the one described by Tillman as the bag in which defendant carried a handgun. The bag was closed. When Officer Krohn picked it up he could feel a heavy handgun inside. The bag and the gun were seized.
According to Officer Krohn, defendant was handcuffed during the entire search. Officer Hudson could not *271remember when, or if, defendant was handcuffed, but said that defendant was placed in the patrol car when “we decided we were going into the trunk and get the gun out.”
Defendant was taken to jail and booked on the assault and theft charges; however, Tillman never signed complaints charging him with those crimes. Defendant was later charged with unlawful possession of a weapon, ORS 166.250,1 and carrying a loaded firearm in violation of Portland City Code Ordinance 14.32.010.2
The trial judge prepared written conclusions which included the following:
“8. The search in this case can be sustained only under the moveable vehicle exception to the requirement of a search warrant. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 US 42 (1970); CLE, *272Criminal Constitutional Procedure Sections 3.5.23, 3.5.30 (1982 Supp).
“9. Probable cause to search the vehicle under the moveable vehicles exception existed in this case because of the information provided by the citizen informer that the defendant ‘always’ carries a gun on his person or in his car. CLE, Criminal Constitutional Procedure Sections 3.4.11, 3.5.30 (1982 Supp).
“10. ‘If probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.’ United States v. Ross, 456 US 798, 102 S Ct 2157, 2172, 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982) (sustaining the search of a paper bag and a zippered leather pouch seized from the trunk of a car.)
“11. Because of the mobility of the vehicle and the easy disposability of the evidence, exigent circumstances existed in this case to authorize an immediate search of the vehicle. CLE, Criminal Constitutional Procedure Sections 3.5.30, 3.5.35 (1982 Supp.)”
In sum, the trial judge reasoned that the information that defendant carried a concealed gun provided probable cause to search the vehicle for the gun3 and upheld the warrantless search of the trunk of the automobile. The court found that exigent circumstances existed “because of the mobility of the vehicle and the easy disposability of the evidence.” The trial court held that these exigent circumstances authorized the immediate search of the automobile and denied the motion to suppress. Defendant was convicted of the charges.
The Court of Appeals concluded that there was “no evidence that the officers reasonably believed that defendant did not have a license” for the gun, that the search for the weapon was not related to the arrest for theft and assault, and that the search exceeded the permissible bound of searches incident to arrests. State v. Brown, 72 Or App 342, 347, 695 P2d 1383 (1985). The Court of Appeals rejected the idea, as it had in previous cases, State v. Martin, 71 Or App 1,6, 691 P2d *273154 (1984); State v. Kirsch, 69 Or App 418, 421, 686 P2d 446 (1984), that the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9, is suspended for searches of automobiles.
The state seeks to validate the search on either of two independent grounds. It first points to the mobility of automobiles and contends that searches of automobiles need not be conducted pursuant to warrants in any case, so long as probable cause exists to believe that the vehicles contain evidence of a crime. Secondly, it argues that the search was properly an incident to the arrest. Because we hold that the conduct of the police in this case was fully justified as a proper “automobile exception”4 warrantless search and seizure, we need not address the state’s second contention that the search could also be justified as incident to defendant’s arrest.
THE OREGON AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the parallel but independent guarantee of personal privacy of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, have long been interpreted to require the impartial approval of a judicial officer before the undertaking of most searches. The warrant requirement of these provisions may be dispensed with in only a few specifically established and well-delineated circumstances.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution provides:
“No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall issue but upon *274probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to searched, and the person or thing to be seized.”
As we said in State v. Quinn, 290 Or 383, 390-91, 623 P2d 630 (1981):
“Two fundamental principles flow from these constitutional provisions: First, all persons are to be free from unreasonable governmental searches and seizures of their persons and property. Second, as a means of protecting that freedom, the decision to search is to be made by a disinterested branch of government, the judiciary, rather than the branch which performs the search and seizure, the executive branch. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 US 443, 91 S Ct 2022, 29 L Ed 2d 564 (1971).
“The requirement that there be preliminary judicial authorization for any official search or seizure is not absolute. The exigent circumstances doctrine recognizes that what is practical may also be reasonable. Therefore, as one example, an automobile, which is mobile by its very nature, may be searched and seized without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that it contains fruit, instrumentalities or evidence of crime and if there are also exigent circumstances which make it impracticable to obtain a warrant. This exception arises from ‘practical necessity,’ State v. Greene, 285 Or 337, 591 P2d 1362 (1979). * * *”
This case presents for us the heretofore unanswered question: Is there an “automobile exception” to the warrant requirement of Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution? We hold that there is such an exception, provided (1) that the automobile is mobile at the time it is stopped by police or other governmental authority, and (2) that probable cause exists for the search of the vehicle. By adopting such a position, we align ourselves with the traditional federal “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement as set forth in the seminal case of Carroll v. United States, 267 US 132, 45 S Ct 280, 69 L Ed 543 (1925), and its progeny. In doing so, we wish to make clear that we are deciding this case independent of federal law; we decide this case under the Oregon Constitution and not the federal constitution. We cite the United States Supreme Court decisions only because we believe they are persuasive, not because they are precedent for this court in interpreting the Oregon Constitution.
*275In 1925, the United States Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States, supra, held that because of its mobility an automobile that is stopped on the highway may be searched without a warrant when police officers have probable cause to believe that it contains contraband. After surveying the law from the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment onward, the Court held that automobiles and other conveyances may be searched without a warrant in circumstances that would not justify the search without a warrant of a house or an office, provided that there is probable cause to believe that the automobile contains articles that the officers are entitled to seize. The Court expressed its holding as follows:
“We have made a somewhat extended reference to these statutes to show that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
“Having thus established that contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come now to consider under what circumstances such search may be made. * * * [T]hose lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise. * * *
* * * *
«* * * The measure of legality of such a seizure is, therefore, that the seizing officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is being illegally transported.” 267 US at 153-54,155-56.
In United States v. Ross, 456 US 798, 102 S Ct 2157, 72 L Ed 2d 572 (1982), Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court, which stated a rule that police officers who lawfully stopped a vehicle, having probable cause to believe that contraband is located or concealed somewhere *276therein, may conduct a warrantless search of the vehicle as thoroughly as that which a magistrate could authorize by warrant. The Court stated that “[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies a search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.” 456 US at 825.
We agree with the proposition that if police have probable cause to believe that a person’s automobile, which is mobile when stopped by police, contains contraband or crime evidence, the privacy rights of our citizens are subjected to no greater governmental intrusion if the police are authorized to conduct an immediate on-the-scene search of the vehicle than to seize the vehicle and hold it until a warrant is obtained. The police ticket to admission into a stopped mobile vehicle is probable cause. The test is whether a magistrate could issue a constitutionally sound search warrant based on the probable cause articulated by the officers. Here, if the officers had made sworn statements to a magistrate that they had reliable information from a credible informant that this defendant always carried a gun on his person or in a black bag in the trunk of his car, a warrant issued pursuant to such an affidavit would authorize a constitutionally valid seizure of the automobile and the search of the trunk.
In explaining the nature of the “exigency” required to satisfy Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, we emphasize that the key to the automobile exception is that the automobile need be mobile at the time it is lawfully stopped. No exigent circumstances other than the mobility of the stopped vehicle need be demonstrated. The California Supreme Court has noted that a variety of factors may demonstrate a particular “exigency” supporting an immediate search, including the lateness of the hour, the remote location of the car, and the comparative number of police and suspects present on the scene. But that court specially held that none of these circumstances is essential to establish “exigency” to sustain the validity of the seizure of a lawfully stopped vehicle or its immediate search without a warrant. Mobility of the vehicle at the time of the stop, by itself, creates the exigency. See People v. Cook, 13 Cal 3d 663, 119 Cal Rptr 500, 532 P2d 148 (1972); Wimberly v. Superior Court, 16 Cal Rptr 641, 547 P2d 417 (1976); and People v. Chavers, 33 Cal 3d 462, 189 Cal Rptr 169, 658 P2d 96 (1983).
*277We are convinced that adoption of a “per se exigency rule” is a sound approach which provides the clearest guidelines for police in conducting automobile searches. Exigencies should not be determined on a case-by-case basis. Police need clear guidelines by which they can gauge and regulate their conduct rather than trying to follow a complex set of rules dependent upon particular facts regarding the time, location and manner of highway stops. Accordingly, we join the federal courts and many other state courts,5 and hold that probable cause to believe that a lawfully stopped automobile which was mobile at the time of the stop contains contraband or crime evidence justifies an immediate warrantless search of the entire automobile for the object of the search, despite the absence of any additional exigent circumstances.
In State v. Quinn, supra, 290 Or at 391, this court stated that “the essential mobility of an automobile is not necessarily sufficient in itself to dispense with the necessity of a warrant for its seizure,” citing State v. Fondren, 285 Or 361, 591 P2d 1374, cert den 444 US 834 (1979) (unoccupied parked car at defendant’s place of employment). That statement was unnecessary in Quinn because the court found that the officer had additional articulable reasons for prompt action in that the car was partially blocking traffic and that it appeared to contain stolen property which the police were obliged to recover and restore to the owner. The court found that these were sufficient exigent circumstances to justify the officer’s decision to seize the car without a warrant. In addition, the citation for that statement was to State v. Fondren, supra, which did not involve the stop of a mobile automobile but involved the search of a parked car. We reject the language that anything in addition to the mobility of an automobile at the time it is lawfully stopped is required to create exigency under the automobile exception as defined in this case. We are not confronted in this case with the search of a vehicle that is not mobile and has not just been lawfully stopped by a police officer. We, therefore, do not address in this opinion whether a warrant for the search and seizure of a parked or impounded automobile is required.
*278In the case at bar, the trial judge recognized that the mobility of the vehicle alone created the exigent circumstances necessary to satisfy Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution, and he properly disregarded that the defendant was under arrest and in police custody and that the car was under police control when the search was conducted. As previously mentioned, under the “automobile mobility” test it does not matter whether the passenger could have taken over the custody of the car (which he eventually did), whether the police had adequate personnel to back-up the arrest, whether a tow truck was available, whether a magistrate was available by telephone or otherwise,6 or whether a threatening crowd gathered, etc. All the trial judge needed to find was what he did find: (1) the car was mobile at the time it was stopped by the police; and (2) the police had probable cause to believe that the car contained contraband or crime evidence. As we said in State v. Greene, supra, and State v. Quinn, supra, we agree with the reasoning of the the United States Supreme Court that for constitutional purposes no difference exists between, on the one hand, seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and, on the other hand, carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Oregon Constitution.
*279Finally, we hold that the scope of the warrantless search of the automobile was reasonable. As stated in Ross, the scope of a warrantless search is defined by
“* * * the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. Just as probable cause to believe that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocumented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless search of a suitcase. Probable cause to believe that a container placed in the trunk of a taxi contains contraband or evidence does not justify a search of the entire cab.” 456 US at 593.
Thus, in this case since there was probable cause to believe that the gun was in the black purse in the trunk of the car, the scope of the search and seizure of the gun was reasonable. The search and seizure in this case also met federal constitutional standards. United States v. Ross, supra.
The Court of Appeals is reversed and the trial court judgment is reinstated.
At the time of defendant’s arrest, ORS 166.250(1) provided:
“Except as otherwise provided in this section, ORS 166.260,166.270,166.280, 166.290 or 166.410 to 166.470, any person who possesses or has in his possession any machine gun, or carries concealed upon his person or within any vehicle which is under his control or direction any pistol, revolver or other firearm capable of being concealed upon the person, without having a license to carry such firearm as provided in ORS 166.290, is guilty of a misdemeanor, unless he has been convicted previously of any felony or of any crime made punishable by this section, ÓRS 166.260.166.270.166.280.166.290 or 166.410 to 166.470, in which case he is guilty of a felony.”
ORS 166.250 was amended by Oregon Laws 1985, chapter 543, section 2, and now defines the crime as occurring when one knowingly carries a concealable firearm “concealed and readily accessible about the person within any vehicle * * Because a firearm in the trunk of a car is not “readily accessible about the person,” defendant’s conduct would no longer be a crime. ORS 161.035(4) addresses the effect of statutory amendments after the occurrence of the conduct and before a conviction becomes final. It provides:
“When all or part of a criminal statute is amended or repealed, the criminal statute or part thereof so amended or repealed remains in force for the purpose of authorizing the accusation, prosecution, conviction and punishment of a person who violated the statute or part thereof before the effective date of the amending or repealing Act.”
Portland City Code Ordinance 14.32.010 provides in pertinent part:
“(a) As used in this Chapter, ‘firearm’ means a pistol, revolver, gun, rifle, or other ordnance, * * *.
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“(c) It is unlawful for any person on a public street or in a public place to carry a firearm upon his person, or in a vehicle under his control or in which he is an occupant, unless all ammunition has been removed from the chamber and from the cylinder, clip, or magazine.”
The Court of Appeals took issue with this conclusion, but the defendant never challenged the trial court ruling that there was probable cause to search the trunk for the gun. Therefore, we do not address that issue.
When we refer to automobiles, motor vehicles or cars, we include similar conveyances.
See, e.g, People v. Chavers, 33 Cal 3d 462, 189 Cal Rptr 169, 658 P2d 96 (1983); People v. Barton, 673 P2d 1005 (Colo 1984); People v. Smith, 95 111 2d 412, 69 111 Dec 374, 447 NE2d 809 (1983); People v. Langen, 60 NY2d 170, 456 NE2d 1167 (1983); Hunter u. State, 704 P2d 713 (Wyo 1985).
In this modern day of electronics and computers, we foresee a time in the near future when the warrant requirement of the state and federal constitutions can be fulfilled virtually without exception. All that would be needed in this state would be a central facility with magistrates on duty and available 24 hours a day. All police in the state could call in by telephone or other electronic device to the central facility where the facts, given under oath, constituting the purported probable cause for search and seizure would be recorded. The magistrates would evaluate those facts and, if deemed sufficient to justify a search and seizure, the magistrate would immediately issue an electronic warrant authorizing the officer on the scene to proceed. The warrant could either be retained in the central facility or electronically recorded in any city or county in the state. Thus, the desired goal of having a neutral magistrate could be achieved within minutes without the present invasion of the rights of a citizen created by the delay under our current cumbersome procedure and yet would fully protect the rights of the citizen from warrantless searches.
Telephonic warrants are only a first step in the process we envision. See discussion of Oregon’s statutory provisions for telephonic search warrants, ORS 133.545(5), in State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337, 363 n 14, 667 P2d 996 (1983) (Jones, J., specially concurring). See also the discussions of early efforts to institute telephonic warrants in Miller, Telephonic Search Warrants: The San Diego Experience, 9 Prosecutor 385 (1974); Comment, Oral Search Warrants: A New Standard of Warrant Availability, 21 UCLA L Rev 691 (1973); cf. McCalla, Telewarrants, 16 Ottawa L Rev 425 (1984).