It was a tragic end to a pleasant day. Patricia Oja, with her mother and aunt, Sally and Suoma Oja, had left home in Ilwaco that morning of October 16, 1965, to go shopping in Longview. The three, with Patricia driving, *761were returning on Highway No. 401 in a 1964 Chevrolet in the early evening. It was dark, raining, and slightly foggy on the highway when, near the town limits of Naselle, the Oja car, moving in a southerly direction around a broad sweeping curve to the left, was struck head on by the car driven by defendant George H. Eike. In the terrific impact, Sally and Suoma Oja were killed, but Patricia lived to describe the accident in court.
Highway No. 401, in the area of the collision, had a smooth, newly paved, 2-lane surface of black asphalt free of chuckholes, and had been freshly marked with a white center line and a white line at each edge. Wide shoulders flanked each side of the highway.
Defendant Eike, alone in his 1960 Oldsmobile, was driving northerly along Highway 401, rounding a gradual curve to his right when his car smashed head on into the Oja car. He estimated his speed at 45 to 50 miles per hour; Patricia Oja estimated hers at not oyer 40 to 45 miles per hour. In the impact, the defendant received serious injuries and was taken to the hospital. He thought he was on his side of the road, he says, remembering only the head-on collision and virtually nothing of what happened afterwards.
Trooper Elmer Roloff of the Washington State Patrol, arriving at the scene about 70 minutes after the collision, said that he interviewed the defendant in the hospital October 19th, 3 days later, and, referring to their conversation, he testified:
As near as I can recall, he stated he had gotten up around noon; that he had his breakfast or lunch; that he had been in the vicinity of Naselle most of the afternoon. That he had consumed five bottles of beer plus one drink of whiskey; that he had attempted to visit his son, who was with his ex-wife in Chinook; that he had this accident. . . . He said his automobile was fine mechanically. He didn’t know of anything that was wrong with it. . . . He said he saw the lights of the oncoming car and that they did not bother him.
The officer also said that defendant told him he had not eaten dinner that evening, but defendant testified he had no *762recollection of such a conversation. Defendant testified that he had had a total of two bottles of beer all of that day preceding the accident and no whiskey. Defendant suffered a fractured jaw, a throat laceration and a broken arm.
All physical evidence at the scene as observed by Trooper Roloff showed the accident took place in Miss Oja’s southbound lane of traffic. None of it indicated the accident could have been in defendant’s northbound lane. Trooper Roloff said each vehicle suffered heavy and practically identical damage to the left front end, and that the right front headlight and fender of each car was unscathed. Radiators, batteries and everything else were smashed. Debris, consisting of dirt, parts of the grill work and battery parts, all were found in the southbound lane and none in defendant’s northbound lane. The officer described a large gouge mark in the pavement made by the collapsed left front suspension of the Oja car when it fell to and scraped along the highway as it was driven backward by the force of the impact. This gouge mark was entirely in the Oja southbound lane.
Patricia Oja, the driver, testifying that she remained conscious after the accident, said she was always in her own southbound lane and described the impact in her testimony:
I saw the headlights of a car coming in the distance. I knew there was a car coming. The next thing I knew he was right in front of us and hit us.
She repeated that, “He was just right square in front of me too.”
Obviously the proof showed a head-on collision, with substantial evidence to support a finding that the defendant was driving on the wrong side of the center line.
The prosecuting attorney for Pacific County filed two counts of negligent homicide against defendant under RCW 46.61.520 (a recodification of Laws of 1961, ch. 12, § 46.56.040, p. 381), which states:
(1) When the death of any person shall ensue within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the *763driving of any vehicle by any person while under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs or by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner or with disregard for the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide by means of a motor vehicle.
Defendant’s main contentions of error are directed to the information and the court’s interpretation of the negligent homicide statute. Each count, the first relating to the death of Sally L. Oja, and the second to Suoma Oja, sets forth the three methods described in the statute, alleging that the defendant caused the deaths in that he “did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously operate his motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or in a reckless manner, or with disregard for the safety of others on Public Highway 401.”
At the close of plaintiff’s case, the trial court granted defendant’s motion for a dismissal of (1) driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and (2) driving in a reckless manner. The jury by its verdict, therefore, found the defendant guilty of the remaining charge in each count of negligent homicide, i.e., by driving a motor vehicle “with disregard for the safety of others on Public Highway 401.” Defendant appeals the judgment and sentence entered on the verdict of 20 years’ confinement on each count, the terms to run concurrently.
The assignments of error center upon the giving of one instruction and the refusal to give another, but the basic point in issue is whether, under the negligent homicide statute, the phrase “with disregard for the safety of others” is included in the offense of driving in a reckless manner and, when the court dismissed the reckless driving charge, did it thereby necessarily dismiss the charge of driving with disregard for the safety of others. Defendant argues that our statute defines but two and not three ways of committing negligent homicide, i.e., (1) driving while under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, and (2) operating in a reckless manner or with disregard for the safety of others.
*764Arguments on appeal concerning these issues came before the trial court with reference to instruction No. 6 which the trial court gave as follows:
As to the charge in the Information, to operate a motor vehicle with disregard for the safety of others, means just what the words imply.
and defendant’s requested instruction No. 6, which the court refused, as follows:
As to the third charge in the information, to operate a motor vehicle with disregard for the safety of others means what the words imply, such a disregard of consequences as to evince or show a willingness to perpetrate injury to another or to take known chances of so doing.
The negligent homicide statute has been on the books since 1937, being first enacted in Laws of 1937, ch. 189, § 120, p. 911 (7A Rem. Rev. Stat. § 6360-120), and subsequently re-enacted in identical language in Laws of 1961, ch. 12, § 46.56.040, p. 381, and Laws of 1965, Ex. Ses., ch. 155, § 63, p. 2314 (RCW 46.61.520). Since 1937, the same language has been construed and applied in a number of cases and in this appeal leaves us with the question of whether it denounces but two rather than three kinds of driving derelictions. Necessarily included in the problem is whether, without a request to do so, the court was bound to instruct the jury that ordinary negligence under the circumstances was insufficient to sustain a conviction.
Adverting to first things first, we note that the plain language of the statute appears to define three distinct ways of committing the offense: (1) Driving while under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs; (2) driving in a reckless manner; and (3) driving with disregard for the safety of others.
In State v. Partridge, 47 Wn.2d 640, 289 P.2d 702 (1955), this court made a comprehensive review of the principal cases dealing with the negligent homicide statute, and, after trying to reconcile some seemingly irreconcilable comments, gave what now appears to be as definitive a statement as the statute is susceptible of. We said, in Par*765tridge, that the statute defines not two, but three separate ways of committing negligent homicide:
The elements of that crime are: death within one year as the result of the operation of a motor vehicle by any person while (1) under the influence of or affected by intoxicating liquor or narcotic drugs, or (2) by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner, or (3) with disregard for the safety of others. (Italics ours.) State v. Partridge, supra, at 645.
Partridge also clarified the law on another point pertinent to the instant case by requiring something more than mere negligence to sustain a conviction. Although we had earlier said in State v. McDaniels, 30 Wn.2d 76, 190 P.2d 705 (1948), in a prosecution for negligent homicide, “[I]t is not necessary that the state prove gross negligence on the part of the accused; proof of ordinary negligence is sufficient to support a conviction. State v. Stevick, 23 Wn. (2d) 420, 161 P. (2d) 181,” the Partridge case recedes from this position and holds that ordinary negligence is insufficient. Referring directly to the negligent homicide statute, in Partridge we said, at 645: “We are satisfied that a finding of ordinary negligence is not sufficient to support a conviction under the act.”
Our study of negligent homicide statutes shows RCW 46.61.520 to be unique among the states. Research has disclosed no other statute couched in indentical language. This gives the Partridge case an even weightier than ordinary impact for it represents the last definitive statement of this court on the interpretation of a statute which, although dealing with a subject matter common to all states of the Union, is phrased in language peculiar to this jurisdiction. Thus, we have no major or minor views to turn to as an aider in interpretation and, accordingly, think it best to adhere to the Partridge rationale.
As Partridge says, ordinary negligence will not support a conviction of negligent homicide. And if one drives a motor vehicle upon the public highways with disregard for the safety of others, this implies an aggravated kind of negligence or carelessness, falling short of recklessness but *766constituting a more serious dereliction than the hundreds of minor oversights and inadvertences encompassed within the term “negligence.” Every violation of a positive statute, from a defective taillight to an inaudible horn may constitute negligence under the motor vehicle statutes, yet be unintentional, committed without knowledge, and amount to no more than oversight or inadvertence but would probably not sustain a conviction of negligent homicide. To drive with disregard for the safety of others, consequently, is a greater and more marked dereliction than ordinary negligence. It does not include the many minor inadvertences and oversights which might well be deemed ordinary negligence under the statutes.
Accordingly, it was not error for the court, in instruction No. 6, to instruct that “to operate a motor vehicle with disregard for the safety of others, means just what the words imply.” But in the absence of a specific request for such an instruction, the court was not obliged to go beyond the language of the statute and declare that to drive with disregard for the safety of others also means a negligence greater than ordinary negligence. Defendant not having requested such an instruction to that effect, it was not error to omit such an instruction.
That there was evidence to support a conviction of driving with disregard for the safety of others is apparent. There was evidence that showed defendant to be driving at 45 to 50 miles per hour on a dark, wet, but well-marked highway, rounding a sweeping curve on the wrong side of the road at night, into a head-on collision with an oncoming car; it is clear from this proof that the jury was warranted in concluding he was then driving with disregard for the safety of others.
We have considered defendant’s requested instruction amplifying the court’s instruction No. 6, but find it is not a correct statement of the law and was properly refused.
Affirmed.
Hill, Weaver, and Hunter, JJ., and Denney, J. Pro Tem., concur.