(dissenting).
I dissent for the reason that I believe it was reversible error for the trial court to refuse the request of the defendant to instruct the jury that an accomplice’s testimony is to be viewed with distrust.
Alaska R.Crim.P. 30(b)(2) specifies in part that the court, whether or not requested to do so, shall give the instruction on all proper occasions “[t]hat the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust . . .”
This rule is not one recently engrafted upon the rights of a defendant, but finds its Alaskan origin in the Act of 1884, first providing for a civil government for Alaska and adopting the laws of Oregon then in force. The Oregon Code of 1862 pro-, vided for a mandatory instruction that the testimony of an accomplice ought to be viewed with distrust.1 The statute codified a long-established common law practice.2 Wigmore states:
The reasons which have led to this distrust of an accomplice’s testimony are *471not far to seek. He may expect to save himself from punishment by procuring the conviction of others. It is true that he is also charging himself, and in that respect he has burned his ships. But he can escape the consequences of this acknowledgment, if the prosecuting authorities choose to release him provided he helps them to secure the conviction of his partner in crime: . . . 3
And in Fresneda v. State,4 we stated that “[a]n accomplice’s testimony is viewed with distrust, because the accomplice usually believes he has a personal interest in aiding the prosecution.”
If ever there was a case where the policy behind the rule applies, this would appear to be one. Peter and Galauska told conflicting accounts of the homicide, each blaming the other for the clubbing. Each could be regarded as having a motive for committing the offense; Galauska to prevent Charlie from testifying, and Peter because of anger over Charlie having struck Peter’s injured eye. They were jointly indicted for murder when Peter “made a deal” with the district attorney to plead guilty to manslaughter. He promised to testify if he would be given an eight-year sentence with five years suspended. Thus Peter had a desire to save himself from more severe punishment by procuring Ga-lauska’s conviction.5 His was the only direct testimony as to Galauska’s participation in the beating. Moreover, this is not a case where defense counsel failed to request the instruction as in Anthony v. State6 where we were compelled to hold .that failure to give the instruction was nevertheless reversible error.
The majority engages in what appears to me to be a highly formalistic argument attempting to distinguish between the charge for which Galauska was convicted, beating Charlie about the head with a rifle, and the information to which Peter pleaded guilty, unlawfully killing Charlie by assisting Galauska in rolling him into a ravine and abandoning him. Both were convicted of manslaughter for killing Charlie.7
I agree with the majority’s definition of an accomplice — one, who with criminal intent, knowingly aids, abets, assists or participates in the crime for which the defendant is charged.
When that definition is construed in light of the purpose behind Rule 30(b)(2),8 I fail to see how the conclusion can be reached that there was no jury issue as to Peter’s aiding, assisting or participating in the homicide for which Galauska was charged. Even assuming that he did not participate in the beating, he rolled Charlie, while still alive, into the ravine. He has pled guilty to the offense of manslaughter thus confessing an unlawful killing. Any question as to his intent was for the jury. According to Peter’s version of the incident, he did not beat Charlie with the rifle. Galauska testified to the opposite effect. The jury was free to believe either’s version of the offense, but they also could recognize the human trait of seeking to exculpate oneself and blame another. The jury could reasonably infer from the *472testimony that both participated in beating Charlie. The testimony was certainly subject to such an inference at the time that the case was submitted to the jury, which is the temporal frame within which the requested instruction must be considered. The jury should have been instructed, in the same manner that we suggested in Anthony, that if they found Peter to be an accomplice, his testimony should be distrusted. I would hold that it was reversible error not to give the requested instruction as required by our rule.
. Annotated Laws of Oregon § 845 (Hill, 1887).
. 7 J. Wigmore, The Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2056, p. 319 (3rd ed. 1940).
. Id. § 2057, p. 322.
. 458 P.2d 134, 144 (Alaska 1969) (footnote omitted).
. Peter was sentenced prior to the trial, but his sentencing was based on his agreement to testify. By this dissent, I am not suggesting that the district attorney’s conduct was improper in any manner.
. 521 P.2d 486 (Alaska 1974).
. In Fajeriak v. State, 439 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1968), the defendant was convicted of first degree murder. Witnesses Benton and Gam-radt aided in the disposition of the body of Rizzo after Fajeriak had shot and killed him. The witnesses’ participation was after the death of Rizzo so that the case may be distinguished from Galauska’s although I do not imply that I agree with the refusal to give the instruction in Fajerialc. Galauska’s case is closer akin to Mahle v. State, 371 P.2d 21 (Alaska 1962), wherein we held the instruction was mandated as to one who did not participate in stealing a safe, but later assisted in opening it.
.The rationale for requiring an instruction to the jury pertaining to an accomplice’s testimony is discussed in Anthony v. State, 521 P.2d at 491.