I dissent.
I agree that the findings of the Civil Service Commission are sufficient to satisfy the charter provisions and that the evidence was sufficient to support the action of the commission in finding grounds for the discharge of petitioner. However, I cannot agree (1) that the lack of findings may be supplied by a presumption when the whole record is before us, nor (2) that it was proper for the commission to conduct the hearing behind closed doors in “star chamber” fashion.
On the first issue it is said in the majority opinion that “the fact that certain action is taken or recommendation made [by an administrative board] may raise a presumption that the existence of necessary facts was ascertained and found.” Then the rule is applied to the instant case, stating: “The fact that the commission discharged him after a hearing raises a presumption that the existence of the necessary facts was ascertained and found under the rule just stated.” In the instant case the city charter expressly requires the commission to make written findings. (Charter, city of Vallejo, art. XX, § 11, as adopted in 1941, Stats. 1941, p. 3370.) Written findings were made in the case at bar and the complete record of the commission’s action is before us. That records shows precisely what was done. Therefore, there is no room for a presumption as to what was done. The sole question is one of whether the findings as shown by the record are sufficient. Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal.2d 303 [144 P.2d 4], relied upon by the majority, presented a case where the record did not show whether findings were or were not made and thus the presumption was indulged. It is said in that ease, at page 323: “In the present state of the record herein it is impossible to isolate the several factors which may have moved the Board of Permit Appeals to make its respective rulings. It was neither required by law, nor did it undertake, to- set forth the reasons for its action at the conclusion of either the hearing or the rehearing in this, matter. However, the proposition that said board, in making such investigation as it deemed the case warranted, was acting *875within its authority cannot be seriously challenged in view of the above-mentioned broad municipal regulations defining its appellate functions. Pertinent here is the observation in Bartholomae Oil Corp. v. Seager, 35 Cal.App.2d 77, 80 [95 P.2d 614] relative to a city planning commission’s recommendation upon an application for a variance permit: ‘ In connection with the action of such a commission, composed usually of laymen, the fact that a certain action is taken raises the presumption that the existence of the necessary facts had been ascertained and found.’ ” [Emphasis added.]
The charter expressly requires a hearing by the commission. When such is the requirement, the necessary implication is that such hearing be open to the public unless some valid reason is shown for excluding all or some portion of the public. For illustration it is said in Railroad Com. v. Pacific Gas & E. Co., 302 U.S. 388, 393 [58 S.Ct. 334, 82 L.Ed. 319] : ‘ ‘ The right to a fair and oyen hearing is one of the rudiments of fair play assured to every litigant by the Federal Constitution as a minimal requirement.” [Emphasis added.] This policy is expressed in our statutes: “The sittings of every court of justice shall be public, except as provided in the next section.” (Code Civ. Proc., §124.) While that refers to courts of justice, it must be remembered that a local civil service commission, in hearing and determining whether an employee should be discharged, is exercising quasi judicial functions (Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816]; LaPrade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal.2d 47 [162 P.2d 13]), and by analogy, rules for proceedings in courts are to some extent applicable to such bodies (Steen v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal.2d 542 [190 P.2d 937 ]). Certainly where there is a fundamental principle involved, such as the need for a public trial or hearing, bottomed upon the distaste for “star chamber” proceedings and their attendant evils, the charter must be interpreted to require a hearing which is open to the public. That being true, no ordinance providing for closed sessions would be valid. In the instant ease, there appears no reason whatsoever, much less a valid one, for a closed hearing, and appellant was, therefore, justified in refusing to participate in the closed hearing held by the commission at which the evidence was presented, which, it is claimed, supports the findings of the commission.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.