dissenting.
I would have reversed the denial of post-conviction relief and remanded this case to the district court with directions to afford appellant an opportunity to amend his petition so as to include specific factual allegations, supported by attached affidavits or other evidence.
As the majority note, appellant Kevin Bibbins’ petition for post-conviction relief consists primarily of general allegations and legal conclusions. However, instead of permitting appellant an opportunity to amend his petition to include factual specificity and evidentiary support, the majority conclude that the court file provided a sufficient basis upon which to determine the merits of the petition. The majority reason:
“ * * * Whether oral testimony, depositions, affidavits or other evidence is produced, likewise depends on the circumstances of each case. Here, the trial court acted on the petition before it, considering only the court file. It was apparently determined from the court file that there was no legal basis for the petition. We cannot say that the trial court was clearly wrong.” 696 P.2d at 1303.
While the court records of a petitioner’s guilty plea may, under some circumstances, adequately support a claim for post-conviction relief,1 such evidence had little, if any, relevance to the claims raised in the case at bar. Appellant alleges that his guilty plea was obtained through coercion and fraud. Evidence of such wrongdoing could hardly be expected to appear in the hearing tran*1306scripts. Similarly, the instances of ineffective assistance of counsel alluded to by petitioner could have occurred outside the record. The majority readily admit that the alleged perjured documents or testimony cannot be discerned from the bare record.
The need for definite factual allegations and supporting evidence from one in appellant’s position is apparent, and our post-conviction-relief statutes, §§ 7-14-101 through 7-14-108, W.S.1977, demand such specificity. Section 7-14-101 requires the filing of a verified petition for the redress of constitutional violations:
“Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary who asserts that in the proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his rights under the constitution of the United States or of the state of Wyoming, or both, may institute proceedings under this act [§§ 7-14-101 to 7-14-108]. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing with the clerk of the court in which the conviction took place a petition verified by affidavit * *
Section 7-14-102 directs the petitioner to state his claim clearly and to attach supporting evidence if possible:
“The petition shall * * * clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner’s constitutional rights were violated. The petition shall have attached thereto affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting the allegations or shall state why the same are not attached. * * * ”
We recently reviewed these statutes in Hopkinson v. District Court, Wyo., 696 P.2d 54 (1985), and concluded:
“ * * * Before a person is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a petition for post-conviction relief, there must be set forth in the text of the petition and the required supporting attachments a substantial claim plus some specificity in support of the claim. Boggs v. State, Wyo., 484 P.2d 711 (1971). In order to justify a hearing, there must be more than a naked statement of a conclusion unsupported by an evidentiary basis. Cook v. State, 220 Kan. 223, 552 P.2d 9.85 (1976); State v. Gillihan, 85 N.M. 514, 514 P.2d 33 (1973). There must not only be verified factual allegations in the petition, § 7-14-101, but the statutory requirement is that they must be supported, likewise with some specificity, § 7-14-102.” 696 P.2d at 61.
We recognized in that case the extraordinary nature of post-conviction relief, but said:
“However, if a petitioner makes a showing of innocence or probability of a different verdict by appropriate attachments to his petition which indicates a need for verification at a hearing, then a hearing may be granted. If good cause is shown, a review is available.” 696 P.2d at 65.
The court in the instant case attempted to review petitioner’s bald conclusions using only the court file, a process doomed from the start.
The proper solution for the trial court, when presented with a deficient petition for post-conviction relief, is to allow the petitioner an opportunity to amend. We recommended this course in Boggs v. State, Wyo., 484 P.2d 711, 714 (1971):
“Where there are insufficient factual allegations in support of an application to warrant an evidentiary hearing, it is usually better practice to permit the petitioner to amend his petition than to dismiss it. Oliver v. United States, 9 Cir., 398 F.2d 353.”
The ability to amend is important in post-conviction-relief proceedings since a prisoner waives all claims not raised in the original or an amended petition. Section 7-14-103 provides:
“Any claim of substantial denial of constitutional rights not raised in the original or an amended petition is waived.”
Thus, our statutes contemplate amendment as a procedural right which protects the prisoner against the loss of claims inadvertently omitted or ineffectively articulated in the original petition.
In summary, Wyoming’s post-conviction-relief statutes, as interpreted by this court *1307in previous cases, entitle a prisoner to an evidentiary hearing on a claimed constitutional violation if his petition contains specific factual allegations supported by affidavits or other evidence. The statutory scheme contemplates the amendment of inadequate petitions. As a general rule the trial court should allow a petitioner a specified time within which to amend his petition to reflect the necessary factual specificity and support. If a petition remains deficient after an opportunity for amendment, the court may justifiably dismiss without holding a hearing. Boggs v. State, supra. However, an amended petition which complies with statutory requirements should, typically, entitle the applicant to a hearing. In this way, courts can encourage and properly review potentially meritorious' claims and, at the same time, avoid having to rule upon vague, inadequately supported contentions.
I do not intend to suggest by this dissent that the district court must, in every situation, allow an opportunity for amendment of a deficient petition for post-conviction relief. Where, for example, a petition presents the identical issues already fully, and perhaps repeatedly, reviewed by this court, the applicant should be expected to include in his original petition the factual basis for reconsideration of his claims. Hopkinson v. District Court, supra. However, in the present case, where the petitioner’s claims have never been considered by this court and where the court record provided an obviously inadequate basis for review, the petition should not have been dismissed or denied without allowing an opportunity for amendment.
. See, for example, Hoggatt v. State, Wyo., 606 P.2d 718 (1980).