(Dissenting) — I must respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that the “triggering event” or “operative date” for purposes of the victim penalty assessment is the date of conviction. I believe, however, that the date of the crime is the triggering event, and because the 1996 amendment to RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) contains no indication the Legislature intended to apply the increase in the assessment amount retroactively, I would hold that the statute in effect at the time of the crime controls the amount of the assessment. I would therefore remand for resentencing.
The majority interprets the opening phrase of the statute (“[wjhenever any person is found guilty”) to mean “at *686the time” any person is found guilty. Majority, at 681-82. I cannot subscribe to this conclusion because my reading of the same language is different, and legislative history indicates a different construction.
The plain meaning of the term “whenever” is “in any or every instance.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2602 (1976). Thus, the language at issue merely indicates that the assessment is mandatory, i.e., it should always (in every instance) be imposed upon conviction. The language does not identify the triggering event for application of the statute.
Indeed, in amending chapter 7.68 RCW the Legislature has on at least two occasions identified the date of the crime as the triggering event in the context of specifying either prospective or retroactive application of the amendments. See Laws of 1997, ch. 249, § 2 (amendment applies retroactively to “criminal acts that occur on April 1, 1997, and thereafter”); Laws of 1989, ch. 252, § 27 (amendment applies prospectively to “offenses committed on or after the effective date of this act”). The Legislature has done so despite the opening phrase “[wjhenever any person is found guilty.” Thus, the term “whenever,” as used in RCW 7.68.035(1)(a), does not delineate the triggering event for imposition of the victim penalty assessment.13 Rather, I *687believe the operative date is the date the crime was committed.14
Whether Messrs. Humphrey and Munden are subject to the higher assessment therefore depends on whether the Legislature intended the 1996 amendment to apply retroactively. A statute is presumed to operate prospectively in the absence of express or implied legislative intent to the contrary. In re Estate of Burns, 131 Wn.2d 104, 110, 928 P.2d 1094 (1997).
The materials relating to the 1996 amendment contain neither an express nor an implied indication of legislative intent to apply the increase in the victim penalty assessment retroactively. When, however, the same statute was amended in 1989, increasing the assessment from $70 to $100 in felony cases, the Legislature specifically provided for prospective application: “[T]his act . . . applies only to offenses committed on or after the effective date of this act.” Laws of 1989, ch. 252, §§ 27, 29. In contrast, in amending chapter 7.68 RCW in 1997, the Legislature specifically announced retroactive application. See Laws of 1997, ch. 249, § 2 (the “act is remedial in nature and applies to criminal acts that occur on April 1,1997, and thereafter”). As evidenced, the Legislature knows how to specify retroactive application, and in light of its silence on the matter, the Legislature must be presumed to have intended the 1996 amendment to operate prospectively.
I believe the majority has inappropriately given the 1996 increase in the victim penalty assessment retroactive ef*688feet. I would therefore reverse the $500 assessment in these cases and remand for resentencing.
Review granted at 137 Wn.2d 1008 (1999).
This interpretation appears consistent with the legislative intent in other instances in which the word “whenever” has been used. See RCW 9.92.060(1) (“ Whenever any person is convicted of any crime except murder, burglary in the first degree, arson in the first degree, robbery, rape of a child, or rape, the superior court may, in its discretion, at the time of imposing sentence upon such person, direct that such sentence be stayed and suspended until otherwise ordered . . . .” (emphasis added)); RCW 9.92.070 (“Hereafter whenever any judge . . . shall sentence any person to pay any fine and costs, the judge may, in the judge’s discretion, provide that such fine and costs may be paid in certain designated installments . . . .” (emphasis added)); RCW 9.92.100 (“Whenever any person shall be adjudged guilty of carnal abuse of a female person under the age of ten years, or of rape, or shall be adjudged to be an habitual criminal, the court may . . . direct an operation to be performed upon such person, for the prevention of procreation.” (emphasis added)); RCW 9.94A.120 (“When a person is convicted of a felony, the court shall impose punishment as provided in this section .... (3) Whenever a sentence outside the standard range is imposed, the court shall set forth the reasons for its decision in written findings of fact and conclusions of law.” (emphasis added)). In each of the above examples, the term “whenever” is *687used to indicate that, if the specified condition (italicized clause) is met, the remainder of the provision applies.
Interestingly enough, after oral argument in these cases, the State, in another case involving the same issue and the same trial court, conceded that the “operative date” for purposes of ex post facto analysis of RCW 7.68.035(1) is “the date on which the crime was committed, not the date of conviction.” State’s Mot. for Remand for Resentencing Based on Resp’t’s Concession of Error at 3, State v. Erickson, No 40832-1-I. This Court accepted the State’s concession and remanded for resentencing. State v. Erickson, No. 40832-1-I (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1998).