by information was charged with the crime of escape, in that on or about the 8th day of May, 1942, he “did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously escape from the Wayside Honor Farm,” while confined therein as a prisoner having theretofore been convicted of a violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code, a felony. Appellant entered Ms plea of not guilty to the charge, waived a jury trial and upon stipulation the testimony taken at the preliminary *611hearing was admitted in evidence on behalf of the People. No evidence was offered by appellant. Thereafter the court' found appellant guilty of the offense, as charged in the information, and sentenced him to the State Prison at San Quentin for the term prescribed by law.
Although represented by counsel at the trial, appellant prosecutes this appeal from the judgment in propria persona, and has filed a brief which fails to raise a question of law. Nevertheless, because of the peculiar circumstances surrounding the ease, some discussion seems necessary in order to explain the conclusion reached by this court.
The record reveals that in March, 1942, appellant was convicted of a violation of section 503 of the Vehicle Code, a felony, but the trial court, instead of sentencing appellant to the state prison, imposed the alternative sentence of one year in the county jail, as permitted by the terms of section 503, supra. By such action, appellant’s crime was thereby reduced or changed from a felony to a misdemeanor, pursuant to the terms of section 17 of the Penal Code, to wit: “A felony is a crime which is punishable with death or by imprisonment in the state prison. Every other crime is a misdemeanor. When a crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, is also punishable by fine or imprisonment in a county jail, in the discretion of the court, it shall he deemed a misdemeanor for all purposes after a judgment imposing a punishment other than imprisonment in the state prison.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, when appellant on May 8, 1942, made his escape from the Wayside Honor Farm, to which he had been transferred from the county jail, he was serving a sentence for a misdemeanor.
Prior to this, to wit, on February 14, 1942, the case of In re Ramirez, 49 Cal.App.2d 709 [122 P.2d 361], in a well-reasoned opinion, held that section 4532 of the Penal Code relating to escapes had reference only to those persons convicted of felonies, and did not apply to a person theretofore convicted of a misdemeanor.
Although he made his escape from the Wayside Honor Farm on May 8, 1942, the information based on section 4532, « supra, charging appellant with the crime of escape was not filed until the following December (1942)." Meanwhile, the Supreme Court on October 30, 1942, in the case of In re Halcomb, 21 Cal.2d 126 [130 P.2d 384] and companion cases, dis*612approved the holding in the Bamirez case and decided that section 4532, supra, applied to escapes by persons convicted of misdemeanors, as well as of felonies. (See, also, People v. Smillie, 55 Cal.App.2d 381 [130 P.2d 714].)
Since this court is bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Halcomb case, we are under the necessity of affirming the judgment of the trial court.
For the reasons stated, the judgment is affirmed.