I agree with the majority that a “good faith settlement” in conformity with Code of Civil Procedure1 section 877.6 as interpreted in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 [213 Cal.Rptr. 256, 698 P.2d 159] (hereafter Tech-Bilt) and its progeny bars a claim for total indemnity against the settling defendant when that claim is based on theories of “equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault” as is expressly provided by subdivision (c) of section 877.6 (hereafter section 877.6(c)). However, the only indemnity claims barred by the statute are those enumerated, and a claim for total indemnity based on a theory of vicarious liability, such as that involved in this case, is not and never was a claim based on a theory of either “equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” Thus, the *818edict handed down today—that a total indemnity claim based on vicarious liability is barred pursuant to section 877.6(c)—is wholly unauthorized by the statute.
As I shall explain, the purported justification for the rule announced today, the encouragement of settlements, is unsound because the rule will actually deter overall settlement of cases involving vicariously liable defendants. But the truth is that the majority’s belief that good policy supports the rule it promulgates is immaterial. A claim for total indemnity based on vicarious liability is simply not barred under the statute upon which the majority relies.
In addition, application of the newly promulgated rule to the facts of this case is not only unfair but little short of confiscatory. The essential facts are that the alleged vicariously liable defendant (Far West2) settled with the plaintiff first and paid the settlement amount. Without doubt that was done with the full expectation it could pursue its right to indemnification from the alleged wrongdoers (the D & S defendants), a right which ripened upon payment of the settlement amount. The alleged wrongdoers thereafter unilaterally entered into a separate settlement with the plaintiff and this court now holds the vicariously liable defendant’s clear right to pursue the wrongdoer for indemnification is barred. It theorizes that in determining a wrongdoer’s settlement is in good faith the trial court can take into consideration the fact that another defendant’s liability is vicarious only. But there is no indication that the trial court actually did so in this case. Thus, the result reached by the majority is not only unauthorized, it is also unjust.
I also dissent from the majority’s wholly gratuitous ruling, on a question not at all in issue in this case, that a settling tortfeasor has an unqualified “right to continue to seek indemnification” (ante, p. 801) from any nonsettling joint tortfeasor. Here, both defendants have settled and no such question arises. It is astounding that without discussion, briefing or argument the court would reach out to resolve a question not remotely presented and in the process fail to consider the limitations that ought to be imposed on a settling defendant’s right to pursue equitable indemnity claims.
I. A Claim for Total Indemnity Based on Vicarious Liability Is Different in Kind From Other Indemnity Claims
Section 876, subdivision (b) (hereafter section 876(b)) provides: “Where one or more persons are held liable solely for the tort of one of them or of another, as in the case of the liability of a master for the tort of his servant, *819they shall contribute a single pro rata share, as to which there may be indemnity between them.” By this provision the Legislature has recognized that a vicariously liable defendant is not a “tortfeasor” but an involuntary surety or guarantor—i.e., one who is liable for the tort of another. Vicarious liability means that the act or omission of one person (hereafter the fault-source tortfeasor) is imputed by operation of law to another and becomes the basis for holding both liable for the plaintiff’s injuries. An indemnity claim based on vicarious liability is not premised on the relative fault or responsibility of the parties for the plaintiff’s injury but rather on the simple fact that the claimant has been compelled by force of law to pay for the tort of the one against whom the claim is asserted.
The majority declares that vicarious liability is similar to strict products liability because similar justifications have been offered to explain why the law imposes them and from this premise leaps blithely but blindly to the conclusion that vicariously liable defendants should not be granted “special dispensation” from the rules applicable to “other . . . tortfeasors” (ante, p. 813, fn. 13.).
As the Legislature has recognized in section 876(b), one who is vicariously liable is not a tortfeasor. When the issue is equitable apportionment of responsibility for the plaintiff’s loss, the vicariously liable party and the fault-source defendant are to be jointly assessed a single share based on the fault of the latter but as between themselves apportionment of loss is governed by the traditional rule of full equitable indemnity, a rule of loss shifting rather than loss sharing, as the law has recognized from very early days. (See Bradley v. Rosenthal (1908) 154 Cal. 420 [97 P. 875]; Comment, Total Equitable Indemnity: Can It Pierce a Pretrial Settlement? (1986) 20 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 99, 104, fn. 29.)
Thus the majority’s attempt to equate the venerable indemnity rights attending vicarious liability with those recently established for joint and concurrent tortfeasors, including defective product manufacturers, is not only logically and historically inaccurate, it is inconsistent with the statutory scheme. To recognize the unique character of vicarious liability is not to grant “special dispensation” to vicariously liable defendants. Unfairness may be practiced not only by applying different treatment to parties similarly situated but also by applying uniform treatment to parties situated differently. The majority practices the latter form of unfairness, which is every bit as destructive as the former.3
*820II. The Statute Does Not Authorize or Support the Rule Adopted by the Majority
The majority claims to derive support for its conclusions from the legislative history and the purpose of section 877.6. As I will show, the majority’s interpretation of that provision finds no support in the plain language of the statute, the statutory scheme of which it is a part, or the history of its enactment.
In construing a statute to effectuate the Legislature’s intent, we turn first to the words themselves, giving them their usual, ordinary meaning. (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224].) Section 877.6(c) provides that a good faith settlement releases the settlor from “any further claims against the settling tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative fault.” The legislative intent deducible from the plain, ordinary meaning of these words is that the statutory bar resulting from settlement is limited to claims based on comparative negligence or comparative fault. That principles of comparative negligence or comparative fault can have no application in a situation where the liability of one individual is imputed to another seems too obvious to require elaboration, yet the majority opinion fails to acknowledge this patently indisputable proposition.
The majority argues that the term “comparative fault” has never been read literally and therefore its meaning may be expanded to reach whatever result the majority deems desirable. As authority the majority relies on Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725 [144 Cal.Rptr. 380, 575 P.2d 1162], which held that principles of comparative negligence apply to actions founded on strict products liability, and on Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart (1978) 21 Cal.3d 322 [146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441], which held that comparative fault principles apply to apportion responsibility between negligent and strictly liable defendants. By permitting the conduct of a defendant who manufactures and markets a defective product to be characterized as “fault” these cases departed from the ordinary meaning of that term but at least they permitted the word “comparative” to retain some significance. A jury may compare the conduct of the defective product manufacturer with the conduct of the plaintiff or codefendant and assess the responsibility of each for producing the plaintiff’s injury but no comparison is possible in a situation where one party’s liability is premised on the act or omission of *821the other. To speak of “comparative fault” in this context is to speak in a cipher or code having no relation to the ordinary meaning of either word.
Apparently relying on the rule that statutory constructions which render some words surplusage should be avoided (White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 681 [183 Cal.Rptr. 520, 646 P.2d 191]), the majority argues that the reference in section 877.6 to claims for “partial or comparative indemnity” should be read as including claims for both partial and total equitable indemnity. But this argument erroneously assumes that the issue in this case is whether all claims for total equitable indemnity survive a good faith settlement by the party against whom the indemnity claim is asserted. As noted, I fully agree that section 877.6(c) bars claims against a settling party for total equitable indemnity if those claims are based on comparative negligence or comparative fault, including active-passive fault distinctions. The indemnity claim at issue here, however, is of a qualitatively different variety—it is based on vicarious liability. Nothing in the language of section 877.6(c) suggests it has any application to indemnity claims based on vicarious liability.
The conclusion that the settlement bar was not intended to apply to equitable indemnity claims based on vicarious liability is reinforced when section 877.6(c) is read in its statutory context, in accordance with the familiar rule of construction that “a statute should be construed with reference to the entire statutory system of which it forms a part in such a way that harmony may be achieved among the parts” (Merrill v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 71 Cal.2d 907, 918 [80 Cal.Rptr. 89, 458 P.2d 33]).
Section 877.6(c) is part of title 11. In section 875, subdivision (f), the Legislature has declared: “This title [i.e., title 11] shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing law. . . .’’As noted, section 876(b) expressly provides that where one party is vicariously liable for the tort of another “they shall contribute a single pro rata share, as to which there may be indemnity between them.” Thus the right of indemnity based on vicarious liability enjoys explicit legislative recognition and approval.
More importantly, if section 877.6(c) does not “impair any right of indemnity under existing law,” it cannot be read as barring any indemnity claims not barred under existing law at the time of its enactment. At that time, as will be demonstrated, indemnity claims based on vicarious liability had never been held subject to a good faith settlement bar.
This court’s decision in American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 578 (hereafter American Motorcycle) established a right of equitable indemnity based on comparative negligence or comparative fault *822but adopted also a limitation that such claims would be barred against a party who entered into a good faith settlement with the plaintiff. In that decision we noted that under section 877 a good faith settlement discharges the settling party from all liability for contribution and we stated: “[W]hile we recognize that section 877, by its terms, releases a settling tortfeasor only from liability for contribution and not partial indemnity, we conclude that from a realistic perspective the legislative policy underlying the provision dictates that a tortfeasor who has entered into a ‘good faith’ settlement [citation] with the plaintiff must also be discharged from any claim for partial or comparative indemnity that may be pressed by a concurrent tortfeasor.” (At p. 604, italics added.)
The majority would read the italicized language as including an equitable indemnity claim by a vicariously liable defendant against a fault-source tortfeasor. Again I insist that it is logically and semantically impossible to view an indemnity claim based on vicarious liability as one “for partial or comparative indemnity.” This is just as true when applied to American Motorcycle as when applied to section 877.6. The majority reasons, however, that American Motorcycle did not establish a new doctrine of partial comparative indemnity as separate and distinct from the existing doctrine of total equitable indemnity, but instead modified the existing total equitable indemnity rule by replacing it with, or transmuting it into, a new system of partial indemnity based on comparative fault.
The majority’s analysis rests on a false premise. The majority reasons that because American Motorcycle did not create a wholly new equitable indemnity action, the action for comparative partial indemnity must have replaced or superseded the earlier action for total equitable indemnity. The majority fails to acknowledge a third possibility, which is most faithful to the language used in American Motorcycle, that the action for partial indemnity based on comparative fault was intended to be a new subcategory within the broader class of equitable indemnity actions.4 Had American Motorcycle intended that a good faith settlement by a fault-source tortfeasor bar an indemnity claim by a vicariously liable defendant, it would have been *823a simple matter to state that such a settlement would bar any claim for equitable or noncontractual indemnity. The use of the term “partial or comparative indemnity” in this context indicates unmistakably that something more limited was intended.
But any doubt on the question of what American Motorcycle actually decided was conclusively laid to rest by Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, supra, 21 Cal.3d 322, in which this court stated it had “no occasion to determine . . . whether the comparative indemnity doctrine should be applied in a situation in which a party’s liability is entirely derivative or vicarious in nature.” (At p. 332, fn. 5.) The point was made even more clearly in Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 305 [216 Cal.Rptr. 443, 702 P.2d 601]: “This court has not yet addressed the question whether an employer-judgment debtor has a right to obtain indemnification from an employee who has settled with the plaintiff.” Thus it is beyond question that American Motorcycle did not determine that a good faith settlement would bar an indemnity claim based on vicarious liability.
When section 877.6(c) was enacted, therefore, neither American Motorcycle nor any other authority had established that a fault-source tortfeasor could achieve immunity from indemnity claims based on vicarious liability by unilaterally settling with the plaintiff. The majority’s decision at this late date to extend the reach of section 877.6(c) to include vicarious liability indemnity claims conflicts not only with the plain meaning of that section’s words, but also with subdivision (f) of section 875, which prohibits any construction of section 877.6(c) impairing indemnity rights existing at the time of its enactment.
III. The Rule Adopted Will Not Promote Settlement
A vicariously liable defendant may seek an early full-value settlement with the plaintiff (anticipating reimbursement from the solvent fault-source tortfeasor) in order to limit the potential exposure, reduce litigation costs, and obtain the plaintiff’s cooperation in litigation of the indemnity claim.5 If *824a liability insurance carrier is controlling the defense, it may seek an early full-value settlement to avoid potential liability to its insured for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (See, e.g., Bodenhamer v. Superior Court (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1472, 1476-1479 [238 Cal.Rptr. 177].) Under the rule espoused by the majority, a vicariously liable defendant will have a great disincentive to enter into a full-value settlement agreement absent a provision reserving to itself the power to veto any later settlement with the fault-source tortfeasor or a provision requiring the plaintiff to dismiss the causes of action against the fault-source tortfeasor.6 (Cf. Owen v. United States (9th Cir. 1983) 713 F.2d 1461, 1467.)
Settlement provisions giving a settling defendant a veto over later settlements or requiring the plaintiff to dismiss causes of action against a fault-source tortfeasor will not be attractive to plaintiffs, who are certain to increase the amount required for settlement whenever such provisions are included. If the vicariously liable defendant is unwilling to pay the additional price there will be no settlement. Veto provisions have an added disadvantage in that, as this court has recognized, they make subsequent settlements with other defendants more difficult and thus “frequently result in unnecessary trials.” (Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 858, 883 [239 Cal.Rptr. 626, 741 P.2d 124].)
The majority’s rule will encourage early settlement by tortfeasors seeking immunity from indemnity claims by vicariously liable defendants to whom their fault will be imputed, but this incentive to settle is fostered at the expense of equitable apportionment of loss since it leaves the vicariously liable defendant to pay all or part of the plaintiff’s remaining damages when in justice and equity that defendant should have full indemnity from the settlor. A defendant in this situation, deprived of recourse against a solvent party whose conduct is the sole basis of its liability, may well prefer to take its chances at trial rather than pay in settlement a claim it in good conscience believes should have been paid by another. (See Roberts, The “Good Faith” Settlement: An Accommodation of Competing Goals (1984) 17 Loyola L.A. L.Rev. 841, 929-930.)
Contrary to the majority’s assurances, the trial court’s inquiry into the good faith of the settlement will not adequately shield a vicariously liable *825defendant against the consequences of a settlement by the fault-source tortfeasor. If good faith is determined by the settlor’s having paid its fair share of the loss according to the “reasonable range” test of Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d 488, the vicariously liable defendant will not infrequently be exposed to substantial liability. Because there may be other nonsettling defendants in addition to the vicariously liable defendant, because liability may present a close question, and because a settlor is expected to pay less than if the case went to trial, a settlement by the fault-source tortfeasor for less than half of the plaintiff’s estimated damages will often be found in good faith. (Cf. Isaacson v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 775, 794 [244 Cal.Rptr. 655, 750 P.2d 297] [settlement offer for two-thirds of estimated damages unreasonably high where liability was a close question].) If the estimates of comparative fault and total damages used to determine the reasonable range prove at trial to have been too low (as not infrequently occurs), the damages ultimately assessed for the fault-source defendant’s tort will far exceed the amount paid in settlement and the difference will be extracted from the pocket of the vicariously liable defendant.
While the majority opinion does not preclude a trial court from withholding approval from a settlement if it finds the vicariously liable defendant has been “improperly” excluded from settlement negotiations this hardly remedies the problem; the majority’s suggestion that it does rests on the erroneous assumption that a party whose liability is strictly vicarious should contribute something in settlement even when the fault-source tortfeasor is solvent. The issue is not whether any defendant has been given a fair opportunity to participate in a settlement agreement but whether a solvent tortfeasor may shift any part of his own liability onto a vicariously liable defendant. In the context of the good faith determination this problem could be directly addressed by holding, as a matter of law, that a settlement which fails to provide for dismissal of vicarious liability causes of action based on the settlor’s conduct is not in good faith, but the majority expressly rejects this solution.
Because of its adverse effect on settlements by vicariously liable defendants, the majority’s rule will make full settlement of actions less likely, even though the rule may promote partial settlements between the plaintiff and the fault-source tortfeasor. If a claim for equitable indemnity based on vicarious liability survives settlement, on the other hand, the prospects of full settlement are favorable. The reasons why vicariously liable defendants are likely to enter into early full-value settlements have already been mentioned. As for the fault-source tortfeasors, their options are not confined, as the majority suggests, to declining settlement or settling without protection against equitable indemnity claims. To obtain both the benefits of settlement and complete immunity from equitable indemnity claims, the fault-source *826defendant need only include in the settlement a provision obligating the plaintiff to dismiss vicarious liability causes of action. The plaintiff will, of course, demand consideration for such a provision but the cost is clearly one which the fault-source tortfeasor ought to bear.
A provision for dismissal of vicarious liability causes of action does not deter later settlements and it provides a clean and equitable solution in cases where a defendant is sued on both vicarious liability and fault theories, since only the vicarious liability causes of action need be included in the dismissal provision. A defendant against whom no vicarious liability causes of action remain will be more amenable to settlement of any remaining fault-based causes of action.
The majority notes that a vicariously liable defendant can bargain for dismissal of the plaintiff’s action against the fault-source defendant but it refuses to acknowledge that a fault-source defendant can likewise bargain for dismissal of vicarious liability causes of action. If it is reasonable to impose on the settlor the burden of obtaining a dismissal in favor of the remaining defendant in the one situation (i.e., where the settlor is vicariously liable), why is it not at least equally reasonable in the other (i.e., where the settlor is a fault-source tortfeasor)? Clearly the burden and expense of obtaining a dismissal in favor of the remaining party should be imposed on the party who committed the tort rather than on the one vicariously liable for it.
IV. A Settling Defendant’s Right to Pursue Equitable Indemnity Claims Is Not Unqualified
Although admitting the issue is not presented, the majority states it is “clear under existing precedent” that Far West had the right to pursue its indemnity claims against nonsettling parties after it had settled with the plaintiff in this action.
Were the issue presented, I would be inclined to hold that a settling defendant’s right to pursue a claim for comparative indemnity is not absolute but depends on whether the settlement amount substantially exceeds the settlor’s fair share of the plaintiff’s damages. The settlor’s right of indemnity against nonsettling defendants is inextricably bound up with the determination of the good faith of the settlement and should be resolved by the trial court as part of that determination. Where a settling defendant insists on the right to proceed against nonsettling defendants for indemnity to recoup the consideration given in settlement, a court might very well, depending on the circumstances, find the settlement not in good faith in respect to the nonsettling defendant from whom recoupment is sought. A *827court so concluding could condition its good faith determination on the voluntary dismissal of the settlor’s indemnity cross-complaints.
A tortfeasor who has settled for an amount within the reasonable range of his liability has no claim in equity to partial reimbursement from other defendants in the event plaintiff’s damages or the settlor’s percentage of fault is determined at trial to be less than anticipated. The settlor has bought his peace and limited his exposure and in return “can fairly be said to have contracted away the right to any benefits resulting from a determination that the settlement was ‘high.’ ” (Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties, and Settlements (1977) 65 Cal.L.Rev. 1264, 1279.) Because a settlor is expected to pay less than if his liability were determined at trial (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p.499), “low” settlements will greatly outnumber “high” settlements. Under basic notions of fairness and reciprocity, nonsettling defendants, who must make up the deficit caused by “low” settlements, should be freed from the threat of the settlor’s indemnity claims and allowed to retain the benefit of the occasional “high” settlement.
My views on this issue are similar to, although less extreme than, those finding expression in section 1, subdivision (d), of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, which provides: “A tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not entitled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of what was reasonable.” The commissioners’ comment to this subdivision states: “The tortfeasor who settles removes himself entirely from the case so far as contribution is concerned if he is able and chooses to buy his peace for less than the entire liability. If he discharges the entire obligation it is only fair to give him contribution from those whose liability he has discharged.” (12 West’s U. Laws Ann. (1975) p. 65, italics added.)
Permitting a settling party to pursue equitable indemnity against nonsettlors is logically justified in those instances where the settlor has paid more than his proportionate share of the loss. The clearest case is settlement by a party whose liability is entirely vicarious and who claims indemnity from the fault-source tortfeasor. As I have emphasized repeatedly, any payment by a party whose liability is wholly vicarious is an overpayment so long as the fault-source tortfeasor is solvent. Where the court making the good faith determination finds that the settlement constitutes an overpayment, the policies of equitable apportionment and encouragement of settlements will both be served by permitting the settlor to pursue equitable indemnity against nonpaying or underpaying tortfeasors.
*828V. Conclusion
Vicarious liability is fundamentally different from other forms of tort liability. A claim for indemnity based on vicarious liability is not a claim “based on comparative negligence or comparative fault” within the meaning of section 877.6(c) and is not barred by that section when asserted against a defendant who has settled. The rule adopted by the majority today, permitting a tortfeasor’s unilateral settlement to destroy a vicariously liable defendant’s right of indemnity, is not only unauthorized by law, it violates fundamental notions of fairness: “One whom the law holds to an absolute liability for the wrongful act of another has been injured just as really, even though indirectly, by that wrongful act as though his property had been struck by the other’s automobile in the first place. . . . [T]he right to indemnity in such circumstances . . . [is] supported by simple, fundamental tort law principles just as clearly as is the right to recover for injuries caused directly by the tortious act. Such indemnity is an imposition of liability for fault, and as such is designed to minimize the harshness of previously imposed liability without fault.” (Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors (1932) 81 U.Pa.L.Rev. 130, 148.)
In this case, it is not seriously disputed that Far West was sued on a vicarious liability theory as well as various fault-based theories and that Far West’s indemnity cross-complaint against the D & S defendants, although hardly a model of clarity, adequately pleads a cause of action for total equitable indemnity sufficient to encompass a vicarious liability theory. Accordingly, as to that cause of action, the trial court erred in dismissing Far West’s cross-complaint following the settlement between the plaintiff and the D & S defendants. I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal as to that cause of action.
All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.
I adopt the majority opinion’s party name conventions.
Arriving at a workable definition of vicarious liability to guide parties and trial courts presents no great difficulty and is in any event required to effectuate section 876(b). The “intractable problem” to which the majority refers was the problem of defining the proper limits of total equitable indemnity after it was extended beyond vicarious liability to encompass the *820elusive active-passive fault distinctions. (See American Motorcycle Assn. v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 578, 594-595 [146 Cal.Rptr. 182, 578 P.2d 899].) That problem no longer exists and provides no justification for the rule announced today.
The American Motorcycle opinion refers to its holding as having “modified” (20 Cal.3d at pp. 583, 591, 598, 607) or as “expanding” (id. at p. 603) the existing equitable indemnity doctrine. It also refers to “the partial indemnity doctrine that we adopt today” (id. at pp. 603-604, italics added; see also, id. at p. 603) and to “recognition of a common law right of comparative indemnity” (id. at p. 602, italics added; see also, id. at p. 603 [“recognition of a common law partial indemnity doctrine”]). Thus the effect of the holding was to recognize and adopt a rule (partial or comparative indemnity) as a new variation within an existing doctrine (equitable indemnity), which was thereby expanded and modified. This usage is consistent with the opinion’s express holding: “Accordingly, we hold that under the common law equitable indemnity doctrine a concurrent tortfeasor may obtain partial indemnity from cotortfeasors on a comparative fault basis.” (Id. at p. 608, italics added.)
The majority finds it implausible that a vicariously liable defendant would enter into a full-value settlement if the fault-source tortfeasor “is likely to be found 100 percent responsible” and asserts it is “much more likely that settlements will take the form of piecemeal contributions by individual defendants in some rough approximation to each defendant’s likely proportionate responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages.” (Ante, p. 811, fn. 11.) These statements reveal a fundamental misunderstanding about vicarious liability. Under section 876(b) the vicariously liable defendant and the fault-source tortfeasor are responsible to the plaintiff for the same pro rata share. Should the case proceed to trial the vicariously liable defendant would be assessed whatever comparative fault share is attributable to the tort for which vicarious liability is imposed. Consequently, the “rough approximation” of the vicariously liable *824defendant’s proportionate responsibility for the plaintiff’s damages in the majority’s hypothetical (which excludes the possibility of other parties being at fault) will be 100 percent.
Unlike the majority, I think it improbable the vicariously liable tortfeasor will settle in reliance on the trial court’s power to withhold its “good faith” approval of a later settlement by the fault-source tortfeasor which fails to provide reimbursement for the vicariously liable defendant. Realizing the great pressure on trial courts to approve settlements, and the unlikelihood of appellate reversal of a good faith determination, vicariously liable defendants will prefer and probably insist on the certainty of a veto or dismissal provision before making a substantial settlement with the plaintiff.