(dissenting) — I cannot join in a defamation decision which ignores a number of the defaming statements complained of, sidesteps crucial facts bearing on those statements which it does discuss; and misapplies the law. In key respects this case is indistinguishable from the recent case of Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., 109 Wn.2d 514, 746 P.2d 295 (1987), reh'g granted July 12, 1988, in which we found a jury question of malice. The decision of the lower courts should be affirmed.
Statements Regarding Secret Port District Files
The majority opinion ignores altogether two statements which Margóles has contended are defamatory. This is a serious omission since, if we construe the evidence favorably to Margóles, as we must on summary judgment, the statements are false and were known to be false. The article of December 17, 1981 contains the following statement:
Early this year, at the behest of Margóles and McLaughlin, the port hired its own auditor . . . and began in-house bookkeeping under the supervision of Margóles.
*209Requests by The Miner for access to port records have been regularly refused ever since.
Exhibit 1. In his affidavit submitted to the trial court, Margóles asserted:
The article stated that requests by the Newport Miner for access to port records "have been regularly refused ever since" is completely false [sic]. Since I was manager of the Port District, I believe this allegation was libelous of me.
Clerk's Papers, at 62. The December 24, 1981 article stated:
Files heretofore kept secret showed that Margóles collected more than $60,000 in salary plus expenses from the Port of Pend Oreille and from another port district during 1980 and 1981.
Exhibit 2. Even aside from the allegation concerning $60,000, Margóles has contended that the assertion that certain port district files were kept secret is false and defamatory. Clerk's Papers, at 62, 64. Margóles' contentions are not frivolous. The Miner's articles suggested that a state audit had uncovered wrongdoing by Margóles. The newspaper's further assertions that it was denied access and that certain records had been kept secret suggest that the wrongdoing was compounded by a cover-up. The majority, however, discusses neither of these alleged defa-mations.
Both statements present a jury question of malice. On summary judgment, we take the facts asserted in Margóles' affidavit to be true and ask whether a jury could reasonably find in his favor. Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., supra at 525. We assume, therefore, that the Miner's request for port records was not refused or that no such request was made. Likewise, we assume that, as Margóles swore, no port district files were kept secret. If that is so, then Hubbart's statements are false and a question of fact is presented for the jury. In addition, Margóles' affidavit logically implies that Hubbart's statements were made with actual knowledge of their falsity. It would have been Hubbart who sought the port district records. If we take Margóles' contentions as true, as we must, then Hubbart would have to *210have known that no such requests were made or that his requests were granted. A jury question is thus presented on the issue of actual knowledge of falsity. Such knowledge would constitute malice under New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686, 84 S. Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412 (1964). Therefore summary judgment should be denied on that issue.
The majority's failure to consider the allegedly defamatory statements on port authority records is inexcusable. The majority deems the claim based on these statements "nonmeritorious" on the ground that Margóles' affidavit does not present evidence of convincing clarity. That conclusion can only be reached by a willful misunderstanding of the convincing clarity standard.
A plaintiff in a case such as this is required to prove the elements of defamation, including malice, by clear and convincing evidence. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986) holds that the same high standard is applicable in the court's consideration of summary judgment. Anderson, however, clearly does not require the grant of summary judgment with regard to the statements regarding secret files and the withholding of information.
Neither Margóles nor Hubbart offered documentary evidence on this issue; each side submitted only affidavits. Only live testimony can establish whether Margóles or Hubbart is telling the truth. While Margóles is required to show malice with convincing clarity, an extreme discrepancy in the respective credibility of Margóles and Hubbart could lead the jury to find clear and convincing evidence of Hubbart's knowingly making a false statement in the oral testimony alone. We have, then, a classic jury question in which credibility is decisive. Anderson does not change the rule that credibility is for the jury. In fact, the Court took pains to stress that its holding should not be construed to limit the jury's function or to expand the role of the court in deciding questions of fact in defamation cases.
Our holding that the clear-and-convincing standard of proof should be taken into account in ruling on summary *211judgment motions does not denigrate the role of the jury. It by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Neither do we suggest that the trial courts should act other than with caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.
(Citation omitted. Italics mine.) Anderson, at 255. Therefore, Margóles' affidavit is sufficient evidence on which to conclude that summary judgment is inappropriate. A question of fact is presented on the issue of Hubbart's malice in publishing the statements that the Miner had been denied access to port district files and that port district records had been kept secret. Summary judgment should be denied and the case remanded for trial.
Statements Regarding "Misappropriated" and "Funneled" Funds
In the December 24, 1981 article, Hubbart reported: "At least $12,750 was funneled to [Margóles] through a company called Thomas Contracting, evidently by consent of the port commissioners." Margóles' affidavit states:
The article [of December 24, 1981] further states that at least $12,750 was "funneled" to me. No money was funneled or inappropriately paid to me. The money was paid to a company that I worked for and in return I received pay from that company. . . .
In the April 8, 1982 articles Hubbarts [sic] stated that I owed the Port District a refund of at least $294 in misappropriated funds. That is not true. The article states that the state audit found four instances in which I was paid by two port districts for the same work and indicated there could have been more. That was completely false.
Clerk's Papers, at 62-63. In the April 8, 1982 article, Hub-bart reported: "[The audit] even states that he owes the *212port a refund of at least $294 in misappropriated funds." This "misappropriated" $294 was a portion of Margóles' salary which the auditor thought should be deducted from his pay. It was said to represent time spent working as a consultant for another port district. The April 8, 1982 article also represents the audit as reporting three other instances in which Margóles allegedly received payment from Pend Oreille Port District for work performed for another district.
The majority concludes that there could have been no malice — no knowing falsity or recklessness — in regard to these statements because they were not materially false.
We fail to see anything in the record which establishes that the use of the word "funneled" in this context is even false. In any event, the "sting" of the reporter's story is true.
As with "funneled", using the word "misappropriated" in this context appears to be no more than a highly critical way of describing what the auditor's final report said.
Majority, at 203. We explained what it means to say the "sting" of a story is true in Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wn.2d 473, 635 P.2d 1081 (1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1124 (1982), and Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., supra. Contrary to the majority's suggestion, it does not mean that a statement is not materially false, despite misleading wording, so long as the underlying facts are true. The question is whether an article containing falsehoods, taken as a whole, leaves a false impression. The majority has misapplied the law by breaking the offending articles down into isolated statements and analyzing these fragments separately for falsity and malice. Prior case law clearly requires us to analyze the statements as a whole, taking into effect their total effect. The majority claims that it keeps the cumulative effect in mind, but there is no sign that it does; the majority ignores and negates that effect.
In Mark, the newspaper and other defendants correctly reported plaintiff was charged with larceny, but reported an incorrect, inflated figure for the amount involved. Mark *213contended that this defamed him. We disagreed, holding that each of the stories, taken as a whole, was true and that the falsehood of the figure did not render any of the stories, taken as a whole, untrue.
It is now generally agreed that a defamation defendant need not prove the literal truth of every claimed defamatory statement. W. Prosser, Torts 798 (4th ed. 1971). A defendant need only show that the statement is substantially true or that the gist of the story, the portion that carries the "sting", is true. W. Prosser, supra.
Mark, at 494.
We examined the offending report as a whole in the recent case of Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., supra. There, the defendant reported correctly that the plaintiff was under investigation concerning bail bond practices; that his close friend was a bail bondsman; and that he had accepted substantial sums from a bondsman to finance his campaigns. The trial court concluded that the further, false statement that plaintiff received "approximately half” of his funds from bail bondsmen did not alter the "sting" of the story and that it was therefore not materially false. We reversed.
Herron assigns error to the trial court's characterization, contending that the true "sting” was to implicate Herron in a criminal conspiracy, giving an overall impression that he bargained away his ethics and integrity in exchange for campaign contributions. We agree. In that context, the statement that "approximately half" of Herron's campaign contributions came from bail bondsmen carries significantly greater opprobrium than the more accurate figure: approximately 2 percent. The false statement thus affected the "sting" of the story itself. Herron has made a sufficient prima facie showing of material falsity to preclude summary judgment.
Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., supra at 523. See also Camer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 45 Wn. App. 29, 38-39, 723 P.2d 1195 (1986) (statement's status as opinion or fact to be determined by examining the report as a whole), review denied, 107 Wn.2d 1020, cert. denied, 482 U.S. 916, 96 L. Ed. 2d 677, 107 S. Ct. 3189 (1987).
*214If the defendant need not prove the literal truth of every claimed defamatory statement, by what standard of fairness can we require the plaintiff making a prima facie case to prove the falsity of each separate statement and, in addition, motivating malice behind each separate statement? Isn't it proper, rather, to look at the defamatory report as a whole when asking whether the plaintiff has carried his burdens, just as we look at the defamatory report as a whole when asking whether the defendant has carried his? Apparently assuming that the answer is no, the majority examines only isolated statements in the articles written by Hubbart, requiring Margóles to show falsity and malice in regard to each one. That virtually ensures that summary judgment will be granted, but it contradicts settled law and ignores the reality of how these articles affected the public that read them.
The statements regarding "misappropriated" and "funneled'' funds should not be analyzed in isolation for their falsity and the malice that might have motivated them. Instead, given that the article does contain falsehoods, the words are relevant to determining whether the article, taken as a whole, leaves a false impression. Do the statements regarding "misappropriated" and "funneled" funds contribute to the impression that Margóles was engaged in misuse of public funds?
It seems obvious to me, as it did to the Court of Appeals, that those statements do contribute to a false impression. There is a tremendous difference between saying that Margóles may have been overpaid and saying that he has received misappropriated funds. The word misappropriated clearly implies malfeasance, where in fact what the audit showed was a disagreement over the calculation of Mar-góles' salary. That false impression was reinforced later in the article, when it was reported that the commissioners "would not seek restitution." In fact, the commissioners disagreed with the auditor's interpretation of the figures and rejected altogether the suggestion that Margóles was not entitled to the money he had received. To say that the commissioners "would not seek restitution" conveys the *215entirely different impression that Margóles had received funds to which he was not entitled, but that the commissioners had decided not to go to the trouble of recovering them. Once again, it is not the isolated word choice which is to be evaluated separately for falsity and malice. Instead, the use of "restitution" like the use of "misappropriated” makes the "sting" of a story containing both truth and falsehood tilt toward the false.
The same is true of the word "funneled". As the majority points out, the dictionary meaning of the verb "to funnel” is innocuous. But this article used the word in a specific context, one full of innuendo and actual falsehood. While "funneled" might mean "to serve as a means for the transmission or direction of" when encountered in isolation, here it clearly implied concealment and dishonesty. That implication pushes the truth contained in the article into a false light. The "sting" of the story is false, though it contains true statements.
Hubbart's Threats
The majority makes a similar error in not taking into account the full factual background of the alleged defama-tions. It fails to give due weight to Hubbart's threats against Margóles. Malice in the context of defamation cases does not mean hatred or ill will, but rather knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of falsity. Nevertheless, evidence of hostility or spite is clearly relevant in determining whether a defendant was inclined to act with such knowledge or recklessness. As we held in Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., supra:
The standard for determining "actual malice" is subjective, focusing on the defendant's belief in or attitude toward the truth of the statement, not the defendant's personal hostility toward the plaintiff. However, actual malice can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, including defendant's hostility or spite, the reporter's knowledge that his sources are hostile to the plaintiff or ignorant of the details concerning the situation in question, destroying notes after the complaint is served, failure to follow newspaper procedures for filing papers of inaccuracy, and failing to properly investigate.
*216(Citations omitted.) Herron, at 523-24. Evidence of hostility was critical to our decision in Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., supra.
Here, viewing the evidence in the record in a light most favorable to Herron, there is abundant circumstantial evidence of actual malice. McGaffin's exchange with Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Sebring was extremely hostile. McGaffin threatened to "get" Herron or his staff in a story he intended to broadcast on the evening news because he was angry at their failure to cooperate with his investigation. He then in fact did broadcast a story casting the prosecutor's office and specifically Herron in a very evil and criminal light in a story that contained inexplicable falsehoods. In addition, the general tenor of the story is hostile and even implies that Herron arranged court records to hide his illegal activities. See Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d 324, 337 (2d Cir. 1969) (innuendo can be indicative of actual malice).
Herron, at 525. The similarities to this case cannot be ignored. Not only did Hubbart make a similar suggestion that a public official had concealed the public records of his activities; he also made similar overt declarations of hostility and an intention to use his position to "get" Margóles. The affidavit of John McLaughlin, a port commissioner, sets forth the facts in detail:
During the fall and winter of 1981, other port district commissioners and I had discussions with James Hub-bart concerning Neil Margóles and the operation of the port district. Mr. Hubbart made it very clear that he wanted to see Neil Margóles fired.
On December 11, 1981, at approximately 4:30 p.m., one other port commissioner, Franklin Billings and I, met with James Hubbart and Sherry Hubbart in the editor's office of the Newport Miner. The purported purpose for that meeting was to discuss the preliminary port district audit. Mr. and Mrs. Hubbart stated that they had reviewed the port audit and demanded that the resignation of port manager Neil Margóles be on James Hub-bart's desk by Monday, December 14, 1981, or they would go hard on the port district and write about port affairs in the worst possible light.
*217As nearly as I can tell, Hubbart['s] antagonism towards Neil Margóles began in approximately October, 1979, when the Newport Miner had set up a meeting at a business called the Ranch Club located between Priest River and Newport. That meeting was to be a luncheon with a man named Porteous. Mr. Porteous was a representative of a company called "Toy Pack". Toy Pack was considering construction of a very large mill which would mean a large infusion of capital and jobs into Pend Oreille County. Hubbarts [sic] planned to pay for that luncheon meeting, and in exchange the Miner was supposedly to get the scoop on any story. A reporter, from a competing newspaper in Priest River, was at that luncheon. After lunch, James Hubbart came to my office. He was livid and blamed Margóles for the reporter's presence. He shut the door and told me that Neil Margóles had stepped on his toes; that "this was my baby". He further stated that he was going to get Neil Margóles even if he had to use the newspaper to do it.
(Italics mine.) Clerk's Papers, at 55-56. These threats are clearly relevant, though not conclusive, on the issue of malice. They indicate that Hubbart may have been disposed to falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. On this motion for summary judgment, Hubbart's stated willingness to "write about port affairs in the worst possible light" does not permit us to conclude, as the majority does, that Hub-bart meant to "get" Margóles simply by vigorous investigation and careful reporting of the truth. Once again, the majority weighs evidence drawing that conclusion. The similar events and threats in Herron v. KING Broadcasting Co., supra, led us to conclude that a jury question was presented on the issue of malice. Given the other evidence in this case, the same conclusion seems inescapable here.
Misuse of the Port District Vehicle
The article of December 17, 1981 stated that:
The audit report will not be made public for at least eight weeks, but apparently it embraces questionable expense accounts, unexplained payouts, private use of the port's vehicle and faulty bookkeeping.
The majority acknowledges that the preliminary audit report did not discuss misuse of the port district vehicle at *218all. The majority stresses the use of the word "apparently" in this passage, and fails to find either falsity or malice in connection with it. However, Commissioner McLaughlin's affidavit, which on summary judgment we take as true, bars such an interpretation. McLaughlin swears that Hubbart personally told him that he, Hubbart, had read the preliminary report. Furthermore, McLaughlin saw Hubbart read from a document he believed to be the preliminary report in the meeting held on December 11, 1981. These latter facts demonstrate that Hubbart knew his statement was false when he incorrectly reported that the preliminary report contained allegations concerning the port vehicle. The use of the word "apparently" is simply disingenuous and does not change the fact that the report was knowingly false. Hubbart knew what the report in fact contained.
The majority not only ignores these facts, its reasoning on this point is a non sequitur.
Since the port manager admits, however, that he was cautioned by the port commissioners after one incident not to make unauthorized use of the port vehicle, we cannot conclude that the statement was published with knowledge of its falsity . . .
Majority, at 201. The fact that Margóles admitted to a warning on a matter not dealt with in the preliminary report has no bearing on the question of malice. Hubbart may or may not have had information on such misuse, hut when he portrayed the preliminary report as containing such allegations, he knowingly made a false statement. Under the facts as we are bound to construe them on summary judgment, Hubbart had the report in his possession, had read it, and knew its true contents.
Conclusion
The majority tries this case on appeal, choosing which facts it will consider and which side it will believe, in complete disregard of its limited role in deciding an issue of summary judgment. Margóles has submitted sufficient facts *219on which a jury might reasonably conclude that Hubbart knowingly reported falsehoods.
I would deny summary judgment as the trial court and the Court of Appeals did.
Goodloe, J., concurs with Dore, J.