concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I dissent as to Part I of the majority opinion.
The instruction approved in People v. Thomson, 197 Colo. 232, 591 P.2d 1031 (1979), as to what would happen to the defendant if he were found not guilty by reason of insanity was characterized as an “informational instruction,” and the jury was further advised that it was to “have no persuasive bearing on the verdict you arrive at under the evidence.”
In Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 92 S.Ct. 916, 31 L.Ed.2d 202 (1973) relied upon by the majority to establish the standards or test by which retroactivity was to be measured, the United States Supreme Court concluded that, although assistance of counsel at a preliminary hearing *237was constitutionally mandated (Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1970)), such constitutional doctrine would not be applied retroactively. See also Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, (1967), and Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 86 S.Ct. 1772, 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), where retroactive effect was not given to the requirement of counsel at a pretrial lineup or at an interrogation conducted without the presence of an attorney. The majority, by giving retroactive effect to this instruction, has elevated it to the level of new constitutional doctrines such as the right to counsel at trial, and on appeal, both of which were given retroactive effect. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963).
I do not accept the view expressed by the majority that failure to give retroactivity to this informational and nonpersuasive instruction impairs the truth-finding function of the trial and thereby raises serious questions about the accuracy of the verdict.