I dissent. The majority opinion concedes not only that plaintiffs failed to present a claim to the Building and Loan Commissioner pursuant to section 13.16 of the Building and Loan Association Act (Deering’s Gen. Laws, Act 986) but that under a proper construction of the act' they could not be regarded as investors excused from presenting claims since their claims did not appear on the books of the association. Plaintiffs are thus allowed to recover without complying with the statutory conditions to recovery. I do not agree that this paradox is compelled by the doctrine of the law of the case.
The first appeal in this action involved the sufficiency of the allegations of plaintiffs’ second amended complaint. The present appeal involves the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings and judgment. The opinion of the District Court of Appeal on the first appeal sets forth that paragraph III of the second amended complaint alleged that plaintiffs were investors within the meaning of section 13.16 of the Building and Loan Association Act (Deering’s Gen. Laws, Act 986). It appears that defendants contended that there was an inconsistency between the specific allegation of paragraph X of the second amended complaint that plaintiffs exchanged their interests for shares of stock in the *492State Capital Company, and the general allegations of paragraph III, and that the specific allegation was controlling. (Little v. Union Oil Co., 73 Cal.App. 612 [238 P. 1066] ; Aitken v. Stewart, 129 Cal.App. 38 [18 P.2d 988].) The court declared that this contention would be persuasive if there were no other facts involved. “But there are many other allegations. The plaintiffs alleged that by the fraudulent representations of the defendant corporation they were induced to exchange securities, issued by the defendant corporation, for securities of State Capital Company, an agent of said defendant; that such exchange was not based on any consideration moving from plaintiffs to defendant; that the defendant corporation still holds the securities which the plaintiffs delivered to it; and that all of said facts appear on the hooks and records of said defendant. [Italics added.] In other words they alleged in effect that there was merely an exchange in form but not in fact, and that the transaction was a mere change in form of accounts between the plaintiffs and the corporate defendant. Manifestly if these allegations are true, and the defendants’ motions admitted the truth thereof, it is clear the plaintiffs are and at all times have been ‘investors’ in the defendant corporation. We are unable to say, therefore, that the plaintiffs’ complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (40 Cal. App.2d 374, 378-379 [104 P.2d 851].)
It is clear from the foregoing that the second amended complaint was held to state a cause of action not simply because of the alleged fraud, but because all the facts showing the fraud and showing the exchange to be without consideration and merely an exchange in form, appeared on the books and records of the defendant. This allegation that all such facts appeared on the books and records of defendant relates to the terms of section 13.16 that an investor need not present a claim with respect to “ any claim shown by the books of the association to exist in his favor against the association.” Nothing in the record, however, indicates that such facts appeared on defendant’s books and records. The books of the defendant association showed that plaintiffs ceased to be certificate holders in the association between 1929 and 1931. The books of the State Capital Company showed that at about the same time plaintiffs became stockholders in that company. Plaintiffs do not state the nature of their action, *493but whether it is an action for rescission, for damages, or to quiet title, the claims asserted did not appear upon the books and records of the association. They are therefore barred by the provisions of the Building and Loan Association Act relating to the presentation of claims in liquidation.
The majority opinion does not rest with its interpretation of the opinion of the District Court of Appeal but extends the doctrine of the law of the case to issues that were not considered in that opinion. In the present appeal defendants contend that plaintiffs’ rights are barred by the statute of limitations. The majority opinion holds that since the availability of this defense was established by the pleadings, the District Court of Appeal determined that the statute was inapplicable by holding the pleadings sufficient even though that court did not mention the statute. It has long been settled in this state, however, that only issues considered in the earlier opinion become the law of the case. (Trower v. City and County of San Francisco, 157 Cal. 762, 765 [109 P. 617] ; Tally v. Ganahl, 151 Cal. 418, 421 [90 P. 1049] ; Central Nat. Bank v. Peck, 15 Cal.App.2d 512 [59 P.2d 599]; see Moore v. Trott, 162 Cal. 268, 273 [122 P. 462]; Mattingly v. Pennie, 105 Cal. 514 [39 P. 200, 45 Am. St. Rep. 87]; Cowell v. Snyder, 171 Cal. 291, 297 [165 P. 920]; Klauber v. San Diego Street Car Co., 98 Cal. 105, 107 [32 P. 876].) With two exceptions, the cases relied upon in the majority opinion involved res judicata, and the rule announced in relation to that doctrine has no application to the doctrine of the law of the case. The first of the two cases not concerned with res judicata, Texas Co. v. Moynier, 137 Cal.App. 112 [29 P.2d 873], holds merely that when a judgment is reversed with directions, the trial court must follow the directions. In the second, People v. Walton, 10 Cal.App.2d 413 [51 P.2d 1117], the court disposed of a question on the merits, noting that the opinion on a previous appeal had reached the same result. The doctrine of res judicata does not require a court to decide a case on an erroneous basis, as the law of the case does, and is therefore not so narrowly applied. (Allen v. Bryant, 155 Cal. 256, 258 [100 P. 704]; see England v. Hospital of Good Samaritan, 14 Cal.2d 791, 795 [97 P.2d 813]; 2 Cal.Jur. 947.) It is designed to make a judgment the final determination of a lawsuit by precluding the parties from presenting the same cause anew even when they have additional arguments. The *494decision that is the law of the case, however, is made in anticipation of further litigation, and is intended not as a final determination of the rights of the parties but as a guide upon retrial. It does not foreclose the consideration of new legal issues arising from changes in the evidence or pleadings (Cowell v. Snyder, supra; Bayer v. Barrett, 127 Cal.App. 305 [15 P.2d 801]; 5 C.J.S. 1508; 2 Cal.Jur. 951), and there is no reason why it should foreclose the presentation of issues not previously considered.
Schauer, J., concurred.