(dissenting):
I dissent from the majority opinion because I believe the trial court abused its discretion in two respects: first, in the manner of computing alimony to be paid to appellant and second, in failing to provide a credit to appellant for the more than $146,-000 she contributed to the marriage from the separate trust fund she acquired prior to the marriage.
The trial court, in setting alimony, obviously took into consideration the respective incomes of the parties. The pretrial stipulation and the court’s findings of fact establish appellant’s estimated income from her trust at a 1980 level of $9,600, or $800 per month. In addition, the pretrial stipulation and the court’s findings show a six-month income figure from “dividends ... from *689the National Bank of Commerce stock” of $3,650.29 for the first half of 1980, which amounts to approximately $600 per month. It appears from a review of the record that this $3,650.29 may in fact be part of the trust fund income, the National Bank of Commerce stock being part of the trust which generates the total of $9,600 per year. It is impossible to determine from the record before us whether this is the case. It appears that the trial court may have confused the National Bank of Commerce stock with separate income from National Bancshares stock in the approximate amount of $600 per year, and therefore counted the $3,650.29 twice, once as part of the trust income and once as separate income. The National Bancshare income appears in 1979 income tax returns at the level of $568 for the entire year, thus substantiating the possibility that the confusion existed. In any case, there is sufficient ambiguity in the record to raise a serious question in my mind as to whether appellant receives a total of $1,400 per month from her separate sources, or only $800 per month (plus $600 per year) as she claims. That question should be remanded for evi-dentiary clarification and any necessary modifications in the findings.
I am also concerned by the fact that the trial court awarded appellant only $400 per month for a temporary period of four years. These parties were married for 27 years. Appellant supported respondent during his education, ran their household, and raised four children as a full-time homemaker. She is now in her fifties, has no employment training, experience or benefits, and has been out of the commercial marketplace for nearly thirty years. She will obviously be eligible for only low-paying menial or clerical positions which will be in striking contrast to the level of respondent’s employment and to the lifestyle they enjoyed together. When these facts are added to the comparison between respondent’s monthly gross income of $3,333.33 and appellant’s $800 (or even $1,400), the disparity is so great as to warrant a finding of abuse of discretion. The four-year limitation is unrealistic, and appears to ignore the factors of appellant’s age, health problems (as found by the trial court), limited employa-bility, length of the marriage, and respondent’s ability to pay. Appellant is entitled under these circumstances to permanent alimony with necessary readjustments when respondent retires or his income (or appellant’s) changes for any other reason. The $400-per-month amount should be reassessed in light of any clarification in the amount of her monthly income.
I also dissent from the majority opinion’s approval of the trial court’s treatment of the more than $146,000 contributed to the marriage from plaintiff’s separate trust fund acquired prior to the marriage. Although the trial court has broad discretionary powers in a divorce action which, absent an abuse of discretion, will not be inter-ferred with on appeal (see, e.g., Jesperson v. Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326 (1980)), I believe the trial court under the circumstances of this case abused its discretion by failing to provide a carefully computed credit to plaintiff for her contribution to the marriage from the corpus of her separate premarital trust fund. The large amounts of income and interest which also were used for marital purposes were properly included in the marital estate, but the $146,000 from the principle should have been credited to appellant in the court’s division of the marital property. A trial court considers many factors in making a property settlement in a divorce action, but the settlement should not be such that one party is damaged or punished. See, e.g., Read v. Read, Utah, 594 P.2d 871 (1979). By failing to give plaintiff credit for the more than $146,000 she expended for marital obligations from the principle of her premarital legacy, the trial court has, in effect, punished plaintiff for contributing to the marriage from her separate funds. Even though the trial court awarded plaintiff the balance of her trust fund, it should have gone further and provided in the property settlement a carefully calculated credit to plaintiff for her contribution. In fact, this Court has previously stated that, in restoring the parties to status quo, a trial *690court should consider the parties’ premarital assets and, if possible and equitable, permit each party to depart with at least what they brought into the marriage.