dissenting.
¶ 41 I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s decision which permits impeachment of an excited utterance by the showing of a prior felony conviction. Because I believe that such impeachment is illogical and therefore unjustifiable, and because I cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that such impeachment here did not affect the verdict, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
¶ 42 The inherent contradiction in the majority’s position is illustrated by setting forth the evidentiary theories involved. Our supreme court has observed that a conviction for any felony, even one without an intrinsic component of dishonesty, is admissible to impeach the credibility of a testifying witness:
upon the theory that a major crime entails such an injury to and disregard of the rights of other persons that it can reasonably be expected the witness will be untruthful if it is to his advantage. The perpetrator of a major criminal act has demonstrated such a lack of scruples as to show a willingness to give false testimony.
State v. Malloy, 131 Ariz. 125, 127, 639 P.2d 315, 317 (1981).
¶43 Our supreme court has also explained the nature of the excited utterance which justifies its admissibility in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule:
The admissibility of such exclamation is based on our experience that, under certain external circumstances of physical or mental shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced in a spectator which stills the reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already produced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses, rather than reason and reflection ... the utterance may be taken as expressing the real belief of the speaker as to the facts just observed by him.
Keefe v. State, 50 Ariz. 293, 297-98, 72 P.2d 425, 427 (1937).
¶44 As I understand these theories, the rule permitting impeachment with a prior felony conviction essentially assesses human nature and concludes that a convicted felon is more likely to deliberately lie when given the chance than someone who has not demonstrated such disregard of society’s rules. The rule clearly contemplates that the testimony by the felon may be the product of a reflective mind making a conscious decision to fabricate.
¶ 45 The essence of an excited utterance, on the other hand, is that it is the product of a “spontaneous” mental process, a statement made “under the immediate and uncontrolled domination of the senses.” Keefe, 50 Ariz. at 297-98, 72 P.2d at 427. As Wigmore has commented, an excited utterance is particularly trustworthy because it is made “during the brief period when considerations of self-interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection.” John H. Wig-more, Wigmore on Evidence § 1747 at 195 (Chadboum rev.1976). Because it is not the product of reasoned reflection engaged in to promote one’s self-interest, an excited utterance by definition precludes the danger of conscious fabrication.
¶ 46 The obvious conclusion should be that an utterance that does not result from reason and reflection is simply not logically impeachable by evidence that is limited in its usefulness to an assessment of the reflective, conscious mind. However, the majority refuses to see this distinction. Rather, it extends a reasonable hypothesis regarding the conscious, reflective mind of a convicted felon into the realm of the unconscious where the relevance of felony conviction impeachment is nonexistent.9
*563¶47 In its defense, the majority asserts that excited utterances are not unimpeachable and reasons from this that felony convictions are admissible to aid the jury in assessing the trustworthiness of such an utterance. State v. Hernandez, at 557, 959 P.2d at 814 (App.1998). I do not gainsay that an excited utterance may be impeached. What I assert is that such impeachment should be logical. For example, if the circumstances show that the utterer lacked the opportunity to accurately observe the startling event, or that the utterer suffers from impaired sight or impaired hearing, these circumstances should be admitted as impeachment. This is so because these factors logically bear on the utterer’s credibility, as they are implicated even when it is the unconscious mind at work. Felony convictions, however, do not have the same logical relevance.
¶ 48 The majority also asserts that precluding felony conviction impeachment of an excited utterance “would require us to give defendant’s out-of-court excited utterance more beneficial treatment than if defendant had related the same statement in open court while subject to cross examination.” Op. at 558, 959 P.2d at 815. This observation illustrates that the majority misses the point. Testifying in open court is precisely the kind of reflective act that implicates the witness’s character for consciously telling the truth at the time he is testifying. And a felony conviction is the kind of evidence which informs the jury of a character flaw which is relevant to their assessment of the witness’s present willingness to consciously fabricate.
¶49 Conversely, an excited utterance is divorced from the witness’s character for truthtelling because it is divorced from the witness’s conscious mental processes. Therefore, a felony conviction does not tell the jury anything relevant about the credibility of the utterance but serves only to tell the jury that the utterer is a person of questionable character. I had thought that our rules of evidence expressly excluded such evidence. See Rule 404(b), Ariz. R. Evid.
¶ 50 What the majority has accomplished is to confuse two entirely different kinds of statements and apply to them a “one-size-fits-all” rule. Precluding felony conviction impeachment of an excited utterance would not be giving such a statement “beneficial” treatment over courtroom testimony. It would instead be a recognition of the true nature of the excited utterance and would emphasize that when logic conflicts with the letter of the law, the law will be read to comport with logic.
¶ 51 The majority’s decision, however, does not stop here. Exacerbating the illogic of their position is the fact that defendant did not suffer his felony convictions until more than two years after he made the utterance at issue. Thus, according to the majority, a felony conviction infects the felon to such a degree that not only are his unconscious thought processes rendered suspect, but the virus is so pernicious it can also operate retroactively to afflict his unconscious mind two years before he became a felon.
¶ 52 The majority also seeks to justify its decision in a manner which gives me concern. The majority seizes on the term “may” from the Keefe definition and suggests that felony convictions are necessary impeachment material so that the jury can find that the excited utterance “was not so influenced by the stress of excitement as to be incapable of fabricating the facts or acting in his or her own self-interests.” Op. at 558, 959 P.2d at 815. Is the majority saying that the jury is now to decide what constitutes an excited utterance?
¶53 I do not read Keefe as creating a jury question regarding excited utterances. Rather, in saying that a speaker “may be considered” as speaking from stress, all Keefe means is that there is a determination that must be made whether an utterance qualifies as excited. This determination is clearly a preliminary question of admissibility under Rule 104(a), Arizona Rules of Evidence, a question which heretofore has been within the province of the trial court. See State v. White, 168 Ariz. 500, 505, 815 P.2d 869, 874 (1991) (“Jurors do not rule on admissibility — that is the sole province of the trial court.”), abrogated on other grounds, State v. *564Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 844 P.2d 566 (1992); State v. Thompson, 169 Ariz. 471, 473, 820 P.2d 335, 337 (App.1991) (“ ‘The crucial point is that the [trial] court must be able to find that the declarant’s state [of mind] at the time he made the declaration ruled out the possibility of conscious reflection.’ ”) (quoting 4 Weinstein’s Evidence ¶ 803(2)[01] at 803-91 (1990)); State v. Valencia, 186 Ariz. 493, 500, 924 P.2d 497, 504 (App.1996) (“[rule 104(a) ] requires the trial court to make ... factual findings in determining as a preliminary matter the admissibility of evidence. Such findings are not made known to the jury and do not usurp the jury’s function.”). If the trial judge admits the utterance as excited, the jury will assess the credibility of the utterance based on the circumstances surrounding it, as well as any logically connected impeachment material. However, the jury is not permitted to overrule the judge and find that the utterance did not qualify as excited.
¶ 54 The majority cites as justification for its position Rule 806, Arizona Rules of Evidence, which provides that any hearsay statement admitted in evidence may be impeached “by any evidence which would be admissible for [impeachment] if declarant had testified as a witness.” Of course, impeachment with a prior felony is admissible against a testifying witness. Rule 609, Ariz. R. Evid. Read literally, then, Rule 806 supports the majority’s.holding, however illogical or unsupported by empirical evidence that holding is.
¶ 55 The answer is that we should not apply the literal language of the rule. Courts have not hesitated in the past to decline a literal application of statutory language when the result was an absurdity or a meaning clearly at variance with legislative intent. Keller v. State, 46 Ariz. 106, 115-18, 47 P.2d 442, 446-47 (1935); State v. Baca, 187 Ariz. 61, 66, 926 P.2d 528, 533 (App.1996). In such a ease, we will alter, modify or supply words to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Keller, 46 Ariz. at 117, 47 P.2d at 447. Here, we should recognize that our supreme court, in enacting Rule 806, could not possibly have intended the untenable result reached by the majority and we should construe the rule accordingly.
¶ 56 Underlying the majority’s willingness to countenance the impeachment permitted in this case is an unstated dissatisfaction with the trial court’s ruling that defendant’s 911 call qualified as an excited utterance. I too believe the trial judge was in error on this point. However, the fact is that the trial judge made his ruling and the state did not contest it as a cross-issue on this appeal. We are stuck with it and the proper response is not to create an untenable rule of evidence. Rather, the majority should acknowledge the trial judge’s error in permitting felony conviction impeachment of an excited utterance and rule accordingly. Since this was not the approach the majority chose, I respectfully dissent.
. The majority asserts that I propose that only felony convictions that involve dishonesty or false statements should be admitted to impeach credibility. Op. at 557, 959 P.2d at 814. I make no *563such proposal, as is evident from my incorporation of the Malloy principle into my analysis.