(dissenting): It is my opinion this court decided State v. Wilson, 169 Kan. 220 P. 2d 121, wrongly irrespective of whether it considered the point now raised or not. The precise contention now made in the instant case was not presented, urged or argued in the Wilson case. Moreover, it was not mentioned in the petition for rehearing.
In any event I am in complete accord with statements in the Wilson case to the extent that it was the legislative intent to prohibit the possession of alcoholic liquor on premises by a person licensed to retail cereal malt beverages thereon.
The only question, in my opinion, is what penalty did the legislature intend to prescribe for the violation of such prohibition? The question is not whether this court believes possession of alcoholic liquor under the circumstances stated should have been made a misdemeanor. Our only function is to ascertain the legislative intent and to make it effective if'reasonably possible to do so.
Careful consideration of the question presented convinces me the legislature deliberately selected the penalty it desired to impose for violation of the act charged and that such penalty was only revocation of the license to sell cereal malt beverages.
*265Assuming, however, such an interpretation is subject to doubt there is another reason which compels an affirmance of the district court. It is that a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of a citizen charged with the commission of a crime. In order to make an act criminal the statute must at least be sufficiently clear to preclude the necessity of resorting to speculation and conjecture in determining whether the legislature intended to declare an act criminal. The statutes here involved, in my opinion, cannot be said to reasonably conform to this established rule. Entertaining these views it is my duty and desire to rectify my own error at the first opportunity.
Smith and Price, JJ., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.