The parties will be referred to herein as-they appeared in the trial court.
On November 16, 1961, plaintiff Dorothy Ann Catlett, filed her petition in District Court of Oklahoma County against defendant, John Cross Catlett, to recover judgment for delinquent child support payments directed in a divorce decree entered in the Juvenile Court of Dallas County, Texas on September 7, 1955. A copy of the decree is attached to the petition of the plaintiff. In the decree plaintiff was awarded the custody of Kathleen Delia Catlett, 'age 9, fhe child of the plaintiff and defendant, and the' defendant was' ordered to pay the sum of $60.00 per week toward the support and maintenance of said minor child, the first payment to be made'on or before'August 13,' 1955, and a like sum of-$60.00 every Saturday thereafter until the ■ child reached the age of eighteen years.
The defendant paid threé or four of the' weekly $60.00 payments. He then' discussed-the matter by telephone with some-ohe connected with the child support office - -in-Dallas, Texas. He testified that the party-informed, him that if he paid ■ $150.0.0 a month, there would be no problem'-as -long as “it -was paid- through the court” and,.,not direct to plaintiff. The records» of ■ the Dallas. County . Child Support Department reflect, that- -defendant has made these» $150.00 payments each month up to the date of trial. . • ■ •
A jury was waived by both parties. The case was tried before the District Judge on July 10, 1963 and taken under advisement. On*October 18, 1963 the trial court entered a judgment finding “generally in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff”. No specific findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered. Timely motion for new trial was filed and overruled. Plaintiff prosecutes this appeal. Parties will be referred to as they appear in the trial court. The cause is regularly before this Court for hearing and disposition on its merits.
- This- Court -has held that full faith and cr.edit. must be accorded to.the .decree of.the. *944Texas court. Clark v. Clark, Okl., 380 P.2d 241; Clester v. Heidt’s Estate, Okl., 353 P.2d 699. Defendant requests that we reexamine this question giving consideration to the- Texas statutes and several Texas decisions. Defendant cites Article 4639-a of the Texas Civil Statutes, Vernon’s Civil Stat, and Texas cases as follows: Blunk v. Ivens, Tex.Civ.App., 330 S.W.2d 247; Johns v. Johns, Tex.Civ.App., 172 S.W.2d 770; Ex Parte Roberts, 139 Tex. 644, 165 S.W.2d 83; and Grubbs v. Grubbs, Tex.Civ.App., 164 S.W.2d 216.
Article 4639-a of the Texas Civil Statutes and the cases cited outline the procedure to be followed in modifying a divorce decree because of change of conditions. The question' of the full -faith and credit to be accorded to a divorce decree of a foreign state is not involved.
These sames cases with the exception of Blunk v. Ivens, supra, were presented to the Oklahoma Court in Clark v. Clark, supra, and held to be inapplicable.
The Texas Court in several cases holds that'the provisions of a divorce decree entered' in a foreign state are entitled to full faith' and' credit in the Texas courts as to ill- past due payments for child support.
In Gard v. Gard, 150 Tex. 347, 241 S.W.2d 618, the Supreme Court of Texas, construing an Idaho divorce decree, held fhát matured payments for child support became “absolute, vested and protected by the full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution”.
In Stout v. Stout, Tex.Civ.App., 214 S.W.2d 891, error refused, the Court held that past due installments on a Louisiana judgment for alimony and child support were final and entitled to full faith and credit in a Texas action on the judgment, notwithstanding the Louisiana statute authorized the annulment or amendment of judgments for alimony.
In Caples v. Caples (CCA 5), 47 F.2d 225, which originated in the Western District of Texas, the Circuit Court held that the accrued payments on an alimony judgment of a California court were final and entitled to full faith and credit by the Texas Court in an action to enforce the California judgment.
In Texas allowances for child support are binding and final until changed by the court. In the case of Ex Parte Padfield, 154 Tex. 253, 276 S.W.2d 247, the Supreme Court of Texas said:
“In this state a decree of divorce including child support becomes final and binding. The child support is certain and fixed until changed by the court after application, a hearing and proof of changed conditions.”
In the instant case the defendant has at no time filed an application in the Texas Court seeking to modify or change the payments for child support.
This troublesome question has been before the Oklahoma Court for more than fifty years. In 1910 in Bleuer v. Bleuer, 27 Okl. 25, 110 P. 736, this Court held that a divórce decree entered in the State of Illinois providing for the payment of child support in monthly installments subject to modification, lacked finality and would not be accorded full faith and credit by the Oklahoma courts.
At the time Bleuer v. Bleuer, supra, was decided, the Court did not have before it the landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 30 S.Ct. 682, 54 L.Ed. 905, 28 L.R.A.,N.S., 1068, wherein the Court held the courts of Connecticut should give full faith and credit to a New York divorce decree in enforcing the payment of past due and unpaid installments of alimony “although the modes of procedure to enforce the collection- may not be the same in both states”.
In 1911, this Court in Campbell v. Campbell, 28 Okl. 838, 115 P. 1111, declined to follow Bleuer v. Bleuer, supra, and approved the case of Sistare v. Sistare, supra. The Court held that the Oklahoma courts should give full faith and credit to a divorce decree entered in Missouri in enforcing the payment of “overdue and unpaid installments” of alimony.
*945In Hastings v. Hastings, Okl., 274 P.2d 540, decided in 1954, this Court said:
“A Nevada judgment for divorce and for continuing monthly payments to wife from husband, valid in Nevada, is here entitled to full faith and credit as a final judgment for the monthly sums which have accrued and are due and payable thereunder.”
This question was before this Court in 1960 in Clester v. Heidt’s Estate, Okl., 353 P.2d 699, involving a suit to enforce the payment of unpaid child support benefits provided for in an Indiana divorce decree and again in 1963 in Clark v. Clark, Okl., 380 P.2d 241, a suit brought to recover past due payments for child support provided for in a Texas divorce decree. In each of these cases this Court said:
“A foreign divorce decree providing for periodical payments of child support is entitled to full faith and credit in this State as to matured, unpaid child support installments.”
Sistare v. Sistare, supra, has been approved by the courts of the last resort of many states. A check by the use of “Shepard’s . Citations” reflects its approval by more than a dozen jurisdictions.
Among the jurisdictions citing with approval the case of Sistare v. Sistare, supra, is the State of Kentucky. The facts in the Kentucky case of Williams v. West, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 468, are almost identical with those presented in the present case. Plaintiff sued in Kentucky to enforce the payment of delinquent child support payments allowed in a Texas divorce decree. The Court held that the Texas decree was not interlocutory as to past due payments and should be accorded full faith and credit.
This Court, in an unbroken line of decisions arising over a period of more than fifty years, has held that the Oklahoma courts must accord full faith and credit to the provisions of a divorce decree entered in a foreign state as to matured, unpaid child support installments. Our decisions appear to be in accord with the weight of authority as reflected in the decisions of sister states. We see no good reason to depart from our rule declared in our prior decisions and none has been pointed out to us. We adhere to our previous rulings.
The rights of the parties under the provisions of the Texas decree are to be determined by the law of Oklahoma. Clester v. Heidt’s Estate, supra; Leonard v. Kleitz, 155 Kan. 626, 127 P.2d 421.
Defendant in his pleadings and evidence contends that the decree of the Texas court should be modified. He argues that the plaintiff has been able to support the minor child for many years on the $150 per month which he has paid her regularly and has therefore acquiesced in the reduction of the payments. In the meantime he has remarried and his earnings are required to support his new family and other dependents. The argument of the defendant is plausible but is not available to him in these proceedings. This Court is firmly committed to the rule that “modification of an order for child support must be prospective and cannot be retroactive”. Clark v. Clark, supra; Clester v. Heidt’s Estate, supra; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 192 Okl. 564, 137 P.2d 914; Sango v. Sango, 121 Okl. 283, 249 P. 925.
The Oklahoma rule is in accord with the decisions of other jurisdictions. Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 66 S.Ct. 556, 90 L.Ed. 635; Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 65 S.Ct. 137, 89 L.Ed. 82; Trunkey v. Johnson, 154 Kan. 725, 121 P.2d 247; Davis v. Davis, 145 Kan. 282, 65 P.2d 562. Many cases supporting the rule are cited in extensive A.L.R. notes: 6 A.L.R.2d 1284-1286; 157 A.L.R. 173-181; 41 A.L.R. 1419-1423.
The Kentucky court in Williams v. West, supra, construing the provisions of a Texas, divorce decree involving past due payments, for child support said:
“Power of court to alter or modify an award made in divorce action for maintenance, whether existing by statute or under terms of judgment itself, operates, prospectively and does not extend to installments which have accrued prior to-modification.”
*946The Texas cases cited in the brief of the defendant do not sustain his contention that the Texas courts “have power to modify child support payments retroactively”. Clark v. Clark, supra. The Texas cases, Gard v. Gard, supra, and Stout v. Stout, supra, also the federal case, Caples v. Caples, supra, which arose in Texas, hold at least inferentially to the contrary.
In Ex Parte Padfield, 154 Tex. 253, 276 S.W.2d 247, construing Article 4639-a, Texas Civil Statutes, supra, relating to the “power and authority” of the court “to alter or change” provisions of child support decrees, said:
“This provision does not make the original decree any the less final nor invest the court with any retroactive authority (Emphasis ours)”.
The Oklahoma court is without authority to vacate or modify the past due payments for child support allowed in the Texas decree.
In 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 381, p. 884, the rule is stated as follows:
“Accrued installments of alimony due under the decree of a foreign court are protected as final judgments under the full faith and credit clause and may not be modified in another state.”
In Cogswell v. Cogswell, 178 Or. 417, 167 P.2d 324, the Oregon Court said:
“The unpaid matured installments of alimony awarded by California court in divorce decree are not subject to rescission or modification, and such decree is protected by the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution.”
Defendant contends that recovery of a portion of the support money is barred by the statute of limitations. Plaintiff contends that if the statute of limitations is applicable, the undirected payments of $150 made monthly by the defendant should be applied to the oldest unpaid weekly support obligation outstanding at the time of each payment. We do not agree. Under the terms of the decree defendant was required to. make a weekly payment of $60.00 each Saturday. If he failed to pay the entire amount on each Saturday the balance became delinquent at that time and the statute of limitations commenced running. This apparently is a new question for the Oklahoma court but the rule appears to be well settled that where a divorce decree provides for the payment of alimony or support in installments the right to enforce payment accrues on each payment as it matures and the statute of limitations begins to run on each installment from the time fixed for its payment. In the recent case of Richter v. Richter, N.D.1964, 126 N.W.2d 634, the Supreme Court of North Dakota said:
“Where divorce decree provides for payment of alimony installments, right to enforcement accrues on each installment as it matures and statute of limitations begins to run on each installment from time fixed for its payment.”
In Simmons v. Simmons, 67 S.D. 145, 290 N.W. 319, it is stated:
“When a judgment is rendered, payable in installments, the statute of limitations begins to run against the judgment from the time fixed for the payment of each installment for the part then payable.”
In Cogswell v. Cogswell, supra, the Oregon court said:
“Each installment of alimony awarded by California divorce decree should be treated as a judgment, and installments matured more than five years before action in Oregon on such decree were barred by limitation.”
Vol. 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 256, p. 88, states the rule as follows:
“Where, however, a judgment provides for payments of alimony in installments, the right to enforcement accrues on each installment as it matures, and the statute of limitations begins to run against the judgment from the time fixed for the payment of each installment for the part then payable.”
Additional decisions sustaining the rule are: Leonard v. Kleitz, supra; McGill v. *947McGill, 101 Kan. 324, 166 P. 501; Mosher v. Mosher, 25 Wash.2d 778, 172 P.2d 259.
This action is governed by the statute of limitations of Oklahoma rather than the statute of limitations of Texas, the state where the judgment was entered.
In Clester v. Heidt’s Estate, supra, we held in action brought in Oklahoma to enforce an alimony judgment entered in the Indiana court that the statute of limitations of Oklahoma controlled and not the statute of limitations of Indiana.
In Leonard v. Kleitz, supra, the Supreme Court of Kansas in a similar situation held the Kansas statute controlled over the Missouri statute.
To the same effect see: Edison v. Lewis, Okl., 325 P.2d 955; 11 Amer.Jur. § 192, p. 507; 53 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 27, p. 970; Extensive Note, 36 A.L.R.2d, pp. 567-603.
Defendant in his answer to the second amended petition contends that the applicable, statute of limitations is the one year provision of § 4, Section 95, Title 12 O.S.1951, or in the alternative the three year provision of § 2, Section 95, Title 12 O.S.1961. The 1961 amendment to Title 95, became effective on October 27, 1961. This action was commenced on November 16, 1961.
The 1961 amendment to Title 95 became effective on October 27, 1961, and reads as follows:
“Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property, can only be brought within the following periods, after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards:
“Second. Within three (3) years: An action upon a contract express or implied not in writing; an action upon a liability created by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty, and an action on a foreign judgment.”
Art. 5, § 52, Constitution of Oklahoma reads:
"The Legislature shall have no power to revive any right or remedy which may •have become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute of this State. After suit has been commenced on any cause of action, the Legislature shall have 'no power to take away such cause of action, or destroy any existing defense to such suit.”
The above constitutional provision was construed by this Court in State v. Ward, 189 Okl. 532, 118 P.2d 216, wherein the facts are as follows: Plaintiff, a Choctaw Indian, filed suit against the State of Oklahoma to recover gross production taxes collected by the state from the production of oil on his allotment during the years 1917 to 1926, inclusive. His suit was authorized by House Joint Resolution No. 51, Chapter 183, S.L. 1933, 68 O.S.St.Ann. § 821, note. In 1925, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted Section 3, Chapter 20, 68 O.S. § 832, effective April 2, 1925, authorizing the State Auditor to refund gross production taxes collected from oil production produced from restricted Indian lands under certain conditions. Ward filed an application for a refund of taxes which was denied but did not seek to enforce his claim in a court action.
This Court held that Ward was not entitled to recover for taxes collected after April 2, 1925 for the reason that “He failed to pursue the remedy until the Statute of Limitations had run against his claim.” We further held, “The right of the plaintiff below could not be revived by the Legislature because prohibited by Section 52, Art. 5, of the Constitution”. This Court said:
“Where Indian’s claim against the state for recovery of taxes which had been illegally levied was barred by limitations, the Legislature was thereafter without power to waive the limitations in view of the constitutional provision that the Legislature shall have no power to revive any right or remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time or by any statute of the state.”
In Mires v. Hogan, 79 Okl. 233, 192 P. 811, this Court said:
“Section 52 of article 5 of Williams’ Oklahoma Constitution provides that the ‘Legislature shall have no power to re*948vive any right or remedy which may have become barred by lapse of time, or by any statute of this state.’ Under that section of article 5 of the Constitution, the Legislature cannot remove a completed statutory bar to a cause of action. Smith v. Winston [67 Okl. 133], 170 P. 503; Dolezal v. Bostick, 41 Okl. 743, 139 Pac. 964. See, also, 12 C.J. 980. Thus the privilege to plead the statute of limitations, when it has run and become a bar to a demand arising ex contractu or ex delicto, is a vested right.”
Prior to October 27, 1961, the date that Title 12 O.S.1961, Sec. 95, Par. 2, became effective, the one year limitation period prescribed by Title 12 O.S.1951, Sec. 95, Par. 4, was controlling. Had plaintiff commenced this action prior to October 27, 1961, her claim for due and unpaid child support would have been governed by the one year limitation period. If the 1961 legislative enactment prescribing a three year limitation could be applicable to the due and unpaid child support payment prior to October 27, 1961, instead of the one year limitation, such enactment would be reviving a remedy to recover due and unpaid child support payment for two years which had become barred. Under the provisions of Art. 5, Sec. 52, of the Constitution, the Legislature had no power to revive any right or remedy which has become barred. It necessarily follows that the one year limitation period provided by Title 12 O.S.1951, Sec. 95, Par. 4, is controlling in the instant action to all due and unpaid child support payment as of October 27, 1961. Therefore, all claims of plaintiff for child support due and unpaid prior to October 27, 1960, are barred by the statute of limitations and plaintiff is not entitled to recover therefor.
Plaintiff seeks recovery of $2,000.00 as attorney’s fee for the use and benefit of her attorneys. In proceedings to enforce allowances for child support in divorce actions the allowances of attorney’s fees to the prevailing party is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Miller v. Miller, Okl., 383 P.2d 873; Watson v. Watson, 202 Okl. 261, 212 P.2d 667. As this cause must be reversed, we leave this matter for the consideration of the trial court.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this cause is remanded to the trial court for new trial.
WILLIAMS, BLACKBIRD, BERRY and LAVENDER, JJ., concur. JACKSON, V. C. J., and DAVISON, IRWIN and HODGES, JJ., dissent.