specially concurring.
I am in full accord with the majority of the court as to the ultimate disposition of this case. Richard Albert Ortega did kill his wife, and he did so purposefully and maliciously. He is guilty of second degree murder.
I am not at all comfortable, however, with the patent evasion suggested by the majority opinion of the holding articulated by the Supreme Court of the United States in Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). If the evanescent quality of blood and body fluids is a reason not to apply the rule of Mincey v. Arizona, supra, then it would seem that a similar search and seizure could occur at every homicide scene. While I confess that I might have decided Mincey v. Arizona, supra, somewhat differently than the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States, I would suppose that the oath of judicial office binds me to accepting that rule as the law.
The real difference between this case and Mincey v. Arizona, supra, as I would understand the factual situations, is that nobody who lived in the Tucson house invited the police officers to come to that house because of the homicides. Conversely, Richard Albert Ortega, as stipulated for purposes of the suppression hearing in this case, called police authorities and stated to them, “I have just shot my wife, get an officer out here.” When Ortega did that, he consented to a search of his home. As to this aspect of the case I would follow the lead of the Supreme Courts of Florida and Louisiana. Both of those courts have held that by reporting a shooting in his home, a person such as Ortega consented to a search of his property for the purpose of investigating the facts and circumstances surrounding the shooting. Zeigler v. State, *945Fla., 402 So.2d 365 (1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1035, 102 S.Ct. 1739, 72 L.Ed.2d 153 (1982); State v. Dowling, La., 387 So.2d 1165 (1980). I would not follow the contrary rule adopted by the Illinois Appellate Court in People v. Annerino, 97 Ill.App.3d 240, 52 Ill.Dec. 714, 422 N.E.2d 923 (1981). Because the search in my view was a consensual search in accord with Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), there would not have occurred either a search or seizure unreasonable under either the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Art. 1, § 4 of the Constitution of the State of Wyoming. This would be my basis for upholding the admissibility of the evidence in accordance with the ruling of the district court, and of course that ground extends to all of the evidence seized.
I also find the majority opinion to be unduly restrictive with respect to its application of the plain view doctrine. Assuming that the presence of the investigating officers inside Ortega’s home was justified, either because of his consent or because of the ground suggested in the majority opinion, then the law enforcement officers are permitted to seize any incriminating evidence or contraband which is in plain view.
“The ‘plain view’ exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement permits a law enforcement officer to seize what clearly is incriminating evidence or contraband when it is discovered in a place where the officer has a right to be. * * * ” Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5-6, 102 S.Ct. 812, 70 L.Ed.2d 778 (1982).
In connection with this flat statement the Supreme Court cited Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), reh. denied 404 U.S. 874, 92 S.Ct. 26, 30 L.Ed.2d 120 (1971), and Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).
Even more recently the Supreme Court of the United States addressed the question of the seizure of property under the plain view exception in Texas v. Brown, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983). In this case the Supreme Court first noted that the “plain view” exception to the warrant requirement is best understood not as an independent exception to the warrant clause, but simply as an extension of any prior justification for the officer’s access to the object seized. All of the Justices agreed with the holding of the plurality opinion that where the other requirements of the plain view exception were met an officer who had probable cause to associate the seized property with criminal activity is permitted to seize the evidence. In the instant case the application of that principle would depend upon the justification for the presence of the officers in Ortega’s house. Assuming that they were properly on the premises then they were entitled to seize all of the evidence found in plain view which they had probable cause to associate with criminal activity.
To round out my position, I state that I am in full accord with respect to the articulation of the holding by the majority opinion on the claimed error with respect to admitting evidence of prior bad acts.